Joseph M. Siracusa - Presidential Doctrines: U.S. National Security from George Washington to Barack Obama

Presidential Doctrines

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

Lanham Boulder New York London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Siracusa, Joseph M., author. | Warren, Aiden, author.

Title: Presidential doctrines : U.S. national security from George Washington to Barack Obama / Joseph M. Siracusa and Aiden Warren.

Description: Lanham, Maryland : Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016012244 (print) | LCCN 2016022560 (ebook) | ISBN 9781442267473 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781442267480 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781442267497 (electronic)

Subjects: LCSH: United States--Foreign relations--Philosophy--History. | National security--United States--Philosophy--History. | National security--United States--History. | Strategic culture--United States--History. | Military doctrine--United States--History.

Classification: LCC JZ1480 .S5 2016 (print) | LCC JZ1480 (ebook) | DDC 355/.033573--dc23

TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

For our fathers

John Paul Siracusa

Michael John Warren

We would both like to thank our respective families in supporting us in this endeavor. Thank you so much for your love, patience, support, and encouraging words.

We also would like to thank Adam Bartley, our valued research assistant, for his fine work on this project.

Professor Joseph Siracusa and Dr. Aiden Warren

Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University, Melbourne

ABMT or ABM Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

ASIL American Society on International Law

AUMF authorization for the use of military force

CBW chemical and biological weapons

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

DMZ demilitarized zone

DOD Department of Defense

DOS Department of State

DOT Department of Treasury

DPRK Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

EDC European Defense Community

EU European Union

FOA Foreign Operations Administration

GLCM ground-launched cruise missiles

GOP Grand Old Party (the U.S. Republican Party)

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBMs intercontinental ballistic missiles

IMF International Monetary Fund

INF Treaty Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty

INR Department of States Bureau of Intelligence and Research

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

LTBT Limited Test Ban Treaty

MENWFZ Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone

MIRV Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle

NAS National Academy of Sciences

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIE National Intelligence Estimate

NLF National Liberation Front

NPR Nuclear Posture Review

NPT Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

NSC National Security Council

NSC 68 National Security Council Report 68

NSCWMD National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

NSS National Security Strategy

PRC Peoples Republic of China

ROK Republic of Korea

SAC Strategic Air Command

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative

SFRC Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

SORT (also the Moscow Treaty) Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

SSBN strategic submarine ballistic nuclear

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

U.N. United Nations

U.S. United States

U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WEU Western European Union

WMD weapons of mass destruction

American foreign policy has long been caught between conflicting desires to influence world affairs yet at the same time avoid becoming entangled in the burdensome conflicts and damaging rivalries of other states. With the term doctrine seemingly (re)attaining charged prominence in the early 21st century and, more recently, in regard to the many contested debates surrounding Obamas very own set of guidelines, this book will argue that the doctrinal thrust in articulating the United States foreign policy direction has long embodied the desire to maintain a balance of influence in meeting U.S. interests. This has necessitated attaining an equilibrium between domestic and international considerations, involvement and detachment from global security issues, unilateralism and multilateralism, interventionism and expansionism, and exceptionalism and hegemony. While some of these factors have been extensively discussed by historians, political scientists, and varying international relations commentators, much of the discourse on presidential doctrines has often been confined to research on singular doctrines. and ultimately explain considerations for both the present and future.

While the definitional debates surrounding presidential doctrines are wide and varied, there are many commonalities that commentators agree on. In the broadest sense, presidential foreign policy doctrines, like much of presidential rhetoric, have a defensive and explanatory component that serve to defend actions already underway or to persuade others to support new plans. Presidents articulate their foreign policy ideas in response to immediate political concerns, and their broader doctrinal significance becomes apparent years later. While not overly detailed in their explanation, Overholt and Chou argue that a rhetorical thematic message and defining strategic thread have been the common features in most, if not all, doctrines extending back to Washington, albeit delivered in varying fashion over the course of 44 presidents. For example, in specifically outlining the course of action in relation to Greece and Turkey and his broader position in containing communism, President Truman at the joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, called for the the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and outside pressures. Similarly, in his own controversial doctrine, George W. Bush concisely argued that [t]o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively in exercising its right of self-defense. In justifying the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively, Bush clearly positedand formalizedhis doctrinal penchant for prevention.