Yves Buffetaut - Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge

Sepp Dietrich, commanding officer of the 6th Panzer Army, did not believe it was possible to reach Antwerp. To seize Lige would be a victory in itself. (BA, Bild 183-J28625, Roeder)

These weaknesses, inevitable in an army that had been in action for five years, and that had suffered numerous setbacks over the preceding months, cannot be considered the only reasons for the German failure however. It was the speed of the Allied reaction, and especially the U.S.s, that would neutralize the German offensive, even before it could reach the Meuse.

Rather than being yet another blow-by-blow account of Operation Wacht am Rhein and the Allied counteroffensive, this book will describe the various events that brought about the German defeat, from the beginning of the offensive, on December 16, 1944, right through to the German withdrawal behind the Siegfried Line. It will consider the American opposition at Saint-Vith; the 101st Airborne stand at Bastogne; German stubbornness in trying to take Bastogne; the airlift and Ninth U.S. Air Force intervention; the Third U.S. Armys lightning regroup; Pattons counterattack; the British counterattack; and the incomplete Allied victory. The latter reminds us that while the Battle of the Bulge was an undeniable setback for the Germans, the Allies did not press home their advantage and convert it into a telling victory. Unable to maintain the encirclement, they failed to seize the opportunity to cross the Siegfried Line and the Rhine and fix the German armies while they were on the run. However, before considering all of this, we must move back in time to the first day of the offensive, as this was when the most important Allied decisions were made.

What was the aim of this offensive, which was wanted by Hitler and had been planned by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, or High Command of the Armed Forces) and Field Marshal Walter Model, commander of Army Group B? The Fhrer had managedthanks to severe cuts on other frontsto rebuild a strategic army to strike in the West. He planned an attack in the Ardennes, aimed at Antwerp, which would slice through the Allied armies, and encircle most of the British Second and U.S. First Armies before taking this major port city. The port itself was of significant importance to the Allies, as supplies for the front all passed through Antwerp. The offensivekept a secretwas to have two phases: firstly to reach the Meuse, and secondly, capture Antwerp. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, head of Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH, or Army High Command), had stockpiled important fuel reserves west of the Rhine, to assist with the first phase. However, these still had to be delivered to the frontline troops during the operation.

On December 15, 1944, faith in the offensives success among German soldiers on the front line contrasted with the misgivings of the senior commanders. Among the generals,none truly believed they would reach Antwerp. Neither Model, nor Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West), had a detailed operational plan to reduce Antwerp. Their directives stopped on the banks of Meuse. Only General Hasso von Manteuffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army, gave instructions for the creation of bridgeheads on the opposite bank in case Hitler had other reserves.