Sam J. Tangredi - AI at War

How Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, and Machine Learning Are Changing Naval Warfare

Edited by Sam J. Tangredi and George Galdorisi

NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS

Annapolis, Maryland

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

2021 by Sam J. Tangredi and George Galdorisi

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Tangredi, Sam J., editor. | Galdorisi, George, date, editor.

Title: AI at war : how big data, artificial intelligence, and machine learning are changing naval warfare / edited by Sam J. Tangredi and George Galdorisi.

Other titles: Artificial intelligence at war

Description: Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, [2021] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020047097 (print) | LCCN 2020047098 (ebook) | ISBN 9781682476062 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781682476345 (pdf) | ISBN 9781682476345 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Artificial intelligenceMilitary applicationsUnited States. | Naval art and scienceUnited StatesData processing. | Naval art and scienceTechnological innovationsUnited States. | Big data.

Classification: LCC UG479 .A44 2021 (print) | LCC UG479 (ebook) | DDC 359.00285/63dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020047097

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020047098

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Printed in the United States of America.

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First printing

ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN (RET.)

SAM J. TANGREDI AND GEORGE GALDORISI

PATRICK K. SULLIVAN AND THE OCEANIT TEAM

2 AI, Autonomy, and the Third Offset Strategy
Fostering Military Innovation during a Period of Great Change

ROBERT O. WORK

WILLIAM BRAY AND DALE L. MOORE

4 The Navy at a Crossroads
The Uneven Adoption of Autonomous Systems in the Navy

PAUL SCHARRE

5 AI Programs of Potential Military Opponents
Propositions and Recommendations

SAM J. TANGREDI

6 Battlefield Innovation on Patrol
Designing AI for the Warfighter

NINA KOLLARS

7 Mission Command and Speed of Decision
What Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, and Machine Learning Should Do for the Navy

ADM. SCOTT H. SWIFT, USN (RET.), AND ANTONIO P. SIORDIA

8 Practical Applications of Naval AI
An Overview of Artificial Intelligence in Naval Warfare

CONNOR S. McLEMORE AND CHARLES R. CLARK

MARK OWEN, KATIE RAINEY, AND RACHEL VOLNER

10 Communicating at the Speed of War
The Future of Naval Communications and the Rise of Artificial Intelligence

ALBERT K. LEGASPI, JEFF MAH, AND STEPHANIE HSZIEH

DOUG LANGE AND JOS CARREO

MICHAEL OGARA

HARRISON SCHRAMM AND BRYAN CLARK

14 Entry Pass to Future Warfare
AI Education at the U.S. Naval Academy

NATHANAEL CHAMBERS, FREDERICK L. CRABBE, AND GAVIN TAYLOR

15 Trying to Put Mahan in a Box
Insights from Attempting to Develop a Decision Aid for the Operational Commander

ADAM M. AYCOCK AND WILLIAM G. GLENNEY IV

16 Sea Hacking Sun Tzu
Deception in Global AI/Cybered Conflict and Navies

CHRIS C. DEMCHAK AND SAM J. TANGREDI

GEORGE GALDORISI

REAR ADM. NEVIN CARR, USN (RET.), AND SAM J. TANGREDI

PATRICK K. SULLIVAN AND THE OCEANIT TEAM

GEORGE GALDORISI AND SAM J. TANGREDI

ADM. MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN (RET.)

Photos

Tables

Figures

ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN (RET.)

Go right at em. Those are the words of the greatest admiral in history, Vice Admiral Lord Nelson of Trafalgar. When I began to truly study his tactical approach over the years, I was a lieutenant commander looking forward to the day I would command a warship at sea. As I pondered his lessons, I wondered how best a warship, and a fleet, could position themselves to achieve that maxim.

From my own study, I already knewor at least suspectedthat information was the key ingredient. But in the midst of crisis or battle, accurate information was always difficult to obtain. Common wisdom held that first reports are always wrong. The key to being a successful commander throughout naval history had been the ability to sort through incomplete information, assess what was probable and what was unlikely, and make a decision based on professional judgment honed by experience. Nelson knew that, and I gradually learned it over the many sea miles of my voyage.

In those days, the late 1980s, the U.S. Navy was already making the change from analog to digital. Many of the weapons and sensors themselves were already digital, but it was not until the paradigm-breaking Aegis combat system proliferated throughout the surface fleet that digital information from multiple sources and sensors became a truly reliable, albeit never infallible, asset in operational (read human) decision-making. I was lucky to be the commissioning operations officer on one of the very first Aegis ships, USS Valley Forge (CG 50), where I benefited from the technical acumen of the father of Aegis, Rear Adm. Wayne Meyer, and the tactical acumen of Capt. Wayne Hughes.

At the same time came the public proliferation of the personal computer, the popularization and commercialization of the Internet, and the incredible advances (and potential for conflicts) in cyberspace. The entire world was becoming awash with information that previously required much time and human labor to acquire and categorize. The prodigious amount of available informationin both the civilian and military sphereswas increasing so much and so fast that it seemed the human mind could not keep up. It was becoming apparent that decision-makers, particularly those who might face combat, needed new ways to sort through all the information with which they were being bombarded.

In naval operations, information was no longer primarily sourced from sensors located on board the individual warshipwhat we call organic sensors. Accurate information was coming from satellites, shore stations, other services joint assets, and open sources. Lack of information suitable for targeting the enemy could often still be a problem, but now it was compounded by other times when there was just too much information to sort through. Much information was available to the enemy as well.

How, then, could we continue to position ourselves to go right at em? That is when I realized that the key had shifted from availability of information to the speed of decision. In some ways, this parallels what was already known in air dogfights based on Air Force Col. John Boyds model of the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop. Pilots who could cycle more quickly through the OODA loopin other words, made accurate decisions more quicklygenerally won the dogfight. They were, in the words of Wayne Hughes, able to attack effectively first.

By the 2000s, when I became a senior decision-maker, particularly as Supreme Allied Commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, the amount of information that could potentially support decisions was absolutely staggering. I knew there needed to be methods of processing, combining, validating, and making the options clear to the humans who had to decide both peaceful and violent actions. The decisions needed to be made before an enemy could make themand faster, as former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson likes to say.