Jonathan Edwards - Freedom of the Will

Concerning the Nature of the Will.

IT may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of going aboutto define or describe the Will; this word being generally as wellunderstood as any other words we can use to explain it: and so perhapsit would be, had not philosophers, metaphysicians, and polemic divines,brought the matter into obscurity by the things they have said of it.But since it is so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend togreater clearness in The following discourse, to say a few thingsconcerning it.

And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any metaphysicalrefining) is, That by which the mind chooses any thing. The faculty ofthe will, is that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capableof choosing: an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing orchoice.

If any think it is a more perfect definition of the will, to say, thatit is that by which the soul either chooses or refuses, I am contentwith it; though I think it enough to say, it is that by which the soulchooses: for in every act of will whatsoever, the mind chooses onething rather than another; it chooses something rather than thecontrary or rather than the want or non-existence of that thing. So inevery act of refusal, the mind chooses the absence of the thingrefused; the positive and the negative are set before the mind for itschoice, and it chooses the negative; and the mind's making its choicein that case is properly the act of the Will: the Will's determiningbetween the two, is a voluntary determination; but that is the samething as making a choice. So that by whatever names we call the act ofthe Will, choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking,disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding,forbidding, inclining, or being averse, being pleased or displeasedwith; all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to actvoluntarily, is evermore to act electively. Mr. Locke (1) says, "TheWill signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose."And, in the foregoing page, he says, "The word preferring seems best toexpress the act of volition;" but adds, that "it does it not precisely;for, though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say heever wills it?" But the instance he mentions, does not prove that thereis any thing else in willing, but merely preferring: for it should beconsidered what is the immediate object of the will, with respect to aman's walking, or any other external action; which is not being removedfrom one place to another; on the earth or through the air; these areremoter objects of preference; but such or such an immediate exertionof himself. The thing next chosen, or preferred, when a man wills towalk is not his being removed to such a place where he would be, butsuch an exertion and motion of his legs and feet &c, in order to it.And his willing such an alteration in his body in the present moment,is nothing else but his choosing or preferring such an alteration inhis body at such a moment, or his liking it better than the forbearanceof it. And God has so made and established the human nature, the soulbeing united to a body in proper state that the soul preferring orchoosing such an immediate exertion or alteration of the body, such analteration instantaneously follows. There is nothing else in theactions of my mind, that I am conscious of while I walk, but only mypreferring or choosing, through successive moments that there should besuch alterations of my external sensations and motions; together with aconcurring habitual expectation that it will be so; having ever foundby experience, that on such an immediate preference, such sensationsand motions do actually, instantaneously, and constantly arise. But itis not so in the case of flying; though a man may be said remotely tochoose or prefer flying; yet he does not prefer, or desire, undercircumstances in view, any immediate exertion of the members of hisbody in order to it; because he has no expectation that he shouldobtain the desired end by any such exertion and he does not prefer, orincline to, any bodily exertion under this apprehended circumstance, ofits being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully distinguish theproper objects of the several acts of the will, it will not appear bythis, and such like instances, that there is any difference betweenvolition and preference; or that a man's choosing liking best, or beingpleased with a thing, are not the same with his willing that thing.Thus an act of the will is commonly expressed by its pleasing a man todo thus or thus; and a man doing as he wills, and doing as he pleasesare in common speech the same thing.

Mr. Locke (2) says, "The Will is perfectly distinguished from desire;which in the very same action may have quite contrary tendency fromthat which our wills sets us upon. A man, says he, whom I cannot deny,may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time Iam speaking, I may wish not prevail on him. In this case, it is plainthe Will and Desire run counter." I do not suppose, that Will andDesire are words of precisely the same signification: Will seems to bea word of more general signification, extending to things present andabsent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my presentsituation and posture, suppose sitting still, or having my eyes open,and so may will it. But yet I cannot think they are so entirelydistinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A mannever, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to his desires, ordesires any thing contrary to his will. The forementioned instance,which Mr. Locke produces, is no proof that he ever does. He may, onsome consideration or other will to utter speeches which have atendency to persuade another and still may desire that they may notpersuade him; but yet his Will and Desire do not run counter all: thething which he wills, the very same he desires; and he does not will athing, and desire the contrary, in any particular. In this instance, itis not carefully observed, what is the thing willed, and what is thething desired: if it were, it would be found, that Will and Desire donot clash in the least. The thing willed on some consideration, is toutter such words; and certainly, the same consideration so influenceshim, that he does not desire the contrary; all things considered, hechooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter them. Andso as to the thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as desired, viz. That thewords, though they tend to persuade, should not be effectual to thatend, his Will is not contrary to this; he does not will that theyshould be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as hedesires. In order to prove that the Will and Desire may run counter, itshould be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the samething, or with respect to the very same object of Will or Desire: buthere the objects are two; and in each, taken by themselves, the Willand Desire agree. And it is no wonder that they should not agree indifferent things, though but little distinguished in their nature. TheWill may not agree with the Will, nor Desire agree with Desire, indifferent things. As in this very instance which Mr. Locke mentions, aperson may, on some consideration, desire to use persuasions, and atthe same time may desire they may not prevail; but yet nobody will say,that Desire runs counter to Desire; or that this proves that Desire isperfectly a distinct thing from Desire.The like might be observed ofthe other instance Mr. Locke produces, of a man's desiring to be easedof pain, &c