| This book presents a defence of hedonistic utilitarianism. It covers the entire field relevant to the defence, but it does not penetrate all the parts of it equally deeply. This is due to the fact that the core of the book is several previously and separately published articles. These articles reflect my thinking on the subject over some twenty years. These articles have been rethought, revised and put together, but they have also been supplemented with much new material, to form a book. So while it is true that some crucial questions are elaborated thoroughly, such as the problems of a paradox-fee statement of the utilitarian criterion of rightness, of measurement and interpersonal comparisons of happiness, and of the relative merits of hedonism as compared to competing ideas about intrinsic value, other questions are dismissed rather quickly. The most obvious point is my treatment of rule utilitarianism. In my treatment of it I have focused entirely on what I consider the strongest argument for it (even if people conform to act utilitarianism the outcome may be sub-optimal, it has been claimed, while general conformance to rule utilitarianism guarantees an optimal outcome) and I show (in Chapter 4) that, if collective action is taken into proper account, the argument is flawed (general conformance to act utilitarianism guarantees optimality as well). Rather than going into the extensive literature on rule utilitarianism, where I feel I have little to contribute, I have referred the reader to the relevant literature and left the problem at that. |
| Moreover, not only are there aspects of the defence of hedonistic utilitarianism that are glossed over, there are also parts of the book that treat problems of a general character, problems facing anyone wanting to defend any kind of utilitarian theory. This is true in particular of my Chapter 2 defending theory in ethics, and of my Chapter 10 treating the problem of free will and moral responsibility, but also, to some extent, of my Chapter 11, defending utilitarianism against criticisms from common sense morality. |
| All this means that the book should not be seen as an introduction to its subject. Yet, for all that, I feel confident that it should interest anyone already somewhat familiar with the subject and prepared to think hard about some of the |
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