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Text originally published in 1919 under the same title.
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Publishers Note
Although in most cases we have retained the Authors original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern readers benefit.
We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.
YPRES, 1914
AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT PUBLISHED BY
ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
TRANSLATION BY G. C. W.
WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH)
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
ILLUSTRATIONS
DISPOSITIONS ON 20TH OCTOBER 1914
THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 30 TH OCTOBER 1914
THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 31 ST OCTOBER 1914
THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES ON 31ST OCTOBER 1914. 81 THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE ON 10TH NOVEMBER 1914
THE ATTACK OF THE SIXTH ARMY ON 11TH NOVEMBER 1914
THE ATTACK OF THE 2ND GUARD DIVISION ON 11TH NOVEMBER 1914
INTRODUCTION
THE German book of which a translation is here given was written in the autumn of 1917 by Captain Otto Schwink, a General Staff Officer, by order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, and is stated to be founded on official documents. It forms one of a series of monographs, partly projected, partly published, on the various phases of the war, but is the only one that is available dealing with operations in which the British Army was engaged. Several concerned with the Eastern theatre of war have already appeared, and one other entitled LIGENAMUR, relating to the Western.
Field-Marshal Viscount French, in his book 1914, has said that the period 27th to 31st October during the first battle of YPRES was more momentous and fateful than any other which I directed during my period of service as Commander-in-Chief in the field. 31st October and 1st November will remain forever memorable in the history of our country, for during those two days no more than a thin and straggling line of tired-out British soldiers stood between the Empire and its practical ruin as an independent first-class Power. The German account accentuates the truth of Lord Frenchs appreciation of the great peril in which the Army and the Nation stood. It tells us of the enemys plans, and of the large forces that he brought up with great skill and secrecy to carry them out, and, generally, to use Marshal Fochs expression, lets us know what was going on in the other fellows house. But it does more than that: unconsciously perhaps, it bears convincing testimony to the fighting powers of the British Army, the determination of its leaders, the extraordinary effectiveness of the fire of its artillery and of its cavalry and infantry, and the skill of its engineers; for it repeatedly credits Field-Marshal Sir John French with reinforcements in abundance, insists that our troops fought desperately for every heap of stones and every pile of bricks before abandoning them, and definitely records that the fact that neither the enemys commanders nor their troops gave way under the strong pressure we put on them...gives us the opportunity to acknowledge that there were men of real worth opposed to us who did their duty thoroughly. We are further told that the effect of our artillery was such that it was not possible to push up reserves owing to heavy artillery fire; that all roads leading to the rear were continuously shelled for a long way back; that the German advancing columns were under accurate artillery fire at long range; that our shells blocked streets and bridges and devastated villages so far back that any regular transport of supplies became impossible. As regards rifle and machine-gun fire, we are credited with quantities of machine-guns, large numbers of machine-guns, etc.; with the result that the roads were swept by machine-guns; and that over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. At that date we had no machine-gun units, and there were only two machine-guns on the establishment of a battalion, and of these many had been damaged, and had not yet been replaced; actually machine-guns were few and far between. The only inference to be drawn is that the rapid fire of the British rifleman, were he infantryman, cavalryman or sapper, was mistaken for machine-gun fire both as regards volume and effect. Our simple defences, to complete which both time and labour had been lacking, became in German eyes a well-planned maze of trenches, a maze of obstacles and entrenchments; and we had turned every house, every wood and every wall into a strong point; the villages of WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES... had been converted into fortresses (Festungen); as also the edge of a wood near GHELUVELT and LANGEMARCK. As at the last-named place there was only a small redoubt with a garrison of two platoons, and the broad wire entanglements described by the German General Staff were in reality but trifling obstacles of the kind that the Germans took in their stride, {1} the lavish praise, were it not for the result of the battle, might be deemed exaggerated. Part of it undoubtedly is. It is fair, however, to deduce that the German nation had to be given some explanation why the contemptible little Army had not been pushed straightway into the sea.
The monograph is frankly intended to present the views that the German General Staff wish should be held as regards the battles, and prevent, as their Preface says, the currency of the legends and rumours which take such an easy hold on the popular imagination and are so difficult, if not impossible, to correct afterwards. One cannot naturally expect the whole truth to be revealed yet; that it is not will be seen from the notes. The elder von Moltke said, when pressed by his nephews to write a true account of 1870-1to their future financial advantageIt cant be done yet. Too many highly placed personages (hohe Herrschaften) would suffer in their reputations. It was not until twenty-five years after the Franco-Prussian War that Fritz Hnig, Kunz and other German military historians who had been given access to the records, were allowed to draw back the veil a little. The publication of the French General Staff account began even later. What is now given to us is, however, amply sufficient to follow the main German plans and movements; but the difficulties that prevented the enemy from making successful use of the enormous number of troops at his disposal and his superior equipment in heavy artillery, machine-guns, aeroplanes, hand-grenades and other trench warfare material, are untold. Until we learn more we may fairly attribute our victory to the military qualities of the British, French and Belgian troops, and the obstinate refusal of all ranks to admit defeat.
