Schaeffer Denise - Socratic Philosophy and Its Others

Socratic Philosophy and Its Others

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham Boulder New York Toronto Plymouth, UK

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Socratic philosophy and its others / Edited by Christopher Dustin and Denise Schaeffer.

pages cm.

1. Socrates. 2. Plato. 3. Philosophy, Ancient. I. Dustin, Christopher A. II. Schaeffer, Denise, 1968

B317.S6435 2013

183'.2dc23

2013009863

ISBN 978-0-7391-8140-9 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-1-4985-2760-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-0-7391-8141-6 (ebook)

TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

The editors are grateful for permission to reprint the following essays: Catherine Zuckerts Why Socrates and Thrasymachus Become Friends originally appeared in Philosophy and Rhetoric vol. 43, no. 2 (2010). An expanded version of Mary B. Nichols and Denise Schaeffers Philosophy and Sophistry in Platos Euthydemus was published in Plato: Euthydemus, trans. Gregory McBrayer and Mary P. Nichols (Focus Publishing, 2011). Jacob Howlands essay on the Apology is reprinted from The Review of Politics, vol. 70 (2008). Michael Daviss Philosophy in the Perfect Tense: On Platos Lovers appeared in the Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, vol. 10, no. 2 (1985). The editors also wish to thank the College of the Holy Cross for fellowship support toward the completion of this volume.

Christopher Dustin and Denise Schaeffer

Strange Fellows

The goal of this collection is to explore the profound entanglement of Socratic philosophizing with some of its generally conceived opposites or othersmost obviously, the figure of the sophist, but also the tragic hero, the tyrant, the rhetorician, and the lover of sights and sounds. Addressing a wide range of Platos dialogues, the authors of these essays suggest that the harder one tries to disentangle Socrates activity from that of his apparent opposites, the more entangled they become. Yet, only by taking seriously this entanglement, and exploring it fully, does the distinctive character of Socratic philosophy emerge.

Scholars often frame the question of philosophy and its others in terms of how Plato might have sought either to shield philosophy from its challengers, or conversely to shield the political sphere from the effects of philosophic skepticism. This collection is distinguished by its willingness to take seriously the potentially troubling implications of philosophical activity itself, turning philosophys skeptical gaze upon its own foundations. The challenge is internalized, and thus intensified: How might philosophy properly defend itself against a problem that arises from within it? Ultimately, these essays help us to see how this question is inseparable from an understanding of Platos art of writingitself an object of suspicion, from a Socratic point of view. As a whole, the collection sheds new light on the importance of the artful ways in which Plato not only represents philosophy in relation to what it is not, but also makes it strange to itself. The collection treats Platonic dialogues that are more familiar (Republic, Phaedrus, Sophist, Apology, Gorgias) together with works that are less well known (Lovers, Theages, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias, Euthydemus, Charmides). In this way, too, it strives to make the familiar revealingly strange, while the less familiar becomes, perhaps, less strange.

In the opening essay, Catherine Zuckert explores the unlikely friendship that Socrates acknowledges between himself and his most hostile opponent in the Republic. Thrasymachus is one of two outstanding rhetoricians against whom Socrates is matched in Platos dialogues, the other being Gorgias in the dialogue that bears his name. In Zuckerts view, Socrates engagement with Thrasymachus sets up a revealing contrast with the Gorgias, where we never see Socrates making friends with his enemy. While both dialogues stage a confrontation and highlight the opposition between Socratic reasoning and rhetorical persuasion, Zuckert sees an important difference in the way the relationship between the philosopher and the rhetorician is modeled by each. What is implicit in Socrates otherwise cordial encounter with Gorgias is made explicit by his increasingly antagonistic exchanges with Polus and Callicles. Gorgias is led by his sense of shame to cede the argument just as the fundamental issueof the relation between rhetoric and justicecomes to the fore. The arguments with Polus and Callicles expose the rhetorical art as but a means to, or a disguised form of, tyranny. Although many of Callicles claims about rhetoric, justice, and power seem to anticipate those of Thrasymachus, Zuckert argues that they are not as close as they appear. Looking beyond the superficial likeness of their arguments, Zuckert goes on to identify an important difference in Thrasymachus soul, which turns out to be the hidden ground of his friendship with Socrates. Despite Thrasymachus own defensiveness in the face of the philosophers attacks, there is something between them: a shared belief that the decisive question is what is truly good. If Socrates sees his victory over Thrasymachus as a failure, just as his defeat of Callicles proved to be, it is for a different reason. Thrasymachus is unpersuaded because he has yet to see the significance of this fundamental agreement between Socrates and himself. If Socrates declaration that he and Thrasymachus have become friends (498d) suggests a more intimate relationship between philosophy and rhetoric, Zuckert contends, it is not because rhetorical persuasion may be useful or necessary if philosophers are to gain the power of rule. It points to something intrinsic to the character of both.

The second essay, coauthored by Michael Davis and Gwenda-lin Kaur Grewal, approaches Socratic reasoning through an exploration of the distinctive character of Socratic piety, focusing in particular on Socrates daimonion and its significance for understanding his philosophic activity. Generally, Socrates daimonion functions in a negative way, warning Socrates off certain behavior, but in the Theages it has the additional function of telling him what others should not do. The Theages is thus peculiar, for in it Socrates becomes something of an oracle. The Theages contains the most extensive treatment of Socrates daimonion in Plato. It comes in at the end of the dialogue to explain why Socrates accepts some as students and rejects others. The underlying theme of the