Pollack - Arabs at war : military effectiveness, 1948-1991

EDITORS

Mark Grimsley

Ohio State University

Peter Maslowski

University of Nebraska

EDITORIAL BOARD

D'Ann Campbell

Austin Peay State University

Mark A. Clodfelter

National War College

Brooks D. Simpson

Arizona State University

RogerJ. Spiller

Combat Studies Institute U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth

Timothy H. E. Travers

University of Calgary

Arthur Waldron

U.S. Naval War College

KENNETH M. POLLACK

A Council on Foreign Relations Book

i. Israel's Conquest of the Negev, October 1948-January 1949, 20

2. Israeli Conquest of the Sinai, October 1956, 3 3

3. Battle of Abu Ageilah, October 1956, 35

4. Major Egyptian Operations in Yemen, 1962-67, 50

5. Israeli Conquest of the Sinai, June 1967, 65

6. Battle of Abu Ageilah, June 1967, 68

7. Egyptian Crossing of the Suez, 6 October 1973, 109

8. Egypt's Offensive and Israel's Attack, 14 and 16 October 1973, 115

9. Israeli Operations on the West Bank of the Suez, 17-24 October 1973, 121

10. Iraqi Army Operations, 1948, 152

i i. Major Battles of the First Kurdish War, i6o

12. Iraqi Attacks on 12 and 16 October 1973, 170

13. Iraqi Attacks on 1g October 1973, 172

14. Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980, 188

15. Iran's Counteroffensives, 1881-82, 197

16. First Battle of al-Basrah, July 1982, 204

17. Iranian Offensives, 1986-87, 222

18. Iraqi Offensives, 1988, 226

19. Iraqi Divisions in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, 24 February 1991, 240

20. Initial Coalition Ground Attacks, 24-25 February 1991, 250

21. Final Battles of the Gulf War, 26-27 February 1991, 253

22. Israeli-Transjordanian Battles for the West Bank, 1948, 275

23. Israel's Conquest of the West Bank, June 1967, 301

24. Jordanian Operations, 16 October 1973, 347

25. Jordanian Operations, 1g October 1973, 349

26. Skirmish Sites between Egypt and Libya, 1977, 366

27. Libyan Operations in Uganda, 1979, 370

28. Important Locations in Chad-Libya Fighting, 1986-87, 378

29. Battle of Was al-Khafjji, 29-31 January 1991, 437

30. Syrian Army Operations in 1948, 451

31. Israeli Conquest of the Golan, June 1967, 466

32. Syrian Attack on the Golan, October 1973, 485

33. Israel's Counterattack on the Golan, October 1973, 492

34. Israeli Counteroffensive into Syria, October 1973, 496

35. Second Syrian Offensive in Lebanon, September-October 1976, 518

36. Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, June 1982, 53 5

i. Israeli Air-to-Ground Sorties by Day, by Front, 5-io June 1967, 85

2. Israeli and Syrian Ground-Attack Sorties on the Northern Front, by Day, during the October War, Soo

3. Israeli Ground-Attack Sorties on the Northern and Southern Fronts, by Day, during the October War, 511

This book is intended to serve two purposes. First, it is designed to try to help answer one of the great vexing questions of post-World War II Middle Eastern affairs: what is it that has consistently hindered the Arab armed forces in battle such that they consistently lose wars or win them just barely? This issue is of more than mere historical curiosity. Every six months or so, another crisis with Iraq reminds us that the U.S. armed forces may again be called on to go to war in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, the Middle East peace process has slipped into a torpor, and it is far from certain that it will recover promptly, if at all. If it does not, we may not have written the last chapter in the story of the Arab-Israeli wars. In short, it behooves us to develop a better understanding of the driving forces in Middle Eastern conflicts so that we can be better prepared for another round.

The second purpose of this book is to provide a robust assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Arab militaries. Since the British withdrawal from "East of Suez" in 1971, the United States has found itself increasingly entangled in the Middle East both diplomatically and militarily. This trend accelerated dramatically after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the massive U.S. military deployment it triggered. Today our military commitment to the Middle East is one of the highest American foreign-policy priorities. As our recent war in Afghanistan has demonstrated, there is every reason to expect that in the future, the U.S. military will again be called on to fight in this part of the world. Because of this commitment, the U.S. military constantly plans and trains to fight both alongside, and against, Arab armies. The rogue states of the Middle East are among our most important potential foes, and the moderate Arab states of the region are among our most important allies. It is crucial that we have a thorough understanding of the capabilities and liabilities of these countries. We have to know what we can count on from our Arab allies and in what areas they most need our support. And we have to know the capabilities of our Arab adversaries so that we can exploit their weaknesses and avoid their areas of strength.