Harding - Moral Dilemmas and Ethical Reasoning

MORAL DILEMMAS AND ETHICAL REASONING

CAROL GIBB HARDING

EDITOR

First published 2010 by Transaction Publishers

Published 2017 by Routledge
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Copyright 1985 by Precedent Publishing, Inc.

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Library of Congress Catalog Number: 2010006150

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Moral dilemmas and ethical reasoning / [edited by] Carol Gibb Harding.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Previously published under title: Moral dilemmas, 1985.
ISBN 978-1-4128-1341-9 (alk. paper)
1. Ethics. 2. Moral development. I. Harding, Carol Gibb. II. Moral
dilemmas.
BJ1012.M632 2010
170.42--dc22
2010006150

ISBN 13: 978-1-4128-1341-9 (pbk)

,

by Marvin W. Berkowitz

,

by Marilyn Friedman

,

by Carol Gibb Harding

,

by Lawrence Hinman

,

by Lawrence Kohlberg

,

by Georg Lind

,

by Larry May

,

by Larry P. Nucci

,

by Fritz Oser

The term moral sciences, which is the rubric for the present series, originated with John Stuart Mill, who used it to cover what are now called the social and behavioral sciences. Accordingly, the Precedent Studies in Ethics and the Moral Sciences have as a general subject matter the rich and problematic interspace between philosophical ethics and such empirical but person- and society-oriented disciplines as developmental psychology, sociology, and anthropology, to cite a few of the more salient moral sciences.

The essays in this volume each have their own philosophical orientations and background suppositions about the limits and procedures of psychological inquiry concerning morality. Nonetheless, they share a conception of human nature as inherently social, as well as a healthy respect for the problems or dilemmas which human sociality carries in its wake. Some of these problems are theoretical, such as those having to do with the ontogenesis of moral reasoning or the classic issues of values justification. Other problems are practical, such as those having to do with distributive justice or the methods of moral education. Only a few of these problems can be addressed in a single book, and the present volume is no exception. However, the importance of a discussion such as this one goes beyond its diverse examinations of specific theoretical and practical issues. Of course the discussions in these pages of such matters as the rational structures of moral discourse, the boundaries of the moral domain, the relationship of caring and justice, and so on, are extremely important in their own right. However, they also serve what might be considered a meta-theoretical function, since they demonstrate the reciprocity of two very difficult tasks: that of charting the flow of moral thought and that of making philosophical sense out of the undeniable psychological fact that we live in a world full of moral dilemmas.

Thomas E. Wren

General Editor

Marvin W. Berkowitz

Department of Psychology; Marquette University; Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Marilyn Friedman

Department of Philosophy; Bowling Green State University; Bowling Green, Ohio

Carol Gibb Harding

Departments of Foundations of Education and Psychology; Loyola University; Chicago, Illinois

Lawrence Hinman

Department of Philosophy; University of San Diego; San Diego, California

Lawrence Kohlberg

Center for Moral Education; Harvard University; Cambridge, Massachusetts

Georg Lind

Department of Social Psychology; University of Konstanz; Konstanz, Germany

Larry May

Department of Philosophy; Purdue University; West Lafayette, Indiana

Larry P. Nucci

College of Education; University of Illinois at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois

Fritz Oser

Pedagogical Institute; University of Fribourg; Fribourg, Switzerland

Carol Gibb Harding

The chapters in this volume are about moral dilemmas in two senses of that term. First of all, they deal with conflict situations, real and hypothetical, that require moral judgments. Several chapters focus explicitly on the well-known Heinz dilemma which is part of Lawrence Kohlbergs scoring system for levels of moral development. Problems related to the use of this particular dilemma as a scoring item are addressed, as are problems generated by similar dilemmas in real life. The kinds of decisions that such dilemmas engender, as well as the processes of reasoning that moral dilemmas require, have come to interest philosophers, psychologists, and educators.

There is a second sense in which these chapters are about moral dilemmas. At the present time, those who study moral reasoning and its development must struggle with their own dilemmas as they attempt to integrate information from the domains of philosophy and psychology, to investigate in varied cultural settings and across genders and age ranges what have been proposed as universals in moral judgment, and to formulate theories that reflect both empirical evidence and logical processes. The quandary in which moral philosophers and psychologists find themselves is certainly not eliminated by the essays in this volume, but may instead be intensified by the questions that are posed and the objections raised. Nevertheless, the process of scholarly discussion, dissent, and growth goes on.

This volume is an integration of philosophical and psychological approaches to moral reasoning. It grew out of an interdisciplinary colloquium series on moral development held at Loyola University of Chicago from 1983 to 1985, funded by a grant from the Loyola-Mellon Fund, whose support for the colloquia and this volume is here gratefully acknowledged. In the course of these discussions, a group of us, under the leadership of Thomas Wren who organized the series, found the process of cross-pollination across disciplines as well as across national frontiers to be an informative and exciting experience. With this book we hope to extend that process to the wider audience of researchers and educators for whom it is intended.

Marvin Berkowitz begins the volume by categorizing current theory and research concerning moral discussion according to four perspectives: Developmental, which describes the stages of development of moral argumentation competencies; Ethical, which describes and often justifies the ideal form of moral argumentation; Growth-Facilitative, which identifies the functions of moral argumentation, especially its capacity to promote moral development; and Instrumental, which focuses on practical functions of moral argumentation. Berkowitz offers a preliminary sketch of an integrative approach to moral argumentation which identifies the developmental path of moral argumentation as well as the ethical endpoint of such development. By calling for increased efforts in the consideration of an integrative understanding of moral discussion, Berkowitzs chapter provides a framework for the integrative approach of the volume.