A CKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book is the culmination of years of research, made possible and enhanced by a smart team of colleagues who shared their time, expertise, and brilliance. This includes a cadre of extremism experts at George Washington Universitys Program on Extremism. The Program is led by Lorenzo Vidino, who gave us both the personal encouragement and the professional freedom to follow the research wherever it took us. We are grateful for the support and scholarship of Audrey Alexander, Jonathan Lewis, Andrew Mines, and Haroro Ingram who read, commented on, and corrected numerous drafts. Without their feedback, this would be a lesser endeavor. We are also appreciative of David Sterman and Daniel Byman, who provided key insights as the research progressed and acted as sage sounding boards. Finally, we thank the countless number of sources, from both government and the public, who trusted us to tell their stories in a serious and respectful manner.
Finally, while professional support is always needed, personal support cannot be ignored. We would be remiss if we did not thank those in our lives who, unlike us, do not spend their days reading and researching terrorism, but nonetheless support our concerning efforts to do so. Alexander would like to thank his family, in particular his wife Lee-Anne. Similarly, Seamus would like to thank his wife, Alison, his three children, and other loved ones who supported him throughout this research project. Bennett thanks Dawn Wullschleger, Dr. Jeanne Clifford, and Ralph Clifford for their constant support.
I NTRODUCTION
Since 2014, the United States has faced the most sustained period of domestic jihadist activity in its history. Compared to previous waves of participation by Americans in jihadist terrorist groups, the scale of current American involvement is unprecedented. This is mainly due to the activities and outreach of one specific group, namely the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is actively pursuing over 1,000 investigations related to the group in all fifty states.
While the majority of American ISIS supporters sought to leave their country and join what they came to believe was an Islamic utopia in the territories held by the group overseas, there have also been deadly ISIS-inspired attacks in California, Minnesota, Ohio, Florida, and several other states. Others, meanwhile, found their calling online, using various forms of online technology to recruit, spread propaganda, and even use cryptocurrencies to fundraise for the group. Similar to the methods they pursued to further the goals of ISIS, the backgrounds of Americas ISIS supporters and activists vary widely, from an underage minor interested in traveling from South Carolina to the caliphate to a 32-year-old man coordinating Syrian extremist organizations pledges of allegiance to ISIS from a New York pizza shop.
For some, this wave of jihadist activity came as a shock. During the previous decade, jihadist attacks and plots in the United States appeared to be on a steady decline, as were instances of Americans leaving the country to join jihadist groups overseas. In the eyes of many, America was witnessing what amounted to the beginning of the end for the global jihad movement. Over a decade of sustained military pressure in jihadist safe havens, coupled with the FBIs aggressive pursuit of jihadists at home, had taken its toll on al-Qaeda and, so the thinking went, the domestic threat level was only going to continue to decline.
Then, on the morning of December 2, 2015, the threat of the Islamic State became a reality for many Americans. After using her Facebook account to pledge allegiance to the groups now deceased leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Tashfeen Malik, along with her husband Syed Rizwan Farook, went on a shooting spree in San Bernardino, California, murdering 14 and injuring another 24 before they were killed in a shootout with the police. Neither Malik nor Farook had any direct connections with ISIS or any of its members. They were inspired to act after hearing a September 2014 speech by ISIS former spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, in which he urged ISIS supporters around the world to commit atrocities in the groups name. Soon after the killings, official and unofficial ISIS media outlets released statements praising the attacks. While not claiming credit for directing Malik and Farooks operation, one of its media arms, Amaq, praised ISIS supporters in America and hailed their willingness to sacrifice all they held dear for the advancement of the caliphate.
Unlike Europe, where most major attacks with a nexus to ISIS involved direct interactions between ISIS members in Syria and Iraq or returned foreign fighters, this type of decentralized, inspired attack characterized the nature of the ISIS threat in America. San Bernardino was soon followed by media coverage of dozens more plots, along with reports of hundreds of Americans leaving their homes to wage jihad in Iraq and Syria. Almost all of these activities were carried out on behalf of ISIS, the new spearhead of the global jihad movement. Americans were increasingly inspired to travel as the group took over a large swathe of territory spanning both nations and covering an area roughly the size of Great Britain. In doing so, the Islamic State used its newfound success as an insurgency to launch an international outreach campaign which, in the West, has dwarfed the efforts of its jihadist predecessors in terms of levels of activity and lethality.
The result of this outreach was twofold. Firstly, ISIS attracted unprecedented numbers of Western Muslims to travel to its territory to join its self-proclaimed state. Secondly, the group used its popularity to launch a terrorist campaign targeting Western nations involved in the international effort to fight the group in Iraq and Syria. Those who could not travel were encouraged to become jihadis in their home country and conduct indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks without first seeking advice or permission. As ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani stated in his 2014 speech, Do not ask for anyones advice and do not seek anyones verdict. Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers. In some cases travelers trained to become terrorists and returned to their country with an even deadlier assignment: plan and execute large-scale and lethal attacks.
In the West, it is Europe that has taken the brunt of this effort, but attacks like San Bernardino are a reminder that Americans are not immune to the ISIS call. While a topic of much interest in the media, ISIS-related activity in the US rarely receives in-depth analytical treatment. This book attempts to provide a clearer understanding of how and why the group was able to gain a foothold in the country and how that presence has changed since the Islamic State lost its geographical caliphate.
Although few authors focus solely on ISIS, the studies which have analyzed the jihadist movement in America can be broadly divided into two categories. Some have taken a qualitative, historical approach, explaining why jihad in America became homegrown after the September 11, 2001, attacks and how the threat has evolved since.
This book combines qualitative and quantitative approaches to provide a comprehensive picture of the contours and dynamics of ISIS in America. Drawing on an array of exclusive primary sources, including interviews with American ISIS members and the agents tasked with thwarting them, this book will reveal how and why the Islamic State is able to successfully radicalize and recruit a new generation of jihadists in America. In doing so, it offers a number of new and unique insights and arguments about this multifaceted and constantly evolving phenomenon. Above all, we argue that, unlike in other Western nations, the Islamic State presence in America is surprisingly self-contained. While ISIS activity in many other Western nations is the result of long-standing and deep-rooted international networks based on connections to jihadist battlefields in Iraq, Syria, and beyond, in America (barring some notable exceptions), it has had little direct input and influence from external actors beyond the propaganda the group is able to spread via the internet. Thus, the story of ISIS in America offers a useful case study for furthering our understanding of jihad in the West, demonstrating the resiliency and adaptability of a movement that has faced, and to some extent overcome, seemingly overwhelming odds.