John E. Peters - The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe: The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001

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The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies, Contract DASW01-95-C-0059.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Peters, John E., 1947

The changing quality of stability in Europe : the Conventional

Forces in Europe Treaty toward 2001 / John E. Peters.

p. cm.

MR-1104-OSD.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-8330-2783-2

1. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990).

2. Arms controlEurope. 3. United StatesMilitary

relationsEurope. 4. EuropeMilitary relationsUnited States.

I. RAND Corporation. II. Title.

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The Conventional Forces in
Europe Treaty Toward 2001

John E. Peters

National Defense Research Institute

Prepared for the
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

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The Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD's) Office of Non-Nuclear Arms Control asked RAND to advise that office regarding its role with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the CFE adaptation talks. This report offers the project team's final observations. Earlier results were reported in CFE and Military Stability in Europe, MR-911-OSD. This report considers the factors that bear on CFE today and that will influence the treaty at the next implementation review conference, scheduled for 2001.

In addition to staff in the Office of Non-Nuclear Arms Control, this report will be of interest to the broader arms control community as well as to those seeking information about European security and repercussions from it for the United States.

The research for this project was conducted within the National Defense Research Institute's International Security and Defense Policy Center at RAND. The National Defense Research Institute is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies.

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Research for this project originally began in 1995 in anticipation of the first CFE Implementation Review Conference. Since then, the project has generally dealt with the operational, practical issues attending the CFE Treaty and attempts to adapt it to the present conditions in European security. This report looks somewhat beyond the military-technical considerations of the treaty and considers how the treatys role is changing at a strategic level.

The report reflects on what CFE will contribute to security after adaptation, how CFE is interacting with NATO, and how arms control has moved from its traditional role in deliberate diplomacy toward a new role in crisis management. The report concludes that an adapted CFE Treaty will not deliver the same quality of stability across the treaty area as the original, cold war treaty did but will provide other benefits. In CFEs relationship with NATO, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, it is not CFE that has the greatest amount of latitude for conditioning the security environment, but rather the Atlantic alliance. A new bargain between CFE and NATO is emerging, in which CFE constrains the dimensions of potential conflicts so that the crisis response means available through NATO remain adequate for the task of quelling confrontations that may arise.