Baldwin Thomas - Moore-Arg Philosophers

EDITOR: TED HONDERICH

The purpose of this series is to provide a contemporary assessment and history of the entire course of philosophical thought. Each book constitutes a detailed, critical introduction to the work of a philosopher of major influence and significance.

Plato J.C.B.Gosling

Augustine Christopher Kirwan

The Presocratic Philosophers Jonathan Barnes

Plotinus Lloyd P.Gerson

The Sceptics R.J.Hankinson

Socrates Gerasimos Xenophon Santas

Berkeley George Pitcher

Descartes Margaret Dauler Wilson

Hobbes Tom Sorell

Locke Michael Ayers

Spinoza R.J.Delahunty

Bentham Ross Harrison

Hume Barry Stroud

Butler Terence Penelhum

John Stuart Mill John Skorupski

Thomas Reid Keith Lehrer

Kant Ralph C.S.Walker

Hegel M.J.Inwood

Schopenhauer D.W.Hamlyn

Kierkegaard Alastair Hannay

Nietzsche Richard Schacht

Karl Marx Allen W.Wood

Gottlob Frege Hans D.Sluga

Meinong Reinhardt Grossmann

Husserl David Bell

G.E.Moore Thomas Baldwin

Wittgenstein Robert J.Fogelin

Russell Mark Sainsbury

William James Graham Bird

Peirce Christopher Hookway

Santayana Timothy L.S.Sprigge

Dewey J.E.Tiles

Bergson A.R.Lacey

J.L. Austin G.J.Warnock

Karl Popper Anthony OHear

Ayer John Foster

Sartre Peter Caws

London and New York

I was introduced to the study of philosophy by Simon Blackburn and Casimir Lewy, and both of them set me at once to read many of Moores works (this was in Cambridge in 1965). As I recall, I was often puzzled by these assignments. Sometimes it was by Moores writings themselves, such as the first chapter of Principia Ethica; at other times it seemed to me that I could understand easily enough what Moore was saying, but it was not clear why it was thought that his argument established anything of philosophical significance. Although my teachers tried to enlighten me on these matters, my attention was soon drawn away from Moore to the more obviously exciting works of Wittgenstein, Quine, and others. The result was that my attitude then was that Moore was someone whose work it was important to know about (if only to satisfy ones examiners), but not someone whose writings I studied much for their intrinsic interest.

My reaction then was, I think, not uncommon. While the writings of the other two members of the Trinity trinity, Russell and Wittgenstein, have been subjected to critical appraisal and discussion for many years, Moores work has attracted little attention of this kind. Indeed there are those who seem to think that it should be left to fade into a series of footnotes to the history of philosophy. One result of this is that the present book is, I think, the first to attempt to deal critically with all aspects of his work, though there are distinguished studies of certain aspects of it,

I myself was partly drawn to write about Moore by the prospect of studying his early writings, which have recently become accessible thanks to the purchase of many of his papers by the Cambridge University Library. It is in these writings that his rejection of idealism is accomplished and they are crucial documents in the history of analytic philosophy. But, of course, that early break with idealism was only the start of his work and influence, and once embarked on this study I came to understand and appreciate his mature philosophy afresh. It would be foolish for me to attempt to argue here for the importance and interest of parts of this mature philosophy; my judgment about it is embodied in the latter part of this book. But no argument is required to establish the fact of Moores influence within British philosophy throughout the first half of this century. Writing in 1920, McTaggart asserted that I have no hesitation in saying that I regard Dr G.E.Moore as unsurpassed in ability by any British philosopher now living.. Even when they disagreed sharply with him (as McTaggart did), other philosophers felt they had to take note of his position. By his writings and lectures on ethics and epistemology, and by the example of his analytic method, Moore set the agenda, and determined the approach, of many of the ensuing discussions within the analytic tradition. Thus to come to terms with analytic philosophy one has to come to terms with Moore.

In 1921 Moore succeeded G.F.Stout as editor of Mind, and in 1925 he succeeded James Ward as Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge. These appointments confirmed his pre-eminent position among British academic philosophers. He held the Professorship at Cambridge until he retired in 1939, and his tenure of it marked the golden period of Cambridge philosophy, when a succession of visitors from abroad came to study with him and Wittgenstein. Moore himself did not publish much during this period; but he exerted his powerful influence through his lectures, his presence at the Moral Sciences Club, and his hospitality to visitors. Despite the publication of his