Ali Soufan - Anatomy of Terror: From the Death of bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State

N o book on this scale could be published at all without the hard work of dozens of dedicated individuals. Constraints of space and memory prevent me from mentioning everyone who contributed, but I trust they know the depth of my gratitude.

First and foremost, I must thank my collaborator throughout this project, A. J. Wilson, without whose intellect, persistence, and way with words this book would simply never have seen the light of day. His wife, Rachel Madan, deserves special mention for her forbearance through the long hours A.J. spent helping me make this book the best it could be.

At the Soufan Group, I am privileged to work every day alongside a staff of truly remarkable individuals. Each of them deserves my gratitude, but particular credit must go to Patrick Skinner, Richard Barrett, Martin Reardon, Michael Masters, Heidi Fink, Anita Waddell, Tim Rhein, and Sydney Black.

For their guidance over the course of this project, my thanks to Lawrence Wright, Howard Means, Umej Singh Bhatia, and Daniel Freedman. Their generous advice, backed by their decades of experience, infinitely strengthened the final product. Id also like to thank Jeff Nussbaum and the team at West Wing Writers for their support throughout the writing process.

Keeping abreast of developments on the ground in the Middle East can often prove extremely difficult, and I could not do so without the frequent assistance of my sources in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Although for obvious reasons I cannot name them here, I will be forever in their debt.

Special thanks must go to my agent, Andrew Wylie, without whom this book would never have made it off the ground; to my editor, Janet Byrne, who vastly improved the finished manuscript with her usual combination of skill and tenacity; and to Starling Lawrence and his all-star team at NortonSarah Bolling, Kyle Radler, Don Rifkin, and Nancy Palmquistwho believed in this project and gave their all to make it a success. Many of these individuals worked with me previously on The Black Banners; once again, they wowed me with their dedication and professionalism.

But above all, thanks to my wife, Heather, who continues to inspire me daily. My work may have become less challenging since my retirement from government service, but there has been no letup in my relentless schedule. It takes a very special person to accept this in a spouse year in and year out; luckily, Heather is such a person.

ALSO BY ALI SOUFAN

The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11
and the War Against al-Qaeda

ANATOMY

OF TERROR

From the Death of
bin Laden to the Rise of
the Islamic State

ALI SOUFAN

W. W. NORTON & COMPANY NEW YORK | LONDON

Independent Publishers Since 1923

So [Hercules] called for help on Iolaus [his charioteer] who, by setting fire to a piece of the neighboring wood and burning the roots of the [Hydras] heads with the brands, prevented them from sprouting. Having thus got the better of the sprouting heads, [Hercules] chopped off the immortal head, and buried it, and put a heavy rock on it, beside the road that leads through Lerna to Elaeus.

PSEUDO-APOLLODORUS, THE LIBRARY, BOOK 2, CHAPTER 5

O n the surface, it seemed I had a fair amount in common with the man sitting across the table from me. We were around the same age, both Arabs by birth, both Muslims, both well read in the scripture and literature of our faith. We had both been trained in counterinterrogation techniques, as his deft deflections of my questions made clear. Beyond that, our biographies diverged to such an extent that only in cosmological terms could we be said to live on the same planet. I was an FBI Special Agent, while Abu Jandal had once been the trusted bodyguard of Osama bin Laden. Needless to say, Jandal held rigid views on Islam, on America, and on the relationship between the two. He lectured me at length on each of these topics, and I let him talk. Then, a few days into our interview, I brought him a simple history, in Arabic, of the United States. Jandal was amazed; this self-described revolutionary had no inkling that Americathe main enemy in bin Ladenist demonologyhad itself been born in revolution. To him, it was simply some abstract placelike Hell, perhaps. Along with Israel, the United States was, for Abu Jandal, the epicenter of all evil.

It was now about a week after 9/11. Jandal had heard about the attacks, but only in the most general terms. I brought in a magazine, pointed to the horrific pictures of people throwing themselves out of the burning twin towers. Bin Laden did this, I said. Jandal scoffed. The photos, he said, looked like something out of a Hollywood action movie. Even if they were real, he insisted, the attacks must be the work of the perfidious Israelis. The sheikh is not that crazy, he said. But he no longer seemed convinced by his own words.

In its final report on the events of September 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission wrote:

The history, culture, and body of beliefs from which Bin Ladin shapes and spreads his message are largely unknown to many Americans. Seizing on symbols of Islams past greatness, he promises to restore pride to people who consider themselves the victims of successive foreign masters. He uses cultural and religious allusions to the Holy Koran and some of its interpreters. He appeals to people disoriented by cyclonic change as they confront modernity and globalization. His rhetoric selectively draws from multiple sourcesIslam, history, and the regions political and economic malaise.... Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism.

Since 9/11, and particularly since the Arab Spring, the threat has evolved. This book has chronicled that evolution and highlighted some of the important personalities who represent change or, conversely, continuity in the al-Qaeda movement. From this history, I draw several conclusions.

First, al-Qaeda and its progeny are remarkably resilient. In 1989, bin Laden left Afghanistan in disgrace when his rash miscalculation at the Battle of Jalalabad led to the deaths of thousands of Arab fighters. Seven years later, he was ejected from Sudan under international pressure. In 2001, after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, bin Laden and Zawahiri went on the run, while Saif al-Adel and other senior figures languished in an Iranian prison. Each time, al-Qaeda has seemed doomed to fail but has actually recovered and come back stronger. Instead of imploding after 9/11, it mutated to fit the new reality, becoming a series of franchises across North and East Africa and the Arab world, governed by an umbrella organization based in northern Pakistan. This new model has not only survived its founders death; it has expanded its membership exponentially. As expected, Ayman al-Zawhiri, struggling under his reputation as an interloper, has not proved a charismatic leader. Most notably, he was unable to keep the Islamic State in the fold (although it is by no means clear that bin Laden would have done any better in this regard). On the other hand, under Zawahiris leadership the remaining franchises have regenerated their capacity to carry out deadly terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has held and governed territory in Yemen. Meanwhile, al-Qaedas overall membership has grown exponentially, and the organization has successfully faced down challenges from the Islamic State and its international provinces.