Lawrence Freedman - Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

by the same author

Strategy: A History (OUP, 2013)

The Future of War: A History (Penguin, 2018)

Nuclear Deterrence (Michael Joseph, 2018)

Ukraine and the Art of Strategy (OUP, 2019)

with Jeffrey Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 4th edn (Palgrave, 2019)

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Lawrence Freedman 2022

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Library of Congress Control Number: 2022943047

ISBN 9780197540671

eISBN 9780197540695

For my grandchildren Ava, Oscar, Gracie, Kit and Ida

Most of the arguments and clashes of opinion that precede a major operation are deliberately concealed because they touch political interests, or they are simply forgotten, being considered as scaffolding to be demolished when the building is complete.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, I, 3

Every effort has been made to contact all copyright holders. The publisher will be pleased to amend in future printings any errors or omissions brought to their attention. Numbers refer to plates.

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This was a book largely written during the enforced solitude of the Covid pandemic. Fortunately, these days it is possible to stay in touch with friends and colleagues, and that meant I was able to get valuable comments back on draft chapters, and in some cases early versions of the whole manuscript. I am truly grateful to Ben Barry, David Deptula, Toby Dodge, Sam Freedman Ofer Fridman, Jack Gill, Michel Goya, Sam Greene, Frank Hoffman, Anthony King, Ben Lambeth, Carter Malkasian, Ibrahim Al-Marashi, Dan Marston, Jeff Michaels, Srinath Rhagavan, Kori Schake, Ayesha Siddiqa, Bruno Tertrais and Tom Waldman. It has also been a pleasure to work again with two first-class editors Stuart Proffitt at Penguin and David McBride at OUP. Both have been full of good ideas for improving the book. I also appreciate the contributions of the team at Penguin, including Alice Skinner and Sarah Waldram. I am very fortunate to be represented by my excellent agents, Catherine Clarke and George Lucas. My wife Judith continues to tolerate my curious enthusiasm for writing about war, despite us both supposedly being retired and the opportunities to spend time with our grandchildren. It is to our grandchildren that this book is dedicated, with thanks for the joy they bring us and the hope that they will live in more peaceful times.

MARK ANTONY When Caesar says Do this, it is performed.

William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act 1, Scene 2

In a chain of command, orders start at the top and then cascade down until they reach the lowliest individuals. Below the supreme command, those in the chain are always accountable to someone at a higher level for what they do with the orders they receive, and for the quality of the orders they issue. Those on the receiving end of orders may have inner doubts and uncertainties, or even make known their misgivings openly, but the orders must still be followed and followed well. Commands are therefore much more than requests or suggestions, and, when a command is challenged, it is not only the wisdom of a particular instruction that is questioned, but also, potentially, the whole hierarchical structure behind it. To disobey an order is insubordination; to walk away is desertion; to depose a commander is mutiny.

Military organizations need strong chains of command because they are about disciplined and purposive violence. Commanders put those serving under them into unnatural situations, where they might be killed as they seek to kill others. At times of war, the special challenge of military command lies in persuading people to act against their own survival instincts and overcome the normal prohibitions about murdering their fellow humans. The stakes can be extremely high. Commanders, especially at the senior levels, can feel the burden of responsibility for the fate of nations, deeply aware of the potential for national humiliation should they fail, as well as the glory if they succeed.

Disciplined, fighting organizations act on commands; but, however well crafted these commands might be, they are not necessarily followed automatically and as intended. Sometimes they are simply inappropriate, perhaps based on dated and incomplete intelligence, and could not be implemented even by the most diligent subordinate commander. In other cases, subordinates may feel that implementation is possible but unwise, or that there is a better way. Faced with orders they dislike or distrust, subordinates usually have alternatives to outright disobedience: They can procrastinate, follow orders half-heartedly, or interpret them in a way that fits better with the situation confronted. In some cases, commanders encourage those closer to the action to make the final decisions; others want to be consulted every step of the way.

Command, therefore, is not a simple matter. It is about much more than handing out orders and ensuring that they are enacted. The stresses of combat impose special demands on commanders at all levels and it is assumed to require people of special character. The qualities that contribute to effective command are often those that would be admirable in almost any setting: professional knowledge; efficient use of resources; communication skills; ability to get on with others; moral purpose; sense of responsibility and care for subordinates.

Being a fine leader may be a necessary condition for a fine general but is not sufficient. According to the military historian Basil Liddell Hart, the two qualities of mental initiative and strong personality, or determination, go a long way toward the power of command in war. These are the hallmark of the Great Captains. That coup dil look of the eye is a consistent theme. Napoleon famously looked for lucky generals on whom good fortune smiled. He spoke of the coup dil as the gift of being able to see at a glance the possibilities offered by the terrain, a quality he himself possessed to an exceptional degree. The theme was picked up by Carl von Clausewitz, the great Prussian theorist of war: