Joseph Dietzgen - Excursions of a Socialist into the Domain of Epistemology

The subject of the following articles seems to have so little in common with Social-Democracy that their publication as part of the Social-Democratic Library necessitates a few words of explanation.

The theory of cognition with which these Excursions deal has for its subject-matter the question, how is the instrument in our head constituted which everybody has to use in order to gain knowledge of the natural and human conditions which surround him, to distinguish, judge and understand them.

An instrument which everybody possesses and uses may be called a democratic instrument. The intellect is common to all men and, therefore, is a concern of the community or society, a Social-Democratic instrument, a Social-Democratic concern. If Bismarck uses his instrument differently from Social-Democrats we are convinced that he makes a wrong use of his intellect.

Absolute unanimity we can never attain, yet progress in this direction is unmistakable. So also will the theory of cognition never exhaust its subject and render us infallible in the use of our mental powers; still we must not on that account renounce improvement. Social-Democracy, too, is strenuously working with the view of making the minds more unanimous; consequently a well-founded theory of cognition can only be of value to it.

As I say, the theory of cognition deals with the question of how our instrument of thinking is constituted. By learning the nature of it we learn at the same time the use of it. Although the nature and the use of a thing may be regarded as two separate things, it is none the less permissible to coalesce them into one. In my opinion only that person is able to understand the nature of a violin who knows thoroughly how to play it who knows what there is in it and what is to be done to bring it out of it.

That men, with their instrument of thinking, have judged correctly, thought correctly and discriminated exactly without knowing anything of epistemology is, of course, unquestionable. The farmer knows how to grow potatoes without having attended an agricultural college. Yet one cannot but admit that science makes even the farmer more intelligent in his work. It teaches him how to predetermine the results of his work. If he still remains, in spite of his predetermination, at the mercy of wind and weather, yet it cannot be denied that science gives him the means to control Nature to a certain extent. Absolutely free he will never be; science and reflection cannot help him to sovereign power, still they help him. If we cease to be slaves of Nature we shall nevertheless ever remain her servants. Knowledge can only give the possible freedom which is at the same time the only rational one.

And so the instrument which is analysed in the following pages is used by everyone at every opportunity. Nothing is so general and universal in the world of man as perception, discrimination, judgment, knowledge, etc. The theory of cognition must, therefore, be regarded as an elementary study, as the Alphabet, but in a higher sense. A trained intellect goes farther than the art of reading and writing. The celebrated Spinoza already left us an opuscule on the Improvement of Understanding and it is to be regretted that his work has been left incomplete. And it is nothing less than the improvement of this instrument that we aim at in the present Excursions into the domain of the theory of cognition.

Whoever desires to be an intelligent Social-Democrat must improve his method of thinking. It was mainly the study of the improved method of thinking which helped the well-known founders of Social-Democracy, Marx and Engels, in raising Social-Democracy to a scientific standpoint on which it finds itself now. The improvement of the method of thinking is like every other improvement, a limitless problem, the solution of which must always remain unachieved. This, however, must in nowise keep us from striving after it. The only and natural way consists in increasing our general knowledge by mastering the special branches of science. Although the theory of cognition, by setting out to illuminate the lamp from which all light emanates, touches the desired enlightment of the human mind at its very source, we are nevertheless modest enough to acknowledge that such a theory, be it ever so perfect, is not sufficient. Though all special branches of science are conducive to that end, yet none of them is able to form the generalisation which could entirely illuminate the mind. This can only be achieved gradually, wherefore we shall be con tent if these Excursions will have contributed some thing to the general aim of science.

CHICAGO, December 15, 1886

J. DIETZGEN