Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich - The I in we: studies in the theory of recognition

First published in German as Das Ich im Wir Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin, 2010

This English edition Polity Press, 2012

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ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-5232-0

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This volume brings together a number of contributions to discussions over recent years on how to build upon the basic assumptions of a Hegelian theory of recognition. After initially outlining my interpretation of Hegel's approach in The Struggle for Recognition, I had my hands full correcting or further elucidating my position in response to various objections. In particular, a debate with Nancy Fraser and the Tanner Lectures at the University of California, Berkeley, offered welcome opportunities to give a more precise account of what were still vague considerations. many questions still remained unsolved. After all, the reason I had sought to reconstruct Hegel's theory of recognition was to garner insights that would not only allow a rethinking of the concept of justice, but also lead to a better account of the relationship between socialization and individuation, between social reproduction and individual identity formation. My diverse efforts to clarify this relationship over recent years are gathered in this volume. Apart from a few exceptions, the essays move along the margins of social philosophy, where normative questions can only be answered by taking into account the empirical undertakings of other, neighbouring disciplines.

Part I, however, contains two essays in which I return to essential elements of Hegel's practical philosophy. Whereas in The Struggle for Recognition I had still assumed that only Hegel's Jena lectures contained coherent elements of a theory of recognition, after more intensive study of his mature writings I came to realize how wrong I had been. I no longer believe that Hegel sacrificed his initial intersubjectivism in the course of developing a monological concept of spirit; rather, Hegel sought throughout his life to interpret objective spirit, i.e. social reality, as a set of layered relations of recognition. On the basis of this reassessment I sought to make Hegel's Philosophy of Right fruitful for the development of a theory of recognition. Expressed much more strongly than in his early writings is the groundbreaking notion that social justice is to be defined in terms of the requirements of mutual recognition, and that we must take our point of departure in historically developed and already institutionalized relations of recognition.) attempts to answer the difficult question of how we are to conceive of the internal connection between recognition and human freedom. According to my interpretation, Hegel creates this link by attempting to demonstrate to contemporary proponents of liberalism that it is only by taking part in institutionalized practices of individual self-restriction that we can experience our own will as being completely free.

In the essays that make up Part II, I attempt to further develop these Hegelian ideas in order to solve some central problems of contemporary theories of justice. The systematic framework for these approaches can be found in the first essay (), which was originally published as a preface to the German edition of his now classic monograph, The Principles of Social Justice. Here as well, I argue that if a theory of justice is to establish stronger ties to social reality, a Hegelian reconstruction of already established principles of recognition is crucial.

In Part III, which bears the relatively vague title Social and Theoretical Applications, I take the ideas described in the first two parts of the book and attempt to make them useful for explanatory purposes. Therefore, problems of sociological explanation, rather than normative questions, stand at the centre of these individual essays. It will soon become apparent, however, that when it comes to applying these ideas, there is no way of cleanly separating social facts from normative claims to validity. As soon as we follow Hegel and interpret relations of recognition as being constitutive for all of social reality, we must recognize that any explanation of social processes necessarily invokes prevailing norms and principles. Claims and demands, obligations and beliefs are just as much a part of reality as supposedly purely objective matters. The first chapter in this part (). Together with Martin Hartmann, I attempt to give a more detailed explanation of our interdisciplinary research on paradoxes in the development of contemporary capitalism. I do so by empirically illustrating the extent to which structural economic changes have transformed historically developed recognitional expectations into disciplinary demands on subjects. In the context of this book, however, both of these more sociological essays can only give some initial indications of what a recognition-theoretical diagnosis of the present would have to look like.

Part IV picks up a theoretical issue that I have left almost entirely untouched since the publication of The Struggle for Recognition.), especially the discussion of the work of my friend Joel Whitebook, represent attempts to defend my own, recognition-theoretical interpretation of psychoanalysis against the obvious objection that I have neglected destructive, antisocial drives.

I wish to thank Stephan Altemeier and Frauke Khler for technical assistance in completing the book. Their calm and care ensured that the scattered essays could be put into a unified and systematic form. Eva Gilmer at Suhrkamp once again provided excellent advice in compiling the various chapters. Finally, I wish to thank the translator, Joseph Ganahl, for his loyal service over the years and for ensuring that this volume could appear in English that is both readable and true to the content.