Monte Bullard - The Soldier and the Citizen: Role of the Military in Taiwans Development: Role of the Military in Taiwans Development

TAIWAN IN THE MODERN WORLD

TAIWAN IN THE MODERN WORLD

The Role of the Military in Taiwans Development

Monte R. Bullard

First published 1997 by M.E. Sharpe

Published 2015 by Routledge

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bullard, Monte R.

The soldier and the citizen : the role of the military in Taiwans development/
Monte R. Bullard
p. cm.(Taiwan in the modern world)
An East Gate book.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 1-56324-978-2 (alk. paper).ISBN 1-56324-979-0 (pbk.: alk. paper)
1. TaiwanPolitics and government1945
2. Civil-military relationsTaiwan.
3. TaiwanArmed ForcesPolitical activity.
I. Title.
II. Series.
DS799. 816. B86 1996
322. 50951249dc20
96-38663
CIP

ISBN 13: 9781563249792 (pbk)

ISBN 13: 9781563249785 (hbk)

W hy this book? Was it because political socialization is an academic topic which deserves more study? Was it because Taiwans military hasnt been sufficiently described? The answer to these latter two questions is yes, but The real motivation for writing this book was to attempt to take advantage of knowledge I acquired from practical experience in the military and from theoretical learning in academia. For many years I have read what scholars have written about Political Warfare and while most was accurate and interesting, there seemed to be something missing. I felt that I wanted to try to add something to this area of knowledge.

My first exposure to political warfare came on June 8, 1964, when I was assigned as a Chinese language escort officer, a young captain, to four political warfare General Officers from the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan to visit military facilities in the United States. The four officers were: General Kao Kuei-yuan (), Lieutenant General Chou Chung-feng (), Rear Admiral Yuan Cheng-chang (), and Major General Ning Chun-hsing (). General Kao, at the time, was Director General of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD). He later went on to become Chief of the General Staff and Minister of National Defense. Lieutenant General Chou was Commandant of the Political Staff College and later went on to become Director of the National Security Bureau, the equivalent to the American Central Intelligence Agency. Rear Admiral Yuan was Director, Political Warfare Department, ROC Navy, and later became Director of the Investigation Bureau, the equivalent to the American Federal Bureau of Investigation. Major General Ning was a Deputy Director in GPWD and later became the Director of the Political Warfare Department, Taiwan General Garrison Command. These were remarkable leaders who were intelligent and dedicated to their country. But I must consider this one-month tour a major missed opportunity. Although I developed an intuitive feeling about the generals and was able to maintain a friendship with them for many years, I learned very little about political warfare.

My next exposure was upon the completion of more language training at the U. S. State Department Language and Area Studies Center in Taichung, Taiwan, in November 1967. 1 was approved by General Kao to attend Class Number Seventy-two, a twenty-week Advanced Course () for middle level officers at the Political Warfare College in Peitou, Taiwan. At that time I began to learn a great deal about the practical application of political warfare. I attended all the classes except about ten hours which were devoted to Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) business.

At the end of the course I was assigned to accompany two more visitors to the United States, General Wang Sheng (), Executive Deputy Director of GPWD and Professor Tseng Hsueh-chia (). General Wang later became Director General of GPWD and became known as Mr. Political Warfare. The focus of that trip was academic. General Wang was invited to visit with U. S. scholars at various universities to discuss his understanding of the situation in Communist China. He visited with Robert Scalapino, Chalmers Johnson, Edward Rice, Stanley Lubman and Jack Service at the University of California, Berkeley. Professor Scalapino recommended that he visit China specialists at other universities so the initial itinerary was changed. General Wang then visited with Harold Hinton, Ralph Powell, Michael Lindsey, and Franz Michael in Washington D. C.; Lucian Pye, Doak Barnett, Ezra Vogel, Jerome Cohen, and Winston Hsieh in Boston; John Lewis, Knight Biggerstaff, and David Mozingo at Cornell in Ithaca, New York; and Albert Feuerwerker, Donald Munro, Harriet Mills, Rhoads Murphy, and Richard Solomon at Ann Arbor, Michigan. He also visited key government officials in Washington D. C. and at the United Nations. It was another rare opportunity for me to be exposed to the discussions on political warfare. But again, I felt I still did not have a sufficient understanding of the topic.