Nikolaus von Vormann - The Battle of Korsun-Cherkassy: The Encirclement and Breakout of Army Group South, 1944

DIE WEHRMACHT IM KAMPF

The Encirclement and Breakout of Army Group South, 1944

NIKOLAUS VON VORMANN

Translated by

GEOFFREY BROOKS

Series editor:

MATTHIAS STROHN

AN AUSA BOOK

Association of the United States Army

2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia, 22201, USA

Published in the United States of America and Great Britain in 2018 by

CASEMATE PUBLISHERS

1950 Lawrence Road, Havertown, PA 19083, USA

and

The Old Music Hall, 106108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JE, UK

2018 Association of the U.S. Army

Originally published as Die Wehrmacht im Kampf 3: N. von Vormann, Tscherkassy (Kurt

Vowinckel Verlag Heidelberg, 1954)

Translator: Geoffrey Brooks

Series Editor: Matthias Strohn

Hardback Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-603-1

Digital Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-604-8

Digital Edition: eISBN 978-1-61200-604-8

Kindle Edition Mobi ISBN 978-1-61200-604-8

Cataloging-in-publication data is available from the Library of Congress and the British Library.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the publisher in writing.

For a complete list of Casemate titles, please contact:

CASEMATE PUBLISHERS (US)

Telephone (610) 853-9131

Fax (610) 853-9146

Email:

www.casematepublishers.com

CASEMATE PUBLISHERS (UK)

Telephone (01865) 241249

Email:

www.casematepublishers.co.uk

Cover image : Panzers and half-tracks, February 1944. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-090-3913-24)

Cherkassy. Who, except military history experts and those with a deep interest in World War II would associate this name of a city in modern-day Ukraine with a bloody battle that raged in January and February 1944? It is doubtful whether many people could point at Cherkassy on a map of modern-day Ukraine. And yet, this battle often known in English as the battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy pocket after the smaller settlement Korsun approximately 70 kilometres to the west of Cherkassy resulted in approximately 55,000 dead plus a much higher number of wounded soldiers. In a war of the early 21st century, this would make this battle stand out. In the context of the Eastern Front of World War II, this figure was, sadly, just another number added to the Reapers long list of casualties between 1941 and 1945. And yet, this battle was special. Approximately 60,000 German soldiers, including some SS units, were encircled by the Soviets and in a desperate struggle these soldiers managed to break through the Soviet lines and were able to link up with the German relief forces. Both the Germans and the Soviets claimed the battle as their victory.

The man who wrote the German account of the battle that you now hold in your hands in the English translation was General der Panzertruppe Nikolaus von Vormann, one of the protagonists of the battle on the German side. He was born on 24 December 1895. He joined the Prussian Army as a young volunteer in August 1914 and in World War I he fought bravely and was highly decorated. After the war, he briefly served in a para-military Freikorps and then joined the Reichswehr, the 100,000-men army of the Weimar Republic. From then until the outbreak of the war, staff posts and unit command alternated, as was the German tradition for general staff officers. During World War II, he served predominately on the Eastern Front. In December 1942, he commanded 23rd Panzer Division, which was involved in Operation Winter Storm , the failed attempt to relief Sixth Army from the pocket in Stalingrad. In December 1943 he became the commander of XXXXVII Panzer Corps which under his command fought at Cherkassy and which was part of the relief force designated to reach the troops in the pocket or cauldron ( Kessel ) as the Germans referred to it. Later in 1944, after his promotion to General der Panzertruppe , he was given command of Ninth Army, which had suffered badly during the Soviet summer offensive. He ended the war as commandant of the Alps Fortress, to which he had been appointed on 4 May 1945. He died on 26 October 1959.

His career was a very successful example of the career of a professional officer in the Prussian/German Army. He was an effective unit commander and a diligent staff officer. This book is in many ways the result of Vormanns training and education. It describes the events of the battle with the quiet, detached style of the general staff officer, who keeps a calm head and is not panicked by the reports from the front line. The result is a portrayal of the battle that could be described as analytical and perhaps somewhat cold. This is particularly obvious in his description of the German break out from the pocket in with their sabres. That night, approximately 20,000 German soldiers perished. Vormann only hints at this when he says that two German army corps had ceased to exist.

Vormann asks who was responsible for this senseless slaughter. He finds the answer very quickly and without too much searching: for him, the culprit was Hitler, who constantly interfered in the operational conduct of war on the Eastern Front. It is therefore not astonishing that quite a great deal of the book deals with Hitler, his responsibility for the defeat and the relationship between the soldiers and the population on the one side and Hitler on the other. Vormann wrote his book in 1954 and his general argument is one that can be found in many of the books published by former German generals in that period. The reason for this is clear: by putting the sole blame on Hitler, the German officer corps, in particular the General Staff, could be white-washed of any potential criticism of their conduct of operations. Today, we know that, as always, the reality was not black and white and that the role of the officer corps has to be seen in a different light. Naturally, Vormann, as a member of the German General Staff, was biased. Also, sources that are available now were not available in 1954, at the time of Vormanns writing. Therefore, it is important to read Vormanns words about Hitler and the operational excursions with a pinch of salt and one has to understand the context that shaped his book. This does not take away the fact that his account provides a very good account of the military issues and problems that surrounded the battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy pocket and it provides an insight into the mind of a German officer who played a very important role in this battle of 1944, which, unfortunately, was only one of the many battles of the maelstrom of the Eastern Front.

Dr Matthias Strohn, M.St., FRHistS.

Head Historical Analysis,

Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research Camberley

Senior Lecturer, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

Reader in Modern War Studies, University of Buckingham

Frederick the Great was the last to have it in his power to be his own Chancellor and Supreme Warlord.

Napoleon tried but was unable to solve the problem.

Hitler made the attempt. He also failed; was weighed and found wanting.

Hitler became Chancellor through the guilt and failure of the political parties. In addition the Reichstag granted him voluntarily full dictatorial powers.