A.G. Noorani - The Muslims of India: A Documentary Record (Oxford India Collection)

W hen India was partitioned into two states, India and Pakistan, on the attainment of independence from British rule, on 15 August 1947, the Muslims of India found themselves facing the same traumatic change which confronted their forbears ninety years ago at the time of the Mutiny in 1857. Radical change in the political order, amidst bloodshed and carnage, was accompanied with threat to old ways of living. Its dimensions they could only dimly perceive, its reality shook them. They feared the worst. As in 1857, their loyalty to the new state was suspect. They felt helpless and forlorn as they experienced distrust and hostile discrimination in their daily lives.

But there was a big difference between the two situations. The late nineteenth century threw up leaders of high staturemen of remarkable intellectual equipment, cultural attainment, strength of character, and commitment. They had capacity for leadership and were ready to plunge themselves in politics and provide the leadership which the community sorely needed.

In 1947, the Muslims of India found themselves leaderless. Those in whom they had, till the day before, reposed confidence, went to Pakistan. The ones who remained had none of the qualities of Syed Ahmed Khan, Ameer Ali, or Badruddin Tyabji. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, their peer in most respects, demonstrated within months after the partition that his were the gifts of scholarship, even political wisdom and insight, but not of political leadership, still less of organization. Far smaller men came to the fore to grab the mantle of leadership and left imprints which the community has not been able to erase completely.

Bereft of determined and wise leadership, the Muslims of India took a wrong turn in 194849 and found themselves confused. Some treaded along the cul-de-sac of political mobilization for redress of grievances which shows no signs of lessening. The mobilization had been mostly on a commercial basis. Others found themselves largely ineffective in secular parties; not least because of their own inadequacies. On their part, the political parties reckoned that too strident an espousal of the Muslims cause might cost them support from the majority community and doom them to marginalization, if not extinction. The dilemma could be resolved only by a concerted effort by both sides; the Muslims should participate actively in all fields of national endeavour, striving to put to rest memories of an unhappy past, while the secular parties should assist them in this effort and make redressal of Muslims grievances part of a wider campaign for eradication of social wrong and economic deprivation.

Things went wrong soon after the partition. Experience even during the British rule amply demonstrated that by themselves constitutional safeguards are hopelessly inadequate. They need political underpinning. If protection was no help, partition was no solution to the problem, rather it aggravated it. Participation in public life alone, in its entire range of activities, provides hope. The deepening divide between Hindus and Muslims was attributed to separate electorates which the Lucknow Pact between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League endorsed in 1916. It held sway till the partition of India in 1947. But a vital aspect of the pact was neglected. It secured the Muslim Leagues acceptance of a whole set of proposals for substantial advance in responsible government. Protection of minorities was linked to their participation in the countrys march towards freedom. Years later, two socialist leaders, Asoka Mehta and Achyut Patwardhan, made an important point: While the Muslims gained substantial weightage, they gave up their right to vote in the General Constituencies that they had enjoyed so long. In dropping it, they lost an important leverage and began to isolate themselves from the rest of India.

The Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms (1918), jointly authored by the Secretary of State for India, Edwin S. Montague, and Viceroy Lord Chelmsford, criticized the Lucknow Pact but acquiesced in it, because it represented an inter-communal accord.