Dag Henriksen - Natos Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999

The latest edition of this work has been brought to publication with the generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

2007 by Dag Henriksen

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

First Naval Institute Press paperback edition published 2007

ISBN 978-1-61251-555-7 (eBook)

The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:

Henriksen, Dag.

NATOs gamble : combining diplomacy and airpower in the Kosovo crisis, 1998-1999 / Dag Henriksen.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Operation Allied Force, 1999. 2. Kosovo (Serbia)HistoryCivil War, 1998-1999Aerial operations. 3. Kosovo (Serbia)HistoryCivil War, 1998-1999Participation, American. 4. United StatesArmed ForcesSerbia Kosovo.5. North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationArmed ForcesSerbiaKosovo. 6.United StatesHistory, Military20th century. 7. Intervention (International law) I. Title.

DR2087.5H46 2007

949.7103dc22

2007018427

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

All of the maps in this book were created by Christopher Robinson.

CONTENTS

A lthough writing this book has often been a somewhat lonesome mental voyage, I am very conscious of and immensely grateful to those who made this journey possible. Invaluable contributions were provided by a number of influential individuals who were willing to share their experiences and perspectives from the Kosovo crisis; to them I am forever grateful. My sincere gratitude goes to friends and colleagues at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, who have provided resources, backing, and advice to my work. Thanks also to the Naval Institute Press for believing in my project. I am indebted to my family and friends, who have been extremely patient with my often physical and sometimes mental lack of presence the past few yearsand particularly to my fiance, Anne Katrine, whose support has proved crucial both practically and emotionally. Thus, this book is dedicated to her.

Map 1. Operation Allied Force area of operation

O n 24 March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began an air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) that lasted for seventy-eight days until it formally ended on 10 June 1999. The air campaignpublicly known as Operation Allied Force (OAF)was the first war NATO had fought against any sovereign nation after its creation fifty years earlier, and for some of the Alliances smaller nationslike Norwayit was the first use of fighter aircraft in war since World War II. It was the first time a theater war of the size of OAF had been fought predominantly by airpower, with ground forces having been publicly ruled out of the operation from the outset. As such, it was arguably a war conceptually different from any other war throughout history.

When the most powerful military alliance in history entered its first war, no one in the military leadership of NATO had received any political guidance or developed any strategy for what the situation in Kosovo should be like after the war. In effect, NATO had not planned for the war it was about to start. It had inadequately planned for a loosely focused bombing campaign perceived to last a few days and was politically and militarily unprepared for the possibility that the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Miloevi, would continue to oppose NATO after that. As the French chief of defense, General Jean-Pierre Kelche, commented with regard to NATOs preparedness: It was no political direction in the beginningabsent. Gradually the military effort improved, but in the beginningit was a mess. Thus, the starting point for this book is to explain why NATO ended up being so unprepared.

When OAF commenced, the deteriorating situation in Kosovo had been the focus of the international community for about a year. With the killing and that airpower could provide diplomacy with the necessary credibility to achieve a negotiated solution to the mounting crisis. Thus, airpower almost immediately became the key ingredient in the international effort to solve the crisis.

After the 1991 Gulf War, which General Clark describes as airpowers persistent reference point, airpower promised a low-cost, low-risk statement of political intent and left open other more difficult and costly options. Combined with the perceived success of airpower in Bosnia in 1995, airpower seemed to many U.S. politicians and diplomats the preferable military tool to coerce an opponent. As Professor Michael Clark asserts, Airpower is frequently regarded as embodying the ultimate instrument of military coercion.

However, the Kosovo War was not like the Gulf War of 1991it was a humanitarian intervention by a military alliance resting on the political will of nineteen sovereign member nationsnations with differing perspectives, commitment, and interests. Without a UN authorization of force, and with NATO struggling to find consensus for a viable strategy to address the crisis in Kosovo, airpower appeared to provide political and military flexibilitythe room to maneuver that was so desperately sought.

As it turned out, airpower did not provide the immediate political leverage hoped for. Key individuals believed that two to four days of NATO bombing would suffice to alter the behavior of Slobodan Miloevias they believed NATO airpower had done in Bosnia in 1995, when Operation Deliberate Force had triggered the peace negotiations that resulted in the Dayton Peace Accords. In fact, it was a gamble, and as Lord David Owen rightly observed with regard to the chosen NATO strategy of relying on a few days of show of force in late March 1999, Their bluff was called by Miloevi. Thats what happened. Instead of a three-day operation, NATO ended up bombing the FRY, mainly Serbia, for seventy-eight days.

This book focuses primarily on how the international community combined diplomacy and airpower in the handling of the Kosovo crisis. It examines the key political, diplomatic, and military processes that shaped NATOs crisis management and how airpower was utilized as the key instrument in NATOs strategy to coerce the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to concede to its demands. It has been an ambition of mine to reveal the origins and content of NATOs strategic and conceptual thinking as to