Roy E. Appleman - Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur

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Chapter 3

Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Lt. Gen. Walton Walker

Bridges over the Yalu River

Maj Gen. John Coulter serving Thanksgiving dinner

Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Maj. Gen. John Coulter

Maj. Gen. William Kean and Lt. Gen. Walton Walker

Maj. Gen. John Church

Maj. Gen. Laurence B. Keiser

2nd Infantry Division squad advancing down a hill

Carrying supplies on a packboard to 9th Infantry

The 8076th MASH at Kunu-ri

11th Engineer Battalion constructing floating bridge

Eighth Army troops withdrawing past refugees

8th Kings Royal Irish Hussars covering withdrawal from Pyongyang

North Koreans fleeing across Taedong River v v

ROK 2nd Division withdrawing ten miles south of Pyongyang

1. Eighth Army strength, 24 November 1950

2. Chinese XIII Army Group order of battle, 24 November 1950

3. Alignment of Eighth Army and CCF forces, 25 November 1950

4. Casualties for US 2nd Division as of 30 November 1950

5. Strength of US 2nd Division units, 30 November 1950

6. US 2nd Division artillery losses at Kunu-ri

7. ROK II Corps strength, 3 December 1950

1. Eighth Army area of combat, 25 November-2 December 1950

2. Eighth Army attack plan, 24 November 1950

3. CCF XIII Army Group deployment, 24 November 1950

4. CCF 38th and 42nd armies' attacks on ROK II Corps, 25-30 November 1950

5. US 25th Division attack and CCF counterattack, 24-29 November 1950

6. Task Force Dolvin, 25-27 November 1950

7. CCF attack on 9th Infantry, 2nd Division, 25 November 1950

8. CCF 40th Army attack on 9th and 23rd infantries and crossing of Chongchon River, 25-26 November 1950

9. 2nd Division front line, 2 A.M., 28 November 1950

10. Withdrawal of I Corps, 25-29 November 1950

11. 2nd Division positions in Kunu-ri and vicinity, 29-30 November 1950

12. 2nd Division at Kunu-ri, 30 November 1950

13. Eighth Army withdrawal positions, 30 November12 December 1950

14. The waist of Korea

15. Plan for withdrawal defense lines given in Operational Plan 12, 11 December 1950

16. Eighth Army front line, 31 December 1950

Flushed with the victory of Inchon and Seoul in the late summer of 1950, Gen. Douglas MacArthur ignored many warnings and forged ahead in the autumn, determined to complete the victory for all of Korea. To this end, he ordered what he thought would be the last campaign: his Eighth Army would advance to the north and his X Corps to the northeast. From the Korean side of the Yalu River border they would be able to see China's desolate Manchuria province and the Soviet Union's Siberian wasteland. Korea would be unified once again, the Korean War won.

This volume tells the story of Eighth Army's misfortunes in the west in that campaign, so optimistically launched in late November 1950. The results dimmed forever MacArthur's aura of military might and led directly to his eclipse and downfall in the early spring of 1951.

It is a story of a sophisticated modern army being overwhelmed by a Chinese army group of light infantry that carried small arms and grenades and that emerged from its mountain hideouts to strike at night with stunning speed against a surprised American and United Nations army. The ancient Chinese weapons of noise and strange calls at night (bugle, shepherd's horn, and an assortment of whistles) together with colored flares worked effectively for them as a communications system in attack and at the same time frayed the nerves of their adversaries, often to the point of paralysis.

The Chinese onslaught in late November and early December in the hills south of the Yalu was not that of an ignorant command system; it was well planned and showed the influence of deep study of Antoine Henri Jomini's theory of warfare. It was characterized by surprise and frontal attack to hold an enemy while other formations attacked one or both flanks and still other parts executed forced marches to reach the rear of the enemy and cut off his retreat. These tactics created great confusion in the separated UN ranks and frequently led to panic and unit disintegration. From the Chinese point of view the campaign against Eighth Army in the west was also a classic example of using night fighting to demoralize an adversary not accustomed to such action.

The campaign was fought with the UN forces, including the Americans, believing that the legendary Chinese soldier Gen. Lin Piao, famous in the Long March and afterward in the Communists' ranks, commanded his veterans of the Fourth Field Army in the battles against Eighth Army. Such was not the case. Lin Piao was not in Korea during the fighting, nor did he command the troops of the Chinese XIII Army Group of his Fourth Field Army. Even now, one comes upon statements in writings on the Korean War that Lin Piao was the adversary commander.