Michael B. Gill - Humean Moral Pluralism

This book is pluralist in method as well as content. I examine historical texts, empirically grounded work in moral psychology, and intuitively supported conceptual arguments. I believe the resulting view is all the more plausible for being arrived at through a variety of approaches. Looking at the same issue through different lenses is also, to me at least, more interesting.

I am deeply grateful to the many friends and colleagues who helped me in this project. Special thanks go to Shaun Nichols, Mark Timmons, and Jenann Ismael, who discussed almost every aspect of this work with me innumerable times. Their feedback made the book much better than it would otherwise have been. Their company made it immeasurably more enjoyable to work on.

I have also received significant help from all of the following: Kate Abramson, Julia Annas, Rachel Cohon, Stephen Darwall, Remy Debes, Richard Dees, Sam Fleischacker, Jerry Gaus, Ryan Hanley, James Harris, Colin Heydt, Tom Holden, Terry Horgan, Rachana Kamtekar, David Owen, Eric Schliesser, David Schmidtz, and Elizabeth Radcliffe.

It used to be a relatively common practice to include in a books acknowledgements a statement along the lines of: Any flaws and errors herein are strictly my own, and not the responsibility of those who have helped me in the writing of this book. Such statements always struck me as irritatingly unnecessary. Of course the flaws and errors are yours! But now I find myself wanting to say the same thing. For on matters outside my field of expertise I have sought guidance from friends. Yet Im sure Ive still made mistakesof both commission and omission. So what I want to say is: those mistakes are present despite my friends efforts. They really did their best to try to get me to do better.

To Sarah, Hannah, and Jesse: thanks for filling my life with so many different things of value.

Chapter is based on my Humean Moral Pluralism, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 28 (2011): 4564.

Chapter is based on my Humean Sentimentalism and Non-Consequentialist Moral Thinking, Hume Studies,37 (2011): 16588.

Chapter is based on my Moral Pluralism in Smith and his Contemporaries, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 68 (2014).

are based on Michael B. Gill and Shaun Nichols, Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Topics, 18 (2008): 143-67.

Chapter is based on my Agonizing Decisions and Moral Pluralism, in Mark Timmons (ed.), Conduct and Character, 31729. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• D

  David . A Dialogue, in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Numeral denotes paragraph.

• E

  David . An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Numerals denote section and paragraph. The appendices from the Enquiry are referred to as App, with the numerals following denoting appendix number and paragraph.

• Essays

  David . Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

• History

  David . The History of England (based on 1778 edn). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Numerals denote volume and page.

• Letters

  David . The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig, i. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• T

  David Hume (173940/2002). A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Numerals denote book, part, section, and paragraph.

• TMS

  Adam . The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.