Lt.-Col. Elizabeth A. Coble - Operation Market Garden: Case Study For Analyzing Senior Leader Responsibilities

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OPERATION MARKET GARDEN: CASE STUDY FOR ANALYZING SENIOR LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES

by

Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth Ann Coble United States Army Reserve

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER

With German forces on the run following the Allied success at Normandy and the breakout and pursuit across France, Allied forces were staged to enter Germany in late summer 1944. Both Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley clamored to be given the priority of effort. General Eisenhower chose Montgomerys Operation MARKET GARDEN as the plan for action. It called for airborne forces to open the route for a ground force to move more than sixty miles up a single road, ending up north of the Rhine River near Arnhem, Netherlands. By accomplishing this task, the German Ruhr industrial heartland would be within easy grasp. But the operation failed. The ground force did not make it to the last bridge; it was six more months before Allied forces crossed the Lower Rhine River near Arnhem. Between 17 and 26 September 1944, there were 17,000 Allied casualties including eighty percent of the 1 st Airborne Division (UK). Did senior Allied leaders do enough to resolve issues raised before the operation began? Should it even have been conducted at all? This paper uses primary sources, including diaries, memoirs, and autobiographies, and unit reports, to examine what role senior leaders played in the failure of the operation.

The higher up the chain of command, the greater is the need for boldness to be supported by a reflective mind, so that boldness does not degenerate into purposeless bursts of blind passion. Command becomes progressively less a matter of personal sacrifice and increasingly concerned for the safety of others and for the common purpose. Carl von Clausewitz, On War

Operation MARKET GARDEN was a strategic plan proposed by British Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery and approved by Supreme Allied Commander General (GEN) Dwight D. Eisenhower. Considered a gamble, especially coming from the cautious Montgomery, its level of risk and probability of success were questioned by leaders and staffs of all effected echelons before it was conducted. And in the end, it was an overall failure. Between 17 and 26 September 1944, there were over 11,000 casualties among three participating Allied airborne divisions. This casualty count represented just under one third of the committed airborne force; it was more than among all Allies on 6 June 1944, the first day of Operation OVERLORD. {1} There were over 17,000 Allied casualties, when the ground force numbers are included. More than one Allied division was lost in the 10 days of Operation MARKET GARDEN.

This paper will examine responsibilities in senior leader decision making, using Operation MARKET GARDEN as the case study. While understanding hindsight is 20/20, it will consider what senior leaders said and did about the operation before it launched to determine if those responsible did what they were charged to do. It will also consider whether the plan was sound, or if it should have been conducted at all.

After significant Allied ground gains following the breakout from Normandy until early September 1944, both Montgomerys 21 st Army Group (United Kingdom (UK)) and Lieutenant General (LTG) Omar N. Bradleys 12 th Army Group (US) were grinding to a halt due to a lack of supplies. The 21 st Army Group was generally along the Belgian- Dutch border, with fighting continuing in pockets along the coast, mainly around major port cities. The 12 th Army Group had crossed the Moselle River and was closing in on the German border south of the Ardennes Forest. LTG Jacob L. Devers 6 th Army Group (US) was moving northeast through France following its success in southern France in Operation DRAGOON.

Figure 1.

Both Montgomery and Bradley were clamoring for supplies, most significantly gasoline, needed to continue their operations. Allied forces were still reliant on supplies being trucked predominately from the Cherbourg port in France, more than 400 miles from the 12 th Army Group. Allied bombing campaigns prior to OVERLORD destroyed the railway system in Western Europe which could have eased the strain. The US Red Ball Express trucked supplies to the front, but this was laborious. It took ten trucks to get five truckloads forward; vehicles wore out quickly. As for flying in supplies, the lack of aircraft, lift restrictions, and airfield availability limited this option. Attempts at opening new ports had yet to come to fruition. Although 21 st Army Group forces captured the major Belgian port city of Antwerp on 4 September 1944, they did not pursue the fight further so German forces still controlled the Scheldt Estuary and the fifty-mile water approaches to the port, making it unusable. Eisenhower had to determine how to prioritize the limited supplies which could be brought to the front.

Figure 2. Situation on the Western Front 5 September 1944 {3}

In addition to the supply concerns, Eisenhower juggled growing infighting and political considerations. Both Montgomery and Bradley thought their Army Groups were best aligned to enter Germany proper and quickly end the war. During Operation OVERLORD planning, Eisenhower, supported by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and UK Prime Minister Wilson Churchill, decided on a broad front strategy for moving across Western Europe into GermanyAllied Armies would advance abreast. But by late August 1944, Montgomerynow with Churchills backingpushed for a change toward a single thrust strategy. The new idea was for one augmented Army Group to drive into German and on to Berlin with the other Army Groups defending with localized advances. At this stage, either way Eisenhower decided would cause additional strain on the political alliance and among his senior leadersespecially Montgomery and LTG George S. Patton, commander of the 3 rd Army (US).