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The Brown Water Navy in the Mekong Delta: COIN in the Littorals and Inland Waters
Lieutenant Commander Richard Sessoms, United States Navy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER
PREFACE
Soon after I was commissioned, I read LCDR Don Sheppards Riverine: A Brown Water Sailor in the Delta 1967 . His work and the mission he described captivated me. This was the first time I had been exposed to a surface warfare officer serving outside the Blue Water Navy. His work has inspired me to serve in several unconventional surface warfare billets myself.
My studies of various counterinsurgencies at USMC CSC lead me to look at the Brown Water Navy in a new light. This paper combines my long time interest in Riverine warfare with my new interest in counterinsurgency operations.
I would like to thank Dr. Eric Shibuya, my Masters of Military Studies mentor, for his patience and dedication guiding me through the long process of putting this work together. I owe him quite a bit for keeping me on track and reeling me in as I frequently found other things more important than completing this paper.
Finally, I have to acknowledge my inspiration for all I do in my career and life; my two heroes, Pop and Dad. I know youre both with me always.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Thesis : The Brown Water Navy, created in less than one year, conducted successful counterinsurgency operations against the Viet Cong only to be marginalized by its own governments policy of Vietnamization.
Discussion : In 1964 the Viet Cong was firmly entrenched in the Mekong Delta region. Using fear and terror tactics, the insurgency gained control of the population creating a safe haven for the movement to thrive and expand. The United States and the Government of South Vietnam recognized the infiltration problem in the Mekong Delta but their military organizations were either unable or incapable to deal with the problem. The geography of the region made it impossible for a U.S. Army or Marine Corps division to operate effectively and the South Vietnamese Army and Navy lacked the training and equipment to operate successfully. In response to these obstacles, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, commissioned the U.S. Navy to develop a fighting force capable of operating in the delta and ridding the region of the Viet Cong influence. The Navy used for main Operations: MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN,The Mobile Riverine Force, and SEALORDS to achieve these goals. In four short years the Brown Water Sailors experienced marked success with Viet Cong influence minimized and resupply efforts rerouted to the tortuous Ho Chi Minh Trail. However, by the end of 1968 American resolve to fight a war in South Vietnam had deteriorated and the Government needed a way out. President Nixons Vietnamization program provided the exit for American forces and in turn mitigated the Brown Water Navys successes of the previous four years.
Conclusion : The Brown Water Navy overcame tremendous obstacles in less than one year to create and deploy a formidable fighting force to the Mekong Delta. In four years aggressive strides against the Viet Cong insurgency were achieved only to be mitigated by the effects of Vietnamization.
INTRODUCTION
In 1964 the Mekong River Delta was firmly under the control of the communist insurgency known as the Viet Cong (VC). The absence of major cities and physical infrastructure south of Saigon made the area ideal for the VC to establish itself and thrive. By 1964, United States Army and Marine Corps presence in South Vietnam was increasing their assistance to the Government of South Vietnam. While progress was made in the areas north of Saigon, the Mekong Delta remained virtually untouched by American forces as well the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN).
Due to the Marine Corps commitment in the north and the cumbersome nature of the Army Infantry Division in 1964, a new method had to be developed to counter the Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta. This task fell to the United States Navy which had no real riverine capability in early 1964. In less than one year the United States Navy developed a robust riverine capability, the Brown Water Navy.
This paper will examine the development of the United States Navys Brown Water Navy and its conduct of counterinsurgency operations. I will begin by discussing a brief history of the Viet Cong insurgency and its genesis in the Mekong Delta. Next I will discuss the formation of the Brown Water Navy through its three primary operations, MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN, and the Mobile Riverine Force. Additionally, I will examine each operations impact in the fight against the VC insurgency. Finally, I will discuss the effects of Vietnamization on the Brown Water Navy which ultimately reduced the effects of the counterinsurgency.
INSURGENCY
Joint Doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. {1} FM 3-24 further defines insurgency as an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, of other political authority while increasing insurgent control. {2}
In order to succeed in a counterinsurgency operation one must strive to gain control of the population. Bard ONeil identifies four critical areas which must be addressed in order to gain control; control the physical environment, win popular support, address needs of the people, and legitimacy of the local government. {3} In South Vietnam the target of both the VC and the U.S. forces were the peasants. These were the fence sitters who had no real alliance to either the communists or the GVN. These individuals were easy targets for the VC because they were able to address their needs and so long as they acquiesced to VC they lived in relative security. The GVN was virtually unseen in the remote provinces of the Mekong Delta giving the VC near free reign and uncontested control of the region.
THE GENESIS OF THE VIET CONG
Subsequent to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Accords divided Vietnam into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North and the Republic of Vietnam in the South. The Accords provided for a period of free movement in which citizens of either new country could move freely from one to the other. The Communist- led Hanoi regime took full advantage of this provision, choosing to keep nearly fifteen thousand communist supporters in place in the South while bringing nearly seventy thousand more Southerners to the North for training and later reinsertion.
