EILEEN. BARKER - On Freedom

LSE

EDITED BY EILEEN BARKER

LSE

A Centenary Anthology

EDITED BY EILEEN BARKER

First published 1995 in LSE Books by Ine Academic Publications Committee

The London School of Economics & Political Science 1997 in Germany by LIT Verlag and Transaction Publishers

Published 2019 by Routledge

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Introduction Eileen Barker, 1995

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from toe British Library

Die Deutsche Bibliothek CIP-Einheitsauthahme

LSE on Freedom / Eileen Barker (ed.). Hamburg : LIT, 1997

(The London School of Economics & Political Science LSE Books)

ISBN 3-8258-2842-5

DOI: 10.4324/9780429338168

NE: GT

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 97-3860

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

LSE on freedom.

On freedom / Eileen Barker, editor,

p. cm.

Originally published: LSE on freedom. London : LSE Books, 1995

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-56000-976-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Free will and determinism. 2. Liberty. I. Barker, Eileen. II. Title.

BJ1468.5.L74 1997

123.5dc21

97-3860

CIP

ISBN 13:978-1-56000-9764 (pbk)

ISBN 13:978-1-138-52914-4 (hbk)

Eileen Barker

THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE has never confined itself to economics and political science but has embraced the full range of the social sciences and its related disciplines in order to know the causes of things. It was founded by Beatrice and Sydney Webb one hundred years ago in the belief that through an empirical science of society we might be able to improve the common weal. A brief reflection on these aims can lead us directly to questions addressed in this volume: Is the concept of a social science a contradiction in terms? If it is not, and society can be studied scientifically, does this imply that human beings are subject not only to the laws of nature but also to social laws that explain what determines their actions? In which case, how can we, determined human beings, interfere with these laws to make a better society? Or, if we can determine what will happen in the future, does this imply there can be no social science?

Then, if we do somehow manage to reconcile the concepts of social science and freedom, can social science tell us whether there are some social situations that give rise to individuals being more free than they would be in other situations? Can social science help us, for example, to understand to what extent and in what ways state intervention can protect or curb our freedom? Under what conditions might freedom in one area (such as economics, politics, religion, the law or the media) be a prerequisite for or a threat to freedom in another area? What other goals (equality? justice? economic growth? political stability? environmental protection?) might be considered of greater value than freedom? And how might social science help us to recognise and resolve some of the tensions that arise when different kinds of freedoms or these other values are in conflict?

The idea for this volume arose in part because I found myself in a court of law being cross-examined by a Queens Counsel who was arguing the case that a group of people had had their freedom removed through brainwashing techniques. It struck me as curious that a sociologist (who might be thought to assume that social influences could determine peoples behaviour) should be denying that science had revealed irresistible and irreversible techniques of mind control in opposition to a lawyer (when it might be thought that the law assumed that individuals are responsible for their actions).

What sorts of assumptions did my LSE colleagues make about freedom, I wondered? Did they consider questions about freedom to be philosophical or empirical issues or did they not consider them at all? Discussions in the Senior Common Room soon made it obvious that, although LSE pondered on and researched into issues relating to freedom, there was no LSE perspective on freedom. This was not exactly surprising. LSE encompasses empirical researchers and abstract theorists, Ivory Tower scholars, non-committed pragmatists and socially involved activists of the left, right and centre. Sitting in the library, one can observe young and old, male and female, and a colourful spectrum of ethnic variety; standing in the lunch queue, one may talk to Muslim, Hindu, Christian, Jew, agnostic or atheist.