Charles G. Thomas - Secession and Separatist Conflicts in Postcolonial Africa

Copyright 2014 Nathan E. McCormack and Charles G. Thomas

Of all the case studies presented in this book, none is more indicative of both the legacies of past secessionist attempts and the present global political dynamics than the unrecognized state of Somaliland. The legacies of the past have imposed a continued insistence that the boundaries of all African states remain sacrosanct absent the express permission of the mother state; this has left Somaliland without international recognition despite having existed as a separate and autonomous territory for over twenty years. However, the end of the Cold War and the increasingly tenuous questions of sovereignty and the nation-state have meant that despite this lack of official recognition of its sovereignty, Somaliland has found pragmatic partners in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea region, and across the globe to sustain itself and the increasingly capable state structures that define it. This chapter will explore the role of Somaliland in the current secessionist and separatist dynamics in Africa and how the denial of de jure sovereignty has, in the current age, not prevented its de facto existence.

It would be a misnomer to discuss the conflict that resulted in Somaliland as a secessionist insurgency from the outset. The separation of Somaliland from Somalia proper was not expected by the combatants, nor was it originally desired. It was only the collapse of the rest of the state into a deadly civil war and its inability to effectively reintegrate that convinced the people of Somaliland that they not only could but should remain a separate political body. However, the previous reform conflict and the insurgency that drove it remain an essential component of the eventual separation of Somaliland and as such deserve discussion to contextualize the current state of Somaliland and its relations with its neighbours.

The seeds of the reform movement that would eventually coalesce into the Somali National Movement and the separation of Somaliland from Somalia were planted in 1969. In that year, the elected government of the United Republic of Somalia was overthrown by the military regime of Mohamed Siad Barre and his Supreme Revolutionary Council. This made the reclamation of the Ogaden a central pillar of Siad Barres Pan-Somali ideology, which was increasingly buttressing the social transformation of his country.

However, at least initially the direct annexation of the Ogaden was out of reach for Siad Barres regime. Instead, significant efforts were made to support the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), a dissident insurgency in the Ogaden that had irredentist goals and its own Pan-Somali ideology.

While this effectively ended the hopes for a Greater Somalia for the time being, hostilities would continue back and forth between the now U.S.-aligned Somalia and the Soviet and Cubanbacked Ethiopia. However, as the formal war ended, the informal war between the two increased in intensity. Without the success of Pan-Somalism and with the loss of the economic support of the Soviet Union, Siad Barres regime began to lose support amongst the rival power blocs within Somalia. The acceptance of structural reforms in return for aid from the IMF was a tipping point, crushing the ability of local peasant agriculturalists to compete economically and creating broad opposition to the regime. Dissident fronts emerged in attempts to force alterations in the governance of Somalia. These included Mohamed Farah Aideeds United Somali Congress (USC), Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmeds Somali Salvation Democratic Front, and the primarily Isaaq clanbacked Somali National Movement (SNM). Each of these fronts was dedicated to the concept of Somalia as a whole, but wished to overthrow Siad Barre. Given Siad Barres continued support for the WSLF in the Ogaden and his continued ambitions on the Ogaden, Ethiopia proved to be a silent haven for these fronts as they found their footing in the early 1980s.