H. P. Willmott - The Last Century of Sea Power, Volume 2

THE LAST CENTURY OF SEA POWER

THE LAST CENTURY OF SEA POWER

THE LAST
CENTURY
OF SEA
POWER

Volume Two: From Washington
to Tokyo, 19221945

H. P. Willmott

This book is a publication of

Indiana University Press
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Bloomington, IN 47404-3797 USA

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2010 by H. P. Willmott
All rights reserved

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition.

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information SciencesPermanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.

Manufactured in the United States of America

The Library of Congress has catalogued the first volume in this series as follows:

Willmott, H. P.
The last century of sea power : from Port Arthur to Chanak, 18941922 /
H.P. Willmott.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-253-35214-9 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Naval history, Modern19th
century. 2. Naval history, Modern20th century. I. Title.
D362.W68 2008
359.0309041dc22

2008015018

1 2 3 4 5 15 14 13 12 11 10

Dedicated to FY1645
and in praise of
Dissent, Uncertainty, and Tolerance

O lente lente currite equis nocti
and
to the memory of Everton, Sherry, Kondor,
Jamie, Suki, Lancaster, and Junior

CONTENTS

CHAPTER APPENDIXES

MAPS AND A DIAGRAM

TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the first volume of The Last Century of Sea Power there was a preface that set out the terms of reference of this work, specifically the various considerations that over time established the basis of this work. This preface is not the place to repeat such matters and hence what was in the first volume a preface and acknowledgement in this volume should be no more than the acknowledgement section.

I would specifically acknowledge and offer my sincere and unreserved gratitude for all the help and advice I received from Ola Be Hansen, Hasegawa Rei, Paul Latawski, Captain Francesco Loriga, and Tohmatsu Haruo and from Jennie Wraight and Iain Mackenzie, and from Anthony Clayton, Sarandis Papadopoulos, and Steven Weingartner, and with these individuals I would add those persons who were always at my side that went beyond the call of friendship, namely Michael and Sara Barrett, Bernard Cole, Michael Coles, Gerard Roncolato, William Spencer and Andrea Johnson and family, John Andreas and Tine Olsen, Jack and Gee Sweetman, and Spencer C. and Beverly Tucker. To all of these people I would simply state my thanks and appreciation for help and camaraderie that are beyond my poor powers to acknowledge properly.

I would also acknowledge the support and encouragement provided by various colleagues and friends in a period of very considerable personal and professional misfortune and without whose quiet companionship what was bad might well have been nigh-impossible. Among those I would acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Tim Bean, Patrick Birks, Nigel and Martine de Lee, Paul Harris, Cliff Krieger, Jim Mattis, Lars Neilsen, George Raach, Kyle Sinisi, Frederick Snow, Patrick and Jennifer Speelman, David Vance, John Votaw, and David White, and with this acknowledgement I would state my hope that this book is some small token of my appreciation and esteem.

I also wish to acknowledge my debt to those without whose patience, tact, and literary ability this book would probably have gone the way of many of the ships cited in these pages. Specifically I would wish to acknowledge my debts to Robert Sloan and Brian Herrmann of Indiana University Press, to Keith Chaffer for his professionalism and imaginative work upon the maps, and to the library personnel who professionally and personally have helped me at every stage of proceedings, Ken Franklin, Andrew Orgill, and John Pearce: I trust they will accept this poor acknowledgement of their support and efforts.

There remains one group that always appears in my acknowledgements section and for one reason: they have been the means of ensuring continuing sanity. I would acknowledge my debt to and love for my beloved woofers. Would that Everton, Sherry, Kondor, Jamie, Suki, Lancaster, and Junior be at peace and together, and in terms of my present debt and love for Mishka, Cassie, and Ozzie, and for Yanya, I would merely express my hope that much time will pass before they join their predecessors and chase together across the celestial fields.

PART 1

NAVAL RACES
AND WARS

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: WASHINGTON, LONDON, AND TWO VERY SEPARATE WARS, 19211941

ARMS RACES ARE NOT the cause of rivalries and wars but rather the reflection of conflicting ambition and intent, though inevitably they compound and add to these differences. The First World War was not the product of Anglo-German naval rivalry, though this was one of the major factors that determined Britains taking position in the ranks of Germanys enemies, and most certainly it was a major factor in producing the growing sense of instability within Europe in the decade prior to 1914. But if the naval race was indeed one of the factors that made for war in 1914although it should be noted that the most dangerous phase of this rivalry would seem to have passed by 1914then there is the obvious problem of explaining the war in 19391941, in that the greater part of the inter-war period, between 1921 and 1936, was marked by a very deliberate policy of naval limitation on the part of the great powers. Admittedly the arrangements that were set in place in various treaties had lapsed by 1937, and a naval race had begun that most certainly was crucially important in terms of Japanese calculations in 1940 and 1941 and indeed was critical in the decision to initiate war in the Pacific. In summer 1941, as the Japanese naval command was obliged to consider the consequences of its own actions and the full implications of the U.S. Congress having passed the Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act in July 1940, the Imperial Navy, the Kaigun, was caught in a go-now-or-never dilemma, and it, like its sister service, simply could not admit the futility and pointlessness of past endeavors and sacrifices. But, of course, not a few of these endeavors and sacrifices had been military and Asian and most definitely were not naval and Pacific.