Wendy J. Schiller - Partners and Rivals: Representation in U.S. Senate Delegations

PARTNERS AND RIVALS

REPRESENTATION IN
U.S. SENATE DELEGATIONS

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Copyright 2000 by Princeton University Press

Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540

In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Chichester, West Sussex

All Rights Reserved

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 99-069513

ISBN 0-691-04886-X (cloth : alk. paper).

ISBN 0-691-04887-8 (pbk. : alk. paper).

eISBN 978-0-691-22391-9

www.pup.princeton.edu

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T HERE ARE many individuals to whom I owe a great deal of thanks for supporting this project. Because they are geographically dispersed, I shall name them by their place of origin. My colleagues at Brown University have provided enormous support, especially Darrell West, who has offered his valuable advice and criticism at every single stage of this book. He is what every academic mentor should aspire to be.

In my parallel universe, Washington, D.C., Michael Baker, Sarah Binder, Dorian Freidman, Bob Katzmann, Curtis Kelley, Frances Lee, Matt Levine, Forrest Maltzman, Mark Patterson, Steve Porter, Jordana Schwartz, and Kent Weaver provided round-the-clock intellectual and moral support.

Among my fellow Congress jocks and jockettes, and those in other assorted subfields of political science, I am especially grateful to Douglas Arnold, Larry Bartels, Bill Bianco, Larry Evans, Dick Fenno, Corinna-Barbara Francis, Fiona McGillivray, Bruce Oppenheimer, Marsha Pripstein, Elaine Swift, and Eric Uslaner for their steadfast support of my work.

Brown University and the Howard Foundation provided the financial support that made this project possible. I also wish to thank Thomas Mann and the Brookings Institution for allowing me to invade their space once again. For their hard work and toil as research assistants, I also want to thank Shalisha Francis, Jill Frankfort, Sara Goldreich, and Kevin Johnson. I would also like to thank the editorial staff at Princeton University Press for all their hard work.

Finally, to the Bennett, Friedman, Miller, and Schiller clans, words do not do justice to the tremendous support I get from having a family like ours.

PARTNERS AND RIVALS

INTRODUCTION

Pilfering laugh lines is a public speaking practice that goes back at least to Demosthenes. Most perpetrators escape unscathed, but occasionally one does not. A month ago in New York City, Senator Alfonse DAmato heard his Democratic colleague, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, respond to a laudatory introduction with this line: Lyndon Johnson used to say, I wish my mother and father could have heard that introduction. My mother would have believed it, and my father would have enjoyed it. Three weeks later before a different audience, Senator Moynihan used the same opening with success and left before Senator DAmato arrived. The Republican began his remarks, obliviously: I wish my mother and father could have heard that introduction. My mother would have believed it, and my father would have enjoyed it. The audience collapsed with laughter. One member said later: I think DAmato still believes he was a smash.

(Francis X. Clines and Warren Weaver, Jr.,
Who Laughs Last)

C OMPETING FOR good opening remarks at constituent events is just one of many ways in which senators from the same state present obstacles to each other in building successful Senate careers. The United States Senate is one of the few legislative institutions in American politics that has two legislators for the same geographic district. From a representational standpoint, we should expect to see senators from the same state representing similar issue areas and economic interests in their legislative portfolios. From an electoral standpoint, we might also expect to see senators addressing similar issuesif they are perceived to be popular among votersbecause they each seek a majority voting coalition in the state. For example, senators from Nebraska, a heavily agricultural state, should both be expected to address farm interests. Senators from the same state should also be expected to respond equally to an overriding policy concern in that state; for example, both senators from Texas should make immigration a primary focus of their legislative agendas.

However, what we actually observe is that senators from the same state do not build legislative agendas based on similar issues and interests; on the contrary, they build very distinct and separate legislative agendas on which they base much of their reputation as senators, regardless of same- or split-party affiliation. We are therefore faced with the following puzzle: Why do senators who represent the same state, but who never compete for the same Senate seat, adopt distinct representational agendas?

The concept of dual representationtwo legislators sharing the same geographic constituencyis a vital and underappreciated component of legislative behavior in American politics. From the very first day they enter the Senate, senators face the constraint of having another colleague from the same state who has similar institutional opportunities to represent that state. Each senators decisions about voting, committee selection, bill sponsorship, amendments, media strategies, political contributions, and campaign behavior are made in the context of sharing the political stage with the other senator from their state. As will be shown throughout this book, senators from the same state join different committees, focus on different policy areas, and address different economic interests through bill and amendment sponsorship. Moreover, senators also adopt contrasting governing styles that are products of their own personal style, the political expectations in their state, and the existing reputation of the other incumbent senator.

The central argument of this work is that the incentive to differentiate within a Senate delegation is a combination of electoral incentives and institutional forces that push senators in contrasting directions. Taking advantage of the particular blend of party, economic interests, and political culture within their state, each public official seeks to develop an identifiable niche, which helps attract media coverage and build the long-term reputation necessary for a successful political career. The behavior of each senator therefore shapes the range of state interests and opinions that are incorporated into federal policy-making. This goes to the heart of democratic decision-making. In assessing how well a senator represents his or her state, we often examine an individual senators voting record and try to match up that behavior with objective state interests or opinions. Inevitably, we conclude from such a test that there are constituents whose interests and opinions go unheeded by the senator. When we do that, though, we are setting up the senator for failure because no legislator can possibly address all the interests and opinions in a single state. Most important of all, a senator is not supposed to represent the majority constituent opinion on every issue because there is another senator who can also provide representation to the state. If we continue to measure Senate representation by examining just one-half of a Senate delegation, we will always produce incomplete results.

As an alternative, this book proposes to assess Senate representation from the perspective of the two senators from each state, each of whom works individually to craft a reputation and seek reelection, but who, when examined as a collective unit, attend to a wide spectrum of interests and opinions in their states. In doing so, this work moves beyond conventional approaches to measurement of representation by demonstrating how senators work within a multidimensional framework. This approach is key for those who believe that partisanship is the clearest signal of accurate representation. If scholars look only through the lens of partisanship, they can construct a majority constituent interest in each state when, in fact, no such majority exists. Subsequently, they might mistakenly conclude that constituents from a state where both senators share the same party affiliation would only be represented in the Senate if they shared that party affiliation.