ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: SOCIAL THEORY
Volume 70
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
Pretence and possibility
KEITH DIXON
First published in 1973
This edition first published in 2015
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1973 Keith Dixon
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ISBN: 978-0-415-72731-0 (Set)
eISBN: 978-1-315-76997-4 (Set)
ISBN: 978-1-138-78386-7 (Volume 70)
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Keith Dixon
Sociological theory
Pretence and possibility
Routledge & Kegan Paul
London and Boston
First published in 1973
by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd
Broadway House, 6874 Carter Lane,
London EC4V 5EL and
9 Park Street,
Boston, Mass. 02108, USA
Printed in Great Britain by
Clarke, Doble & Brendon Ltd
Plymouth
Keith Dixon, 1973
No part of this book may be reproduced in
any form without permission from the
publisher, except for the quotation of brief
passages in criticism
ISBN 0 7100 7601 0 (c)
0 7100 7698 3 (p)
Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 73-75940
Contents
Sociology, a Scottish philosopher once remarked to me, is about what chaps do. I suppose not many practising sociologists would accept this statement in spite of the empirical spirit which informed it. Certainly, much sociological investigation is concerned to establish what men actually do in contrast to what they are popularly supposed to do. In an area where ignorance, prejudice and subjective judgment still hold sway over the public mind the sociologist is justly proud of his objective stance. Most sociologists are not content, however, with the role of mere fact-gatherer. Brute or 'piecemeal empiricism is unfashionable. What confers professional prestige is explanation of human behaviourcouched in forms which bear some general resemblance to successful theorising in the physical sciences. Sociology is nothing, so it may be argued, if it is not a generalising science of human behaviour.
This book is concerned with an analysis of the status of the claim that sociology is, or ought to be, a theoretical science. My conclusion is not that such a claim is unfounded on a priori grounds but that it is formulated in such a way that a proper evaluation of its status is extremely difficult. Having, I hope, resolved some of these ambiguities, I conclude that the contingent objections to the possibility of sociological theorising are sufficiently strong for such activity to be labelled as pretence. Of course it is always possible by adopting a sufficiently broad and ambiguous definition of theory to rebut these contentions but linguistic sleight of hand, though it may lead to the disappearance of both critical distinctions and relevant objections, is still a conjuring trick.
Much of what I have to say is necessarily negative or destructive. But pretence to the theoretical is a hindrance to the development of sociology proper. It devalues significant empirical work by giving status to research findings only in so far as they relate to often arbitrarily conceived theoretical concerns; it leads to a systematic neglect of the historical dimension in the explanation of human behaviour and it sets up ideals of explanation whose pursuit leads to sterility, frustration and even intellectual corruption.
The present climate of opinion in sociology is such that any attack on the possibility of theory is liable to be seen as an attack on the possibility of sociology itselfa capitulation to the obscurantism of the romantic and the mystic. No one should read such implications into this work. In attacking the contingent possibility of theory I do not mean to devalue empirical expertise, analytic skill or the exercise of disciplined speculative intelligence. But intelligence can only flourish when released from the constraints of attempting to justify the unjustifiable.
I wish to express my thanks to the University of York and to my colleagues in the Department of Sociology for granting me paid leave of absence for the Michaelmas term 1971, and to the Department of Applied Economics and to University College, Cambridge, for providing an ideal working environment during my stay at Cambridge.
I am particularly indebted to Professor Ronald Atkinson and to Mr Arthur Brittan for their criticism and encouragement and to Alexander Stewart, Bob Blackburn and Ken Prandy of Cambridge for their often vigorous opposition to much that I have to say. I should also like to thank Dr Cohn Campbell and Roland Hall of York and Anthony Giddens of Cambridge for commenting helpfully on various drafts or chapters of the book.
I am also indebted to those ladies both in Cambridge and York who were kind enough to offer secretarial assistance.
Finally I should like to express gratitude to Sandy and Frieda Stewart whose kindness made my stay at Cambridge very enjoyable and to my wife, Barbara, for enduring both my fits of depression about the book and my three months absence from home.
K.D.
chapter 1
Ordinary language and theoretical explanations
The description and explanation of human behaviour is not the prerogative solely of social scientists. Each of us is already equipped with a set or sets of concepts which enable us to make sense, more or less successfully, of our own behaviour and the behaviour of others. Explanations of human behaviour are given typically by referring to the motives, intentions and dispositions of people and to the reasons they have, or are alleged to have for their behaviour. Arguments frequently centre around the evaluation of the behaviour of others either in an attempt to elicit the meaning of actions or in making moral judgments about them. We ask questions about the significance of remarks, gestures and movementsattempting to see other peoples behaviour and our own in terms of some consistent pattern which enables us to typify individuals and to simplify our relationships with them. In morally evaluating the acts of others we are interested in the question of whether they acted freely or under some kind of physical or psychological constraint. The states of affairs which people actively bring about are distinguished from things which happen to them and associated with, or parasitic upon this distinction are such notions as responsibility, culpability, justification and excuse.
