Judkin Browning - An Environmental History of the Civil War

The day after Christmas 1862, Union general Ambrose Burnside started planning a bold maneuver to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond. The commander called for his Army of the Potomac to cross Virginias Rappahannock River on pontoon bridges west of Fredericksburga city halfway between Washington, D.C., and Richmondand move south around the Confederate troops on the other side. From that position, Burnside hoped to squeeze the enemy between his army and the banks of the Rappahannock. With southern forces defeated or on the defensive, Burnside believed he might have an easy path to Richmond. Once there, he would deal the South a blow from which it could not recover. Such an aggressive move might also boost northern morale, which had been at low ebb since a humiliating defeat at Fredericksburg two weeks earlier. Few subordinate officers expressed much faith in Burnside or his plan. At least two generals met with President Abraham Lincoln to say as much, and for a moment, the commander in chief wavered. But when Burnside threatened to resign, Lincoln reluctantly approved the action.

During the first weeks of 1863, Burnside watched the weather. Sunny skies and cool temperatures allowed local roads to dry out and become firm enough for travel. Even a quick cold snap on January 17 seemed to have little effect on his men or his projected path to the Rappahannock. Encouraged by the good weather, the general put his army in motion at noon on January 20. As he approached the river, however, Burnside got word of Rebel troops stationed south of the river in a position he had not anticipated. He decided to delay the crossing for a day while he considered the latest intelligence. After that, he intended to move his two corpsBurnside preferred to call them Grand Divisionsconsisting of 75,000 men into position for an attack on Robert E. Lees Confederate forces.

Around 9:00 on the night of January 20, just as the first of his men reached the rivers edge, a cold, heavy, incessant rain set in along the Rappahannock. At times the rain mixed with snow, and the precipitation did not stop for thirty hours. Driving wind blew down hastily pitched tents. The relentless downpour doused campfires, leaving shivering soldiers no protection against the elements. Gen. Rgis de Trobriand recalled that nightfall brought a funereal aspect, in which the enthusiasm is extinguished. In short order, the once-firm Virginia roads became a muddy morass of ruts and ditches as impassable as any swamp. Trobriand asserted, the mud is not simply on the surface, but penetrates the ground to a great depth. According to one of Burnsides artillery officers, The mud was so deep that sixteen horses could not pull one gun. Wagons stuck up to their hubs, draft animals died from exhaustion, and mules drowned in the middle of the road. At least four of the pontoon bridges needed to cross the river remained mired firmly in the muck. Theodore A. Dodge, a soldier in the 110th New York who followed Burnside to the river, explained it this way: Mud is really king. He sets down his foot and says, Ye shall not pass, and lo and behold we cannot.

Something about the Virginia quagmire proved especially insidious. Dodge could not put his finger on it, but for some reason, he believed, mud wields a more despotic sway these last two days than I ever saw him wield before. Unable to go any farther, Burnsides bedraggled men forlornly returned to their winter camps near Fredericksburg without so much as firing a shot. Meanwhile, on the other side of the river, Lees men looked on with glee, posting large signs that read This Way to Richmond (complete with arrows pointing in the opposite direction from the capital city) and Burnside Stuck in the Mud.

In the aftermath of the fiasco, Burnside blamed insubordinate Union officers for his woes and threatened to resign unless Lincoln dismissed the alleged offenders. The officers and their supporters, some of whom coveted Burnsides command, pointed the finger at the general. Eventually Lincoln, never enamored with Burnsides effort in the first place, convinced the general to accept another assignment and entrusted the Army of the Potomac to Joseph Hooker, one of Burnsides critics. Perhaps better than any other incident, Burnsides ill-advised Mud March demonstrates the indecision, lack of leadership, and internal rancor that plagued the Union high command in late 1862 and early 1863.