First published 1996 by Westview Press
Published 2018 by Routledge
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Copyright 1996 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatin Data
Makovsky, David.
Making peace with the PLO: the Rabin governments road to the Oslo Accord / David Makovsky.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8133-2425-4 (hardcover).ISBN 0-8133-2426-2 (pbk.)
1. Jewish-Arab relations. 2. Israel-Arab conflicts. 3. Israel
Politics and government. 4. Palestinian ArabsPolitics and government. 5. Israel. Treaties, etc. Munaamat al-Tar
ir al-Filastiniyah, 1993 Sept. 13. 6. Rabin, Yitzhak1922 I. Title.
DS119.7.M253 1996
320.95694dc20
95-39631
CIP
ISBN 13: 978-0-8133-2426-5 (pbk)
The long, tortuous history of the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts has witnessed numerous tragic episodes, but rarely a moment as hopeful as the handshake between the leaders of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization on September 13, 1993. Though other emotions were palpable among the well-wishers and onlookers on the White House lawn that dayincluding heavy doses of anxiety and trepidationhope was the most powerful.
Indeed, could that moment have been frozen in time, a century of conflict that has left thousands dead and tens of thousands in mourning would be definitively over. Sadly, however, the conflict lives on and terror still claims the lives of innocents. But the accord signed between Israel and the PLO that day, along with the letters of mutual recognition that accompanied it, reshaped and redefined the conflict in fundamental ways.
This book offers the key element of the story behind that handshakehow and why the leaders of Israel abandoned a policy of rejecting the PLO as a terrorist gang bent on Israels destruction for a diplomatic approach founded on the belief that the PLO and its longtime leader, Yasser Arafat, were essential partners in the experiment of peacemaking.
Others will no doubt dissect the Palestinian side of the equation. In Making Peace with the PLO, award-winning journalist David Makovsky brings to bear years of experience as a correspondent for the Jerusalem Post and U.S. News and World Reportduring which he observed the mechanics of the Rabin government on a daily basisto analyze and explain the Israeli side of the peace process. Along the way he sheds new light on the often combustible mix of policy, politics, and personalities that defines the Israeli decision-making process.
Through scores of interviews with Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian, American, and Norwegian officials, Makovsky offers a glimpse inside the inner workings of a government during a period of intense national reckoning. From the decision to deport more than 400 Palestinian Islamic radicals to Lebanon in December 1992 to the popular closure of the West Bank and Gaza in March 1993 to the escalation against Hezbollah terrorism in Lebanon in July 1993, Makovsky presents a series of case studies in Israeli decision making that culminates with the historic breakthrough at Oslo.
Along the way, he sketches a political profile of Yitzhak Rabin and the narrow, Labor-led coalition he cobbled together following the election in June 1992. With an intimate knowledge of the Israeli political scene, Makovsky provides a primer on Rabinsoldier, strategist, politician, leaderthat is second to none. His focus on the prime minister is particularly important given the personalized nature of the Israeli political system, which lacks any equivalent to the U.S. National Security Council.
Millions of words have already been written about the path to the Israel-PLO accord, but true to journalistic form, Makovsky has unearthed a handful of scoops that confirm some well-known elements of the Oslo process while forcing a wholesale rethinking of others. Among the revealing items:
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres repeatedly blind-sided and circumvented Rabin, proposing numerous ideas to foreign leaders that went far beyond government policy. For example, Peres proposed to Egypt that Arafat take over Gaza and Jericho without ever having informed Rabin.
Rabin, however, was no Peres dupe; on the contrary, Makovsky offers convincing evidence that the prime minister was informed of the Oslo talks from virtually the first discussion among academics and became intimately and personally involved in the subsequent negotiations.
Domestic politicsnamely, the fear that Israels Labor-led coalition government might fall as a result of a corruption scandal unrelated to the peace processcompelled Rabin to conclude a deal in Oslo more quickly than he would have preferred.
U.S. officials blithely accepted Rabins dismissal of the PLO throughout the first half of 1993 and did not investigate numerous signs of clandestine Israel-PLO negotiations; largely, according to former Secretary of State James Baker, because they simply did not take Peres as seriously as they should have.
A key factor in Israels decision to strike the Oslo bargain was the PLOs repeated promise that they would subdue and control radical Islamic groups such as Hamas.
Contrary to popular perception, then IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak was privy to all Oslo-related documents throughout the negotiating process and, along with chief Israeli negotiator in Washington Elyakim Rubinstein, led the charge against cabinet ratification of the eventual agreement.
These and other special findings lend spice to Makovskys overall account of the Oslo process and provide a framework for drawing valuable and instructive lessons for the future of the peace process. His main contribution, however, lies elsewherein providing a dispassionate examination of a political system that revels in passionate debate. As much as anything, Israels behavior in the Oslo process provides a lens through which to view democracy at work. Through dogged reporting and deft analysis, Makovsky keeps that lens sharp and clear.
Robert B. Satloff, Executive Director
The Washington Institute
I would like to thank The Washington Institute for Near East Policy for providing me with the visiting fellowship that served as the basis for this project, and its executive director, Robert Satloff, for encouraging me to expand what was a short paper into a book. I would also like to thank the entire staff of the Institute for their help and for making me feel welcome during my stay.
There are two people without whom this book would not have been possible. As always, I am grateful to my uncle, Alan Makovsky, for his analytical insights and wisdom, and to John Wilner, who could not have been more helpful and generous with his support and patience. Wielding their respective pens, Alan and John brought clarity and shape to the book when needed.
