Paul G. Halpern - The Mediterranean Fleet, 1930-1939

1 The Mediterranean Sea

2 The Western Mediterranean

3 The Central Mediterranean

4 The Eastern Mediterranean

5 Southern Red Sea and East Africa

6 Alexandria

7 Zones Established by the Nyon and Paris Agreements

At the beginning of the 1930s the Mediterranean Fleet, Great Britains premier naval force, was still operating in the atmosphere of what would soon seem to have been the halcyon days of the 1920s. The fleet in many of its training and exercises seemed to be preparing for a repetition of Jutland with squadrons of heavy warships and massed destroyer flotillas engaged against their enemy counterparts. At the same time, the Navy was endeavouring to integrate new weapons, notably aircraft, into its battle practices. It was, however, a period of world depression and the financial stringency was felt in the fleet, particularly in deferred spending on the defences of the bases of Malta and Gibraltar. It would be difficult to remedy these deficiencies. The world situation was also changing. In 1931 the Japanese, a former ally, embarked on aggressive expansion and in subsequent years became an apparent threat to the British position in the Far East. In the event of war with Japan, the Mediterranean Fleet was designated to move to the Far East. In 1932 the Ten Year Rule that Britain would not face a major war within ten years was abandoned. In 1933 Hitler and the Nazis came to power in Germany and began policies that would lead to war in less than a decade. The technological progress of aviation also cast a growing uncertainty over traditional naval operations: how well were warships equipped to meet the new threat?

The first major crisis came in 1935 with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, a member of the League of Nations. There was a very real possibility the Mediterranean Fleet would be engaged in hostilities against the Italians in support of League policies. The lasting effect of the crisis was that Italy went from being a traditional friend to a potential enemy. This had enormous consequences for the Mediterranean Fleet because of Italys central position in the Mediterranean. The principal base of the Mediterranean Fleet at Malta was now in easy striking distance of the Italian air force. While the exact effectiveness of air power was still uncertain, and possibly underestimated, the potential danger to a fleet caught at anchor in harbour was apparent and the Mediterranean Fleet for the duration of the crisis shifted its major base far eastward to Alexandria. In the succeeding crises of the 1930s, notably Czechoslovakia in 1938 and the final months of peace, the Mediterranean Fleet would again leave Malta for the more secure location of Alexandria. The Ethiopian crisis was no sooner over when the Spanish Civil War began and for the next few years portions of the Mediterranean Fleet were engaged on duties off the Spanish coast with the threat of mines, air and submarine attack. The end of the Spanish Civil War by the spring of 1939 brought little real relief when the Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939 began another crisis and a run-up to the events which ended in the outbreak of the Second World War. The challenges grew with not one but three potential enemies, plus a potentially hostile Spain where the victorious Nationalists were indebted to Germany and Italy for assistance during the war. In return, the hostility with Turkey so apparent in the first half of the 1920s was gone, although hopes that Turkey might prove an ally in a potential conflict were overly optimistic. The relationship with the French, relatively cool during the Ethiopian crisis, grew warmer with both navies engaged in conversations for at least distant cooperation in the impending war.