John Andreas Olsen - The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present

(p.iv)

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• John Andreas Olsen and Colin S. Gray 2011

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• First published 2011

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• 13579108642

The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present focuses on the nature and logic of grand strategy and military strategy through the lens of twelve case studies, from ancient times to contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The book is intended for military professionals; officerscholars; postgraduate students in history, international relations, and strategic studies in its various forms; and all who have a wide interest in strategy and history. While the book is designed as a cohesive whole, each chapter can be read in isolation.

The book's point of departure is Professor Colin S. Gray's thesis from his study Modern Strategy: there is a unity to all strategic experience: nothing essential changes in the nature and function (or purpose)in sharp contrast to the characterof strategy and war. To shed light on this claim, and to deepen understanding of both the uniqueness and the universality of grand strategy and military strategy, Professor Gray and I decided to select a range of historical case studies drawn from more than two millennia. Next, we identified leading experts to conduct independent research and write the respective chapters.

I am deeply thankful to the authors, all of whom showed both scholarly professionalism and personal dedication as they crafted their contributions to this volume. I am most obliged to Margaret S. MacDonald, who once again committed her unique editorial skills to, and showed great enthusiasm for, yet another project. I am grateful to the Norwegian Defence University College and the Swedish National Defence College for having sponsored this project, Commander Tore J. Rosseid for administrative assistance, Dr. H. P. Willmott for constructive insight, and Laurien Berkeley for editorial support. It is also my pleasure to thank the University of Reading's Liberal Way of War Programme, conducted with the support of the Leverhulme Trust. In addition, I would like to thank Dominic Byatt, Jenny Lunsford, Sarah Parker, Lizzy Suffling, Carla Hodge and Vijaysankar Natesan at Oxford University Press and SPi for their professionalism.

Finally, special thanks to Colin Graya profound scholar, always pushing the envelope, and full of ideas and enthusiasm. It has been a great pleasure to coedit this book with him. I especially enjoyed our honest and refreshing exchanges as we developed and then realized this book project.

John Andreas Olsen

Sarajevo

This book focuses on grand strategy and military strategy as practised over an extended period of time and under very different circumstances, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in presentday Afghanistan and Iraq. It presents strategy as it pertained not only to wars, campaigns, and battles but also to times of peace that were overshadowed by the threat of war. The terms grand strategy and military strategy as we understand them today were unknown to rulers and generals in ancient, medieval, and even the early portion of modern times. Yet, although they may never have received formal teaching about military or political theory, and some may not have read much history, nonetheless, when faced with decisions about their national policies and about combat, these leaders practised strategy. This does not mean that all Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman emperors had overarching grand strategies through which they assessed how to combine political, economic, and military resources, or that all military action was based on deliberate planning, but all of them undoubtedly sought some sort of gain, some sort of victory, and most did so by combining desired objectives, concepts of operations, and available resources: Just as the laws of physics governed the universe long before there were physicists to study them, so those who command nations in war are subject to the logic of strategy even if they know nothing of strategy. Indeed, from the historical record it is not selfevident that the selfconsciously strategic politicians and soldiers of modern times have demonstrated superiority in strategic performance over their fardistant predecessors.