Martin Van Creveld - The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz

Copyright 1991 by Martin van Creveld

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The Free Press
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Printed in the United States of America

printing number

13 15 17 19 20 18 16 14 12

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

van Creveld, Martin L.

The transformation of war / Martin van Creveld.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-02-933155-2

ISBN 978-0-0293-3-1552

eISBN 978-1-4391-8-8897

1. Military art and scienceHistory20th century. 2. Military art and scienceHistory19th century. 3. War. 4. World politics1945- 5. World politics1900-1945. 6. World politics19th century. 7. Military history, Modern20th century. 8. Military history, Modern19th century. I. Title.

U42.V36 1991

355.020904dc20 90-47093

CIP

The Transformation of War

To my children May they never have to fight

The present volume has a purpose; namely, to address some of the most fundamental problems presented by war in all ages: by whom it is fought, what it is all about, how it is fought, what it is fought for, and why it is fought. These questions are by no means new, and indeed merely to list the answers to them that have been given by various people at various times and places would be tantamount to a record of civilization. No doubt many readers will also regard some of these questions as too philosophical, even irrelevant to the practical business of waging war. However, it is axiomatic that no human activity can really take place, let alone be carried out successfully, without a thorough understanding of the principles involved. Therefore, finding correct answers to them is vitally important.

The present volume also has a messagenamely, that contemporary strategic thought about every one of these problems is fundamentally flawed; and, in addition, is rooted in a Clausewitzian world-picture that is either obsolete or wrong. We are entering an era, not of peaceful economic competition between trading blocks, but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups. Even as familiar forms of armed conflict are sinking into the dustbin of the past, radically new ones are raising their heads ready to take their place. Already today the military-power fielded by the principal developed societies in both West and East is hardly relevant to the task at hand; in other words, it is more illusion than substance. Unless the societies in question are willing to adjust both thought and action to the rapidly changing new realities, they are likely to reach the point where they will no longer be capable of employing organized violence at all. Once this situation comes about, their continued survival as cohesive political entities will also be put in doubt.

This work aims at providing a new, non-Clausewitzian framework for thinking about war, while at the same time trying to look into its future. Accordingly, its structure is as follows. Chapter I, Contemporary War, explains why modern military force is largely a myth and why our ideas about war have reached a dead end. Chapter II, By Whom War Is Fought, discusses the relationship between war, states, and armies, and a variety of other war-fighting organizations that are neither armies nor states. Chapter III, What War Is All About, examines armed conflict from the point of view of the interaction of might with right. Chapter IV, How War Is Fought, offers both a description and a prescription for the conduct of strategy at all levels. Chapter V, What War Is Fought For, investigates the various ends for which collective force can be, and has been, used. Chapter VI, Why War Is fought, constitutes an inquiry into the causes of war on the individual, irrational, level. Chapter VII, Future War, analyzes the probable forms of future war from all these points of view and offers some ideas on how it will be fought. Finally, there is a brief postscript called The Shape of Things to Come. Its task is to tie the strands together and outline the likely nature of war ten, twenty-five, or fifty years hence.

A book is written by a single person but reflects the contributions of many minds. Those involved in the present one include Moshe Ben David, Mats Bergquist, Menachem Blondheim, Marianne and Steve Canby, Seth Carus, Oz Fraenkel, Azar Gatt, Steve Click, Paula and Irving Glick, Eado Hecht, Ora and Gabi Herman, Kay Juniman, Benjamin Kedar, Greta and Stuart Koehl, Mordechai Lewy, Dalia and Edward Luttwak, Ronnie Max, Leslie and Gabriele Pantucci, Yaffa Razin, Stephanie Rosenberg, Joyce Seltzer, Darcy and David Thomas. For inspiration, friendship, hospitality, or all of these, thank you.

Jerusalem, April 1990

The Transformation of War

A ghost is stalking the corridors of general staffs and defense departments all over the developed worldthe fear of military impotence, even irrelevance.

At present, as during the entire period since World War II, perhaps four-fifths of the worlds military power is controlled by a handful of industrialized states: the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Between them these states spend over four-fifths of all military funds. They also originate, produce, and field a corresponding share of modern, high-tech, military hardware from tanks to aircraft and from Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to submarines. The armed forces of these states, particularly those of the two superpowers, have long served the rest as models and, indeed, as standards by which they evaluate themselves.

The principal military states also own perhaps 95 percent of all military expertise, if that can be measured by the number of publications on the subject. They have even managed to turn that expertise into a minor export commodity in its own right. Officers belonging to countries which are not great military powers are regularly sent to attend staff and war colleges in Washington, Moscow, London, and Paris, often paying through the nose for the privilege. On the other hand, the principal powers themselves have sent thousands upon thousands of military experts to dozens of third-world countries all over Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

The above notwithstanding, serious doubt exists concerning the ability of developed statesboth such as are currently liberating themselves from communist-domination and such as are already freeto use armed force as an instrument for attaining meaningful political ends. This situation is not entirely new. In numerous incidents during the last two decades, the inability of developed countries to protect their interests and even their citizens lives in the face of low-level threats has been demonstrated time and time again. As a result, politicians as well as academics were caught bandying about such phrases as the decline of power, the decreasing utility of war, andin the case of the United Statesthe straw giant.

So long as it was only Western society that was becoming debellicized the phenomenon was greeted with anxiety. The Soviet failure in Afghanistan has turned the scales, however, and now the USSR too is a club member in good standing. In view of these facts, there has been speculation that war itself may not have a future and is about to be replaced by economic competition among the great trading blocks now forming in Europe, North America, and the Far East. This volume will argue that such a view is not correct. Large-scale, conventional warwar as understood by todays principal military powersmay indeed be at its last gasp; however, war itself, war as such, is alive and kicking and about to enter a new epoch. To show that this is so and why it is so is the task of the chapter at hand.