William N. Nelson - On Justifying Democracy

Any attempt to justify democracy must contend at the beginning with the following problem: A justification (or, more generally, an evaluation) of democracy seems to presuppose an account of what democracy is. But the nature of democratic government is as much a matter of dispute as is its justification. It might appear, then, that we ought to begin by deciding what democracy is. But how are we to do this? I see no reason to believe that there is only one kind of government properly called democracy. Suppose we start with one definition and find democracy, so defined, to be unjustifiable. That does not show that there is no justification for some other form of democracy. Suppose, alternatively, that we find some form of democracy justifiable. It does not follow that we ought to adopt it. Perhaps it is not feasible. Perhaps some other form, or our present form, is even better, but the arguments for it are not apparent when we look at other forms. Where should we begin?

I propose to deal with this problem by concentrating neither on questions of definition nor justification, taken in isolation, but instead on what I shall call theories of democracy. Any theory of democracy includes an account of what democracy is, an evaluation of democracy so conceived, and an account of its feasibility. When we focus on the problem of describing and comparing various theories of democracy, not only do we avoid the problem of finding an elusive essence of democracy, but we also avoid the tendency to confuse questions of definition and questions of justification or evaluation. I must emphasize, however, that my desire to distinguish these questions by no means implies an indifference to questions of evaluation. I think these are the most important questions. Perhaps the democratic ideal suggests a unity in the concept of democracy that is not to be found. But there can still be democratic ideals, and the description of a democratic ideal is a worthwhile enterprise. My problem, then, the problem of justifying democracy, is the problem of finding a conception of

Some further methodological points are in order here. (1) I do not assume, at the outset, that democracy is a good form of government. For one thing, it seems to me likely that different forms of government can correctly be called democratic, and it is quite possible that these different forms differ significantly in value. Moreover, while our pretheoretical conception of democracy may leave us considerable room to maneuver it does set some limits. I can see no good theoretical reason for assuming at the beginning that some form of government falling within these limits must be a good form of government. (2) I regard democracy as a system for making governmental decisions. Democracy is to be defined in terms of procedures, not in terms of substantive policy. While I think our ordinary use of the term provides some justification for this stipulation, I shall not try to defend it in this way. It is better regarded merely as a simplifying assumption. While there are many legitimate questions to be answered in political philosophy, one good question, certainly, is how the various institutions affecting governmental decision-making should be structured. These institutions together constitute what I think of as the governments procedures for making decisions. Their proper structure is the subject of my investigation.