R. E. Urquhart - Arnhem

ARNHEM

ARNHEM

BY
MAJOR-GENERAL
R.E. URQUHART CB DSO

WITH WILFRED GREATOREX

First published in Great Britain in 1958 by Cassell St Company Ltd

Reprinted in this format in 2007, 2008 & 2011 by
PEN & SWORD MILITARY
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Copyright Major-General R.E. Urquhart CB, DSO, 1958, 2007, 2008, 2011

ISBN 978 1 84415 537 8

The right of Major-General R.E. Urquhart CB, DSO to be identified as Author
of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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To all ranks who served in the

1st Airborne Division in September 1944

and their Comrades in Arms of the

1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group

THIS is the story of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem during the Operation Market Garden which involved not only an Airborne Corps of three Divisions but also the bulk of the British 2nd Army in Europe. The Market part of the operation covered the action of the Airborne troops and Garden the ground operations which were designed to join up with them. Considerable attention has been focused on the action of my Division and sometimes it is too easily forgotten that the other two Airborne Divisions, the 82nd and the 101st which were American, also had tremendous battles in their own sectors.

Market was an Airborne Corps battle and the success or failure of the operation must be viewed as a whole.

In order to prevent the story of this action, which at times was very confused, from becoming merely a narrative of events in the style of an official history, it has been found impossible to give prominence to all, both units and individuals, who deserve mention for their part in this battle. Some are mentioned often but this does not mean that the performance of others, who are either not named at all or who are very briefly dealt with, is undervalued. All units and all ranks played their part in this very intensive nine days and I wish it were possible to deal with them all equally in the text.

I would like to thank the many who have helped me in the preparation of this book by either lending their own personal accounts of the battle or allowing themselves to be interviewed.

I have to thank General Eisenhower, Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein and Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Browning for allowing the reproduction of their letters to me in connexion with this action.

Finally I must acknowledge the help which Wilfred Greatorex has given me in the preparation of this book. Without him the account would never have been written. His professional skill has been of the greatest assistance in the arrangement of the material and the stories of those days and it is to be hoped that the result is such as to make evident something of the spirit and fighting ability of the 1st Airborne Division.

R.E. U.

Drymen,

Stirlingshire.

May, 1958.

Photographs supplied by The Imperial War Museum

In attack most daring, in defence most

cunning, in endurance most steadfast,

they performed a feat of arms which will

be remembered and recounted as long as

the virtues of courage and resolution have

power to move the hearts of men.

Winston Churchill, 28 September 1944

WITH a grand sweep of the hand, my Corps commander, Boy Browning, drew a third large circle on the talc-covered map and, fixing me with his hard and direct gaze, said: Arnhem Bridge and hold it. The three circles represented the airborne carpet along which Montgomery intended to roll the victorious 2nd Army from the DutchBelgian border all the way across Holland to the Zuider Zee ninety-nine miles away. It was nothing if not daring. Monty had two major objectives: to get troops over the formidable Rhine barrier, and to capture the Ruhr. Further, he planned by this powerful stroke to cut off the escape route of the Germans still in western Holland, some of whom were responsible for the V2 attacks on England; to outflank the Reichs West Wall, and to give the Allies a springboard for a rapid drive across the north German plain.

As deputy to the American commander of the Allied Airborne Army, General Lewis Brereton, Browning was responsible for ground operations. As he elaborated on the plan, I glanced at the two American generals sitting alongside me and wondered if they were as surprised as I was at the boldness of the whole conception coming as it did from the usually cautious Monty. Major-General Max Taylor and his 101st U.S. Airborne Division were responsible for the stretch of carpet which included the river crossings between Eindhoven and Grave, and Jim Gavin and his 82nd U.S. Airborne Division for the middle length and the crossings of the River Maas at Grave and the Waal at Nijmegen. It occurred to me that it was either a compliment to the efficiency of my own 1st Airborne Division that we had been given the farthest bit of carpet or an instance of safety-first diplomacy in view of the fact that the idea was Montys and the operation British. If I had known all that had transpired between the birth of the idea in Montys agile mind and its acceptance by SHAEF, I might well have taken the latter view. For Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, did not see eye to eye with Monty about the immediate shape of operations against the now battered Germans. While Eisenhower favoured an advance along a broad front, taking advantage of all lines of attack, Monty saw an opportunity for one really powerful and full-blooded thrust in the north. As Eisenhower was later to write: There was still a considerable reserve in the middle of the enemy country and I knew that any pencil-like thrust into the heart of Germany such as he proposed would meet nothing but certain destruction. This fundamental disagreement blew up when they met in Eisenhowers aircraft on Brussels airfield on the afternoon of 10 September 1944.