Acknowledgements
First of all I would like to thank Harry Holmes and George Jenks and the Avro Heritage Centre at Woodford for all the support and photographs I have received.
Charles Masefield, besides writing the foreword, supplied the splendid picture of the Nimrod landing at Farnborough and he also continually reminded me of some of the things I would rather forget, a few of which I have included in this book.
I also got a lot of help from my crews, in particular Ted Hartley, Bob Pogson, Jack Haddock and Dickie Proudlove, not only in discussing the book but also in helping me through the years flight testing all our different aircraft.
Wayson Turner has been superb, reminding me of all the technical points I had forgotten of the work we did together developing the Vulcan.
As I have remarked at the end of this book I have been very lucky in the support I have had from everybody and it is a real pleasure to be able to record these happenings in this hardback edition.
With regard to the photographs Peter Elliott at the Royal Air Force Museum has been a great help. Also Nick Stroud of Aeroplane with some splendid shots. I have tried to acknowledge the source of all the photographs, where appropriate. I must apologise if I have omitted an acknowledgement or made a mistake.
In the pictures of 5 Squadron and 11 Squadron I would appreciate knowing the names of the missing people.
Acronyms
AAIB | Air Accident Investigation Board |
ADS | Automatic Dependent Surveillance |
ADF | Automatic Direction Finder |
AEO | Air Electronics Officer |
AID | Airworthiness Inspection Department |
ARB | Air Registration Board ( later Airworthiness Requirements Board) |
ASN | Aviation Safety Network of Flight Safety Foundation |
ATPL | Air Transport Pilots Licence |
BAe | British Aerospace |
BCARs | British Civil Airworthiness Requirements |
BLEU | Blind Landing Experimental Unit |
CAA | Civil Aviation Authority |
CRT | Cathode Ray Tubes |
DEW | Distance Early Warning |
DME | Distance Measuring Equipment |
EASA | European Aviation Safety Agency |
FAA | Federal Aviation Administration |
FAR | Federal Aviation Regulations |
GCA | Ground Controlled Approach |
GPS | Global Positioning System |
HF | High Frequency Radio |
ILS | Instrument Landing System |
LED | Light Emitting Diode |
LIAT | Leewards Island Air Transport |
MFS | Military Flight System |
PAL | Philippine Airlines |
PEC | Personal Equipment Connector |
SBA | Standard Beam Approach |
SBAC | Society of British Aerospace Constructors |
SFS | Smiths Flight System |
SETP | Society of Experimental Test Pilots |
SRG | Safety Regulation Group |
TAF | Tactical Air Force |
VHF | Very High Frequency Radio |
APPENDIX I
Flying the Avro 748
The 748 was a very challenging aircraft for a test pilot to be able to achieve the desired performance and, by modern standards, it was a demanding aircraft. Geoff Howett, an ARB test pilot who did the original flying with Jimmy Harrison, remarked that it was really two very different aircraft depending on whether it was flying on one or two engines. I think the point he was making was that the difference in flying skill required between flying on one engine and on both engines was much greater on the 748 than on other similar twin-engined aircraft.
The flying controls on the aircraft were all aerodynamically balanced; the ailerons were pleasantly light but the elevators and rudder were heavier, though of course all the forces could be trimmed out in steady flight. The time when the pilot really had to be in charge of the aircraft was on the approach when significant elevator forces were required when operating the flaps and when changing the power settings. In fact it was changes of trim with power which was the most significant, so that for a good approach, particularly on instruments, it was advisable to fly a steady speed on the glide slope. Pilots learnt the optimum way to fly the approach and we didnt have any problems with the airline pilots we trained once they got used to the aircrafts characteristics.
Flying on one engine was a very different proposition. The certification rules in those days allowed a pedal force of 180lb to be applied when determining the minimum speed the aircraft could be flown steadily on one engine, VMCA. This force is right at the limit for most pilots and certainly cannot be held for long; in fact it was reduced to 150lb some years later but of course the change did not apply retrospectively. In airline operation, the pilot should never have had to fly the aircraft at this speed since the minimum speed permitted was V2 which was 1.1 times VMCA. Nevertheless the rudder force to maintain V2 was still high and the sooner one trimmed the rudder forces the better.
It also had to be remembered that when an engine failed it was vital for the propeller to feather immediately to reduce the drag and the 748 was like all other propjet aircraft in that on engine failure the propeller was designed to auto-feather. Unless the propeller feathered it was almost impossible to control the aircraft on one engine.
When we were training airline pilots we would not actually close an engine down on take-off since this would have created an emergency situation unnecessarily. We only stopped an engine when we were actually carrying out test work such as measuring performance or determining critical control speeds. Instead we would simulate engine failure by throttling the engine back to about forty torque on the power gauge; throttling right back would actually create an adverse drag situation with the propeller. It usually took several take-offs before we were satisfied that the pilot under training could be relied on to accelerate the aircraft on the ground from V1 to VR, rotate the aircraft, allow it to accelerate to V2 and then climb the aircraft up to 400ft. This part of the training schedule was the most demanding, not only for the trainee pilot but also for the instructor. There were no simulators for the aircraft and, in reality, in the case of the 748 even had there been one I dont believe it could have substituted for having a real failure.
These days, control forces are much lighter and very often on a twinengined aircraft there is an automatic system so that if an engine fails some rudder is immediately applied towards the live engine to help the pilot. It was the high rudder forces on the 748 which caused the problem for the pilots.
There was another complication on the aircraft which was that it was necessary to choose the optimum amount of take-off flap depending on the length of the take-off strip and we certificated the aircraft for three settings, 7/2, 15 and 22/2. The shorter the strip the more flap was needed but in order to meet the climb out performance should an engine fail the maximum take-off weight would have to be limited with the higher flap settings. For this reason it was always very important that the pilot or dispatcher knew the flap being used so that the maximum take-off weight could be determined.