Lewis B. Namier - In the Margin of History (Essay index reprint series)

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Title: In the Margin of History

Date of first publication: 1939

Author: L. B. Namier, M.A. (1888-1960)

Date first posted: Oct. 16, 2014

Date last updated: Oct. 16, 2014

Faded Page eBook #201410D9

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IN THE

MARGIN OF HISTORY

BY

L. B. NAMIER, M.A.

Professor of Modern History in the University of Manchester

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED

ST. MARTINS STREET, LONDON

1939

COPYRIGHT

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

BY R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, EDINBURGH

Most of the essays in this book have beenprinted before, and are now republished with aminimum of change; in the case of the politicalessays their original dates should therefore benoted.

My best thanks are due to the editors, owners,and publishers for permission to reproduce theessays; to those of Palestine and Middle Eastfor the diagram on the Palestine VanishingTrick; to Sir Max Beerbohm for the cartoonof Count Berchtold and to Mr. SiegfriedSassoon who owns it; and to Flight-LieutenantR. G. Sims, R.A.F., for the photograph ofT. E. Lawrence.

L. B. NAMIER

15 Gloucester Walk

London , W.8

June 1, 1939

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JUDAICA

UNDER THE GEORGES

NAPOLEON

MEN WHO FLOUNDERED INTO THE WAR

T. E. LAWRENCE

There would be little to say about Diplomacy,Secret and Open, were it not for the nonsensewhich is talked about it. Diplomacy is theorganized system of negotiations between sovereignStates, and in its nature and methods doesnot differ essentially from other kinds of negotiations.As Lord Hervey wrote, two centuries ago,the transactions between men, great and small, are

still the same game, and played with thesame cards, the disparity in the skill ofgamesters in each equally great ... theonly difference is their playing more orless deep, whilst the cutting and shuffling,the dealing and the playing, is still thesame whether the stakes be halfpence ormillions.

But games are not played with open cards, andnegotiations, whether between States, businessfirms or individuals, can seldom, if ever, be conductedin public.

At the root of most of the nonsensetalked about secret diplomacy lies confusionbetween aims and methods, between policyand negotiations. The vital distinction betweenthe two is stressed by Mr. Harold Nicolson,one of the most articulate experts and best-informedwriters on diplomacy. Policy should besubjected to democratic control: the execution ofthat policy should be left to trained experts.Policy should never be, and need never be,secret; but the conduct of negotiations must beconfidential. In other words, what the public hasa right to know is the general trend of nationalpolicy and any binding commitments incurred inits name; while the decision as to the amountof information to be given out about negotiations,and the choice of time for doing so, must be leftto those entrusted with their conduct.

Publicity destroys the freedom of negotiations.Every word said in public is apt to commit thenegotiator. This makes him over-cautious andleaves little scope for tentative proposals. Couldeven a non-political treaty e.g. a commercialagreementbe discussed in public? At everyturn vested interests would be created whichwould hamper the further course of the negotiations.Still worse where frontiers are concerned:that between the Irish Free State and Ulsteradmits of obvious improvements; but all thoughtof such amendments, which could have been madeon a basis of give and take, had to be droppedbecause of the vested interests created by the treatyonce it was published. Those included in the Statein which they wish to be, even if less numerous,have a moral superiority in asserting the statusquo over those who would profit by a change.

In fact, premature publication, or exposure,is a well-known method of interfering with negotiations.When in the spring of 1919 an inter-AlliedCommittee suggested a frontier which would havesatisfied very nearly the maximum of Polish territorialclaims against Germany, their secret reportspeedily found its way into the French Press, itbeing hoped by those who committed the indiscretionthat the intense anti-German feeling in Alliedcountries would henceforth preclude any materialchange in the proposed frontier. There was agreat deal to be said for that frontier which gaveDanzig to the Poles, but not for the attempt toput pressure on what ought to have been a quasi-judicialbody, considering territorial claims in thelight of certain acknowledged principles; andthe attempts of decent negotiators to find justsolutions are seldom helped by public discussionand agitation. The fruit will be poor if prematurelyplucked by incompetent and irresponsiblehands, and orchards therefore require a reasonablemeasure of protection and seclusion.

There is a further, very important, reason whydiplomatic negotiations must be conducted insecret. Most nations are extremely touchy.National honour and national prestigewere a fetish in this country in the eighteenthcentury, and are still on the European Continent;and the less honour nations observe in practice,the more sensitive are they to anything whichmight seem to question what amount of it theypossess. The British and French Governmentsmust have repeatedly charged the Italians withbreach of faith in the matter of non-interventionin Spain, even before Mussolini proudly proclaimedit to the world, and must have hinted atwhat everyone knew about the nationality of thepirate submarines in the Mediterranean. But anysuch public pronouncement originating from ourside would have rendered further negotiationsimpossible.

Altogether, the veil thrown over a great deal ofdiplomatic transactions, in so far as this countryis concerned, often serves the purpose of hidingfrom the British public the bad manners andunreasonable nature of foreign Governments; inother words, it serves the interest of peace. Otherwisedamage is apt to occur. The Kruger telegram,which was a public act, is a case in point.It did serious and lasting harm to Anglo-Germanrelations and weighed heavily with public opinionin this country. But in diplomatic intercoursewith the Germans such incidents are by no meansrare. What reception would the Kaiser have receivedfrom the British public in 1899 had theyknown that he had refused to accept the invitationof his grandmother unless the British Governmentfirst gave way to his petulant and unreasonabledemands arising out of some obscure squabbles inSamoa? Again, had every step in the negotiationsfor a limitation of naval armaments beendisclosed to the British public, Sir EdwardGreys policy would have been fully justified intheir eyes, but further talks would have becomeimpossible.

Generally speaking, the public and the Pressare much more inflammable than professionaldiplomats, or even Cabinet Ministers, who haveto consider the consequences of blowing offsteam. Mr. J. A. Spender, an unimpeachablewitness, thus describes the position during theyears preceding the Great War: