United States. Office of Strategic Services - Simple sabotage field manual: (declassified)

Simple Sabotage Field Manual
(Declassified)
First published in 1944.

ISBN 978-1-775415-47-3

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SIMPLE SABOTAGE FIELD MANUAL
Strategic Services
(Provisional)
Prepared under direction of The Director of Strategic Services
OSS REPRODUCTION BRANCH

STRATEGIC SERVICES FIELD MANUAL No. 3

Office of Strategic Services

Washington, D. C.

17 January 1944

This Simple Sabotage Field Manual Strategic Services (Provisional) ispublished for the information and guidance of all concerned and will beused as the basic doctrine for Strategic Services training for thissubject.

The contents of this Manual should be carefully controlled and shouldnot be allowed to come into unauthorized hands.

The instructions may be placed in separate pamphlets or leafletsaccording to categories of operations but should be distributed withcare and not broadly. They should be used as a basis of radio broadcastsonly for local and special cases and as directed by the theatercommander.

AR 380-5, pertaining to handling of secret documents, will be compliedwith in the handling of this Manual.

William J. Donovan

The purpose of this paper is to characterize simple sabotage, to outlineits possible effects, and to present suggestions for inciting andexecuting it.

Sabotage varies from highly technical coup de main acts that requiredetailed planning and the use of specially-trained operatives, toinnumerable simple acts which the ordinary individual citizen-saboteurcan perform. This paper is primarily concerned with the latter type.Simple sabotage does not require specially prepared tools or equipment;it is executed by an ordinary citizen who may or may not actindividually and without the necessity for active connection with anorganized group; and it is carried out in such a way as to involve aminimum danger of injury, detection, and reprisal.

Where destruction is involved, the weapons of the citizen-saboteur aresalt, nails, candles, pebbles, thread, or any other materials he mightnormally be expected to possess as a householder or as a worker in hisparticular occupation. His arsenal is the kitchen shelf, the trash pile,his own usual kit of tools and supplies. The targets of his sabotage areusually objects to which he has normal and inconspicuous access ineveryday life.

A second type of simple sabotage requires no destructive toolswhatsoever and produces physical damage, if any, by highly indirectmeans. It is based on universal opportunities to make faulty decisions,to adopt a noncooperative attitude, and to induce others to follow suit.Making a faulty decision may be simply a matter of placing tools in onespot instead of another. A non-cooperative attitude may involve nothingmore than creating an unpleasant situation among one's fellow workers,engaging in bickerings, or displaying surliness and stupidity.

This type of activity, sometimes referred to as the "human element," isfrequently responsible for accidents, delays, and general obstructioneven under normal conditions. The potential saboteur should discoverwhat types of faulty decisions and the operations are normally found inthis kind of work and should then devise his sabotage so as to enlargethat "margin for error."

Acts of simple sabotage are occurring throughout Europe. An effortshould be made to add to their efficiency, lessen their detectability,and increase their number. Acts of simple sabotage, multiplied bythousands of citizen-saboteurs, can be an effective weapon against theenemy. Slashing tires, draining fuel tanks, starting fires, startingarguments, acting stupidly, short-circuiting electric systems, abradingmachine parts will waste materials, manpower, and time. Occurring on awide scale, simple sabotage will be a constant and tangible drag on thewar effort of the enemy.

Simple sabotage may also have secondary results of more or less value.Widespread practice of simple sabotage will harass and demoralize enemyadministrators and police. Further, success may embolden thecitizen-saboteur eventually to find colleagues who can assist him insabotage of greater dimensions. Finally, the very practice of simplesabotage by natives in enemy or occupied territory may make theseindividuals identify themselves actively with the United Nations wareffort, and encourage them to assist openly in periods of Alliedinvasion and occupation.

To incite the citizen to the active practice of simple sabotage and tokeep him practicing that sabotage over sustained periods is a specialproblem.

Simple sabotage is often an act which the citizen performs according tohis own initiative and inclination. Acts of destruction do not bring himany personal gain and may be completely foreign to his habituallyconservationist attitude toward materials and tools. Purposefulstupidity is contrary to human nature. He frequently needs pressure,stimulation or assurance, and information and suggestions regardingfeasible methods of simple sabotage.

(a) The ordinary citizen very probably has no immediate personal motivefor committing simple sabotage. Instead, he must be made to anticipateindirect personal gain, such as might come with enemy evacuation ordestruction of the ruling government group. Gains should be stated asspecifically as possible for the area addressed: simple sabotage willhasten the day when Commissioner X and his deputies Y and Z will bethrown out, when particularly obnoxious decrees and restrictions will beabolished, when food will arrive, and so on. Abstract verbalizationsabout personal liberty, freedom of the press, and so on, will not beconvincing in most parts of the world. In many areas they will not evenbe comprehensible.

(b) Since the effect of his own acts is limited, the saboteur may becomediscouraged unless he feels that he is a member of a large, thoughunseen, group of saboteurs operating against the enemy or the governmentof his own country and elsewhere. This can be conveyed indirectly:suggestions which he reads and hears can include observations that aparticular technique has been successful in this or that district. Evenif the technique is not applicable to his surroundings, another'ssuccess will encourage him to attempt similar acts. It also can beconveyed directly: statements praising the effectiveness of simplesabotage can be contrived which will be published by white radio,freedom stations, and the subversive press. Estimates of the proportionof the population engaged in sabotage can be disseminated. Instances ofsuccessful sabotage already are being broadcast by white radio andfreedom stations, and this should be continued and expanded wherecompatible with security.