Johnson Lyndon Baines - Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War

Lyndon Johnson and the
Escalation of the Vietnam War

Brian VanDeMark

Oxford University Press

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Copyright 1991, 1995 by Brian VanDeMark

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First published as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1995

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
VanDeMark, Brian
Into the quagmire : Lyndon Johnson and the escalation
of the Vietnam War / Brian VanDeMark.
p. cm. Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-19-506506-9
ISBN 0-19-509650-9 (pbk.)
1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975United States
2. United StatesPolitics and government1963-1969.
3. Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973.
I. Title. DS558.V36 1991
959.704'3373dc20 90-6829

2 4 6 8 10 9 7 5 3

Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

To my parents and Dian

SOME YEARS AFTER leaving the presidency, Lyndon Johnson reflected on the Vietnam Wars significance to both his historical reputation and the American experience. The struggle in Vietnam, LBJ rightly observed in his memoirs, inspired one of the most passionate and deeply felt debates in our nations life. That debate will go on, he correctly added, for as Johnson himself realized, succeeding generations of historians will make [their] judgments on the decisions made and the actions taken.

LBJ had voiced similar thoughts as President. As early as 1965, Johnson sensed that the Vietnam War would determine his ultimate place in history, overshadowing all else, including his extraordinary domestic reform program, the Great Society. LBJ, one associate vividly remembered, talked about this all the time.

How, then, should historians interpret this epochal event of Johnsons presidency and 1960s American life? Vietnams very importance demands a thorough, critical, but sensitive understanding of the people and forces which together shaped the struggle. The privilege of hindsight, if not humility, calls for nothing less. For, as Carl von Clausewitz, the pre-eminent student of war, once wrote, we see things in the light of their result, and to some extent come to know and appreciate them fully only because of it.

I have tried to heed this advice in analyzing LBJs Vietnam decisions from November 1964 through July 1965the pivotal months when Johnson launched the bombing of North Vietnam and dispatched major U.S. ground combat forces to South Vietnam, thus fixing America on a course of massive military intervention in the region. I have sought to reconstruct those events in their widest possible light, stressing the tangle of international and domestic pressures confronting LBJ and his advisers during this watershed period.

I feel this approach best recaptures the contemporary context in which decisionmakers acted, while also illuminating the immense complexities and tensions surrounding the war. I believe these insights, in turn, offer readers a clearer, deeper understanding of LBJsand AmericasVietnam ordeal.

I make no claim, though, to exhausting study of this important subjectonly broadening and, hopefully, enriching perceptions of it. Such goals, however modest, remain the historians proper task. Richard Hofstadter, a wise and gifted practitioner of this craft, put it best, I think: The closer the historian comes to the full texture of historical reality, the more deeply is he engulfed in a complex web of relationships which he can hope to understand only in a limited and partial way.

With that thought in mind, I hope the following account casts added light on Lyndon Johnson and the escalation of the Vietnam War, while moving the reader to reflect further on this fateful chapter in modern American history.

Although writing is a solitary labor, all historians rely on others for help along the way. I am no exception. I have several people to thank for advice and assistance in preparing this book.

First is the archival staff at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texasparticularly its chief Vietnam curator, Dr. David C. Humphrey. LBJ Library archivists extended a rare blend of skillful help and warm courtesy during my many visits to Austin. Thanks also are due to the librarys LBJ Foundation, for a Moody grant-in-aid to defray travel and research expenses.

This book began as a dissertation in history at the University of California, Los Angeles. Throughout much of the project, UCLAs Department of History provided a stimulating and collegial environment in which to teach and write. It also bestowed generous and welcome fellowship support. UCLAs University Research Library furnished a rich storehouse of books and, at times, a quiet haven for reflection.

Two fine historians deserve particular thanks for their guidance and support over many years. Professor Robert A. Divine of the University of Texas at Austin first stimulated my interest in diplomatic history, and inspired me to do my best. My doctoral mentor, Professor Robert Dallek of UCLA, proved a model scholar and teacher, from whom I learned much indeed. His example and encouragement, quite simply, made this a better book.

I have also benefited from the rare privilege of assisting Mr. Clark M. Clifford in preparing his memoirs. Working with Mr. Clifford and his distinguished coauthor, Richard C. Holbrooke, deepened my appreciation for both the complexities and the burdens of governance. Mr. Clifford, moreover, graciously allowed me to quote from his forthcoming autobiography. I have, however, neither sought nor received Mr. Cliffords endorsement of the views expressed in this book.

A word of thanks must also go to my publisher, Sheldon Meyer, editors David Bain and Stephanie Sakson-Ford, and all the other talented and friendly people at Oxford University Press, who helped make the manuscript a book.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge a very special and heavy debt to my wife, Dian Owen VanDeMark. Her encouragement, understanding, and, above all, her extraordinary forbearance sustained me from beginning to end.

Washington, D.C. B.V

january 1990

VIETNAM DIVIDED AMERICA more deeply and painfully than any event since the Civil War. It split political leaders and ordinary people alike in profound and lasting ways. Whatever the conflicting judgments about this controversial warand there are manyVietnam undeniably stands as the greatest tragedy of twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations.

Americas involvement in Vietnam has, as a result, attracted much critical scrutiny, frequently addressed to the question, Who was guilty?Who led the United States into this tragedy? A more enlightening question, it seems, is How and why did this tragedy occur? The study of Vietnam should be a search for explanation and understanding, rather than for scapegoats.