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Text originally published in 1997 under the same title.
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THE REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE SIXTH COALITION AGAINST NAPOLEON IN 1813
By
LCDR John Trost Kuehn, USN
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the reasons for the success of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon in 1813. Four critical principles emerge from U.S. joint doctrine that provide a means to examine coalition warfare: national goals, unity of effort, strategic plans, and adherence to plans. These principles illuminate the primary importance of coalition warfare in the defeat of Napoleon.
The failure of an earlier coalition the Second Coalition in 1799 underscores the importance of the principles of coalition warfare to the success or failure of the coalitions against Napoleon and the French. This coalition failed because of its lack of attention to the details of coalition warfare. Its basic flaw, lack of a common coalition goal, undermined its unity and resulted in defeat.
The development of a common goal, the liberation of Germany, combined with the decline of the French and reforms by Napoleons opponents led to a level playing field 1813. The 1813 spring campaign resulted in a stalemate. The coalition used the subsequent armistice to further improve their coalition both politically and militarily. These improvements, particularly the adoption of a unified military strategy, resulted in improved unity of effort and provided the coalition the margin for ultimate victory.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Major Jean-Francois Parlanti of the Army of the Republic of France for his translation of the Trachenberg Convention from the original French. I also owe a debt of gratitude to David Chandler for his wonderful Campaigns of Napoleon which inspired my interest in the Napoleonic era. Finally, I am most grateful to my partner, friend, and wife Kimberlee for her untiring support and advice throughout the entire project.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The period of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars was a key era in the development of coalition warfare. The period produced seven anti-French coalitions, both unsuccessful and successfulmostly unsuccessful. As such, it provides both the student and military professional a veritable laboratory of coalition warfare from which to gain both historical and professional insights. Analysis of both the failed and victorious coalitions, therefore, offers a means to examine some basic principles that are essential to understanding the causes of success and defeat in coalition warfare.
The Sixth Coalition, formed in 1813, was the first coalition to conclusively defeat Napoleon. Why was the Sixth Coalition successful? {1} Most explanations center on two themes: the decline of France and Napoleon and the improvements of his opponents. A total explanation of the Sixth Coalitions victory encompasses both themes. The improvements Napoleons opponents made together as a coalition team dominates the theme of improvement. Therefore, the composition, character, and history of these coalitions and their successful culmination as the Sixth Coalition illuminate some basic principles of coalition warfare.
Joint U.S. military doctrine provides a road map to study Napoleonic coalition warfareparticularly the evolution of its most successful coalition. Indeed, the natural result of the lessons nations learned from the Napoleonic period provided the basis for much current military doctrine. The writings of two of these coalitions participants, Jomini and Clausewitz, have been quoted extensively in the U.S. Armys capstone operational doctrine manual FM 100-5. Examination of Napoleonic coalition warfare may lead to the discovery of common principles and trends that lead to success in coalition warfare in general.
Examination of modem doctrinal considerations with respect to anti-Napoleonic coalitions yielded at least four principlesgoals, unity of effort, strategic plans, and adherence to the plan. Doctrine explicitly states the first twogoals and unity of effort. The second two emerge from an examination of the successful resolution of the 1813 campaign in Germany by the Sixth Coalition. Modem doctrine implies unified coalition planning and coordination during execution, but goes no further than that. For the Sixth Coalition, with only one goal and one enemy, the second two principles were critical in providing the margin for success. However, a coalition risks failure and defeat if it ignores any of these principles.
An earlier coalition from the Napoleonic period provides a historical example of the danger inherent in a casual approach to coalition warfare. The Second Coalition, formed in 1798-1799, superficially resembled the later Sixth Coalition. Despite superior numbers, the isolation of Napoleon, and relatively good leadership in the field, the Second Coalition collapsed. However, the Second and Sixth Coalitions differed dramatically in the way they addressed the four principles discussed above. The Second Coalition virtually ignored these principles while the Sixth Coalition took much greater care in forming a multinational team.
Napoleon was to prove repeatedly that strength in numbers (sometimes to his own chagrin, as in Russia) did not guarantee success unless accompanied by strength of purpose. For a coalition, defining this purpose is the key. It was also difficultas Napoleons opponents discovered. Thus it takes more effort for a coalition to define common goals, agree to a common strategic plan, execute the plan, and maintain unity than it does for a single nation state or empire. Napoleons opponents learned this lesson the hard way in the intervening years between their failure in 1799 and their success in 1813.
The nations of Europe not only learned the lessons of coalition warfare, but the period between the Second and Sixth Coalitions saw massive reforms and changes within the individual nations themselves. Were these lessons enough? Once the advantage that Napoleon had was counterbalanced by organizational, tactical, and even political improvements of his adversaries, the stage was set for a contest between the genius of one man and the collective strength of the coalition in 1813. Decisive success eluded the coalition in the spring of 1813. The leaders of the Sixth Coalition recognized the importance of their coalition itself and in the summer of 1813 exclusively devoted themselves to their goal of unityin efforts, strategic plans, command, and execution. Despite some problems, their persistence and dedication led to success.
