Russell Guest - A History of the Mediterranean Air War, 1940-1945, Volume 4: Sicily and Italy to the fall of Rome 14 May, 1943 – 5 June, 1944

A HISTORY OF THE

MEDITERRANEAN AIR WAR

1940-1945

Volume Four: Sicily and Italy to the Fall of Rome

14 May, 1943 5 June, 1944

A HISTORY OF THE

1940-1945

Volume Four:

Sicily and Italy to the Fall of Rome

14 May, 1943 5 June, 1944

Christopher Shores and Giovanni Massimello with Russell Guest, Frank Olynyk, Winfried Bock and Wg Cdr Andy Thomas

Published by

Grub Street 4 Rainham Close

London SW11 6SS

Copyright Grub Street 2018

Copyright text Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello,

Russell Guest, Frank Olynyk, Winfried Bock and Wg Cdr Andy Thomas

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP record for this title is available from the British Library

ISBN-13: 9781911621102

eISBN: 9781911621782

Mobi ISBN: 9781911621782

All rights reserved. No part of this publication my be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the copyright owner.

Maps by Morten Jessen

Design by Roy Platten, Hemel Hempstead

As described herein the roles of the units forming the Allied air forces commenced a change to these of growing significance from the start of November 1943 onwards. Until that time the activities of the heavy bombers still at this time under the control of the US 12th Air Force and the 205 Group, were in the main effectively of what we have termed a long-range tactical nature rather than a truly strategic one. Only occasionally would a special operation of a genuinely strategic nature be undertaken (such as an attack on the Ploesti oilfields or the Axis aircraft factories in Austria) be undertaken.

These circumstances were not the desire of those directing overall policy who wanted to add the potential striking power from the Mediterranean area to that increasingly being wielded from the United Kingdom. They were in part occasioned by the distance from North Africa, where the bombers of the USAAF and the RAF were based, to the required targets within the territories of the Reich, and partly by the continuing need to support the war on the ground. When properly organised attacks could be made on strategic targets they would on many occasions be undertaken quite separately by designated units over different areas and against different opponents than might be encountered when undertaking tactically oriented attacks.

However, the occupation of airfields closer to the strategic targets (i.e. the complex of these on the Foggia Plain of southern Italy) would provide more suitable bases from which to supplement the offensive now being prosecuted from England.

Thus, it was that on 1 November 1943, with these requisite bases now in Allied hands, the strategic heavy bomber wings and the longer-ranging fighter escort units, were to come within the aegis of a new US 15th Air Force.

But such changes do not simply happen overnight and there was an interregnum lasting for some months before the split between the two air forces until they had become fully involved in their separate duties insofar as they ever became fully so divided.

Up to the critical November date our team had been dealing on a chronological basis incorporating the activities of both tactical and strategic units while all were involved to a greater or lesser extent in the overriding tactical role, immediate or longer ranging. So long as the still very occasional strategic operations were set aside with only a mention that they would be covered in more detail in a planned future volume, this appeared to allow us to present a relatively seamless continuing narrative.

Having considered this, it was equally clear that a time would come when in most cases the actual activities of the tactical and strategic elements would become so removed from each other as to require two separate narratives if the specific threads of these two roles were not to become so intertwined that following each in detail would become increasingly difficult.

It was only after considerable discussion and no little heart searching that we decided how best to deal at least with the period from November to about the time of the fall of Rome. We therefore decided upon the way we would proceed. Firstly, the continued operations by the strategic forces would increasingly be recorded as a separate narrative where these steadily became effectively more so. However, while those operational missions in support of the tactical air forces continued to occur, these will also be included within the tactical narrative as happens in this Volume 4, but with a clear commitment from us that they will be dealt with further in the future strategic volume (likely to be Volume 6) to the extent necessary to ensure a full and adequate coverage between the two volumes, clearly noted between them.

There are several specific examples which we feel may usefully be identified here. Firstly, 15th Air Force units undertook raids early in the commands existence against targets in the south of France and in Greece and Yugoslavia which were specifically arrived at in support of existing or forthcoming ground operations in these areas. Added to these were raids on targets in northern Italy, particularly where opposing fighters were likely to be met which would also possibly be encountered on occasion by tactical units. It is also worth mentioning here that in the initial period following the formation of 15th Air Force, the greater part of the medium bomber force of B-25s and B-26s were attached from 12th Air Force due to the initial shortage of sufficient numbers of heavy bomber units. Since their attachments were brief particularly of the B-25s their activities until their return will be treated as essentially of a tactical nature.

It also requires to be retained in mind that on occasions of particular need such as the Anzio landings, the 15th Air Forces escort fighters were similarly loaned to the 12th to support the units of XII Air Support Command and Desert Air Force.

We believe the route we have chosen will continue to provide readers with narratives that can be followed with relative ease. Rest assured that where there is any ambiguity or threat of misunderstanding, we will seek to tell you more rather than less.

While we have our soapbox out, there are one or two other points perhaps worth mentioning. In official publications there has frequently been a tendency when recording the performance of air forces involved by using totals of numbers of sorties flown and tonnages of bombs dropped as proof thereof. We believe that these figures do not on their own prove a huge amount since in both cases it is only the accuracy and effectiveness of such deliveries that actually prove much. Wherever possible we try to indicate more measurable yardsticks.

Further, we are very cognisant that still to this day there is in many publications an acceptance of the claims made at the time to be treated as being set in stone. This our joint experiences have persuaded us frequently not to be the case. It was perhaps acceptable for those recording events soon after the time when evidence of actual achievements was not immediately available, to do this. However, some 70 years after those events and with many opportunities for research to be undertaken, is this still acceptable? We widely employ the description claimed unless we feel that sufficient evidence is available to offer at least a fairly robust confirmation.