Bell Daniel A. - The China Model

THE CHINA MODEL

THE CHINA MODEL

Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy

DANIEL A. BELL

With a new preface by the author

Princeton University Press Princeton and Oxford

Copyright 2015 by Princeton University Press

Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street,
Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TR

press.princeton.edu

Cover photograph: A general view of the closing session of the
National Peoples Congress, at the Great Hall of the People on March 16, 2007.

Photograph Andrew Wong/Getty Images.

All Rights Reserved

Fourth printing, and first paperback printing with a new preface by the author, 2016

Paperback ISBN: 978-0-691-17304-7

The Library of Congress has cataloged the cloth edition as follows:

Bell, Daniel (Daniel A.), 1964

The China model : political meritocracy and the
limits of democracy / Daniel A. Bell.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-691-16645-2 (hardback)
1. Political cultureChina. 2. Merit (Ethics)Political aspectsChina. 3. Political leadershipChina. 4. Elite (Social sciences)Political activityChina. 5. DemocracyChina. 6. ChinaPolitics and government19762002. 7. ChinaPolitics and government2002 I. Title.

JQ1516.B45 2015

306.20951dc232014044502

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available

This book has been composed in Electra LT Std

Printed on acid-free paper.

Printed in the United States of America

5 7 9 10 8 6 4

To my Chinese mother and father

CONTENTS

PREFACE TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION

Troubles for the China Model?

T he China Model has been more widely reviewed and discussed than any of my previous books, all within a few months. Of course I feel honored and gratified that the book has had an impact on public discourse. I confess, however, that it has also drawn its fair share of critical fire. Although I deliberately refrained from polemics and one-third of the book consists of boring endnotes, the book seems to have triggered some raw political emotions. The main thrust of my book should not be too controversial: its an argument for taking Chinese political theory and institutions seriously and for the view that Chinese political culture and history should serve as the main standards for judging political progress (and regress) in China. It would seem odd to defend an argument for, say, reforming American political institutions according to Confucian values, and it should seem equally odd to argue for reforming the Chinese political system according to the values of the American founding fathers or Kantian liberals. Why the opposition? One reason may be reflexive attachment to the view that liberal democracy is the only defensible form of government (the end of history): more precisely, one person, one vote is the only morally legitimate way of selecting political rulers and it is morally perverse to suggest otherwise. So why bother drawing upon different political ideals in Chinas own culture and institutions? Another reason may be dogmatic attachment to the view that nothing good can come out of the Chinese political system: it is similar in nature to other evil communist regimes such as the Soviet Union and North Korea, and the sooner it collapses, the better. I cannot respond to such views beyond what Ive already written in the book. But more open-minded readers may be willing to engage with what I say. Let me respond to some of the main criticisms, while updating some of my views in response to new political developments in China.

Is Democracy a Bad Thing?

My book has been perceived as an attack on democracy. Stein Ringen, for example, claims that the book is meant to persuade those of us who are defenders of democracy that we are wrong. My attempt to denigrate democracy as such turns the book nasty: Bell is an admirer of the Chinese system for whom it is not enough that the friend succeeds, also foes must fail.

But my aim is not to denigrate democracy as such. Quite the opposite: I strongly support electoral democracy in countries that have implemented such a system. I hope democracy can be improved by drawing on the best meritocratic practices, but any such improvements need to be built on a foundation of electoral democracy, if only because the practical alternatives tend to be military dictatorship or authoritarian populism. Once people get the vote, they dont want to give it up, and supporters of the political alternatives need to rely on force to change the system. And those alternatives are almost always worse than electoral democracy: think of Thailand or Egypt (my heart sank when military dictators supported by a minority of wealthy liberals overthrew the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). So when countries implement a system of one person, one vote to select leaders, its usually too late to change (except by force), regardless of the case against it. But electoral democracies can and should learn from the best of meritocratic practices compatible with electoral democracy, such as building up a competent, professional civil service and empowering experts in narrow domains.

So why do I open with a chapter that discusses four typical problems associated with democratic systems? My aim is simply to desacralize the ideal of one person, one vote by showing that electoral democracies do not necessarily perform better than political meritocracies according to widely shared standards of good government, with the hope that readers could join my quest for a more balanced assessment of Chinas political system in the rest of the book. But I now realize that its not easy to set aside a political value that has come to have almost religious overtones. I was brought up in the political culture of a Western society, and it took decades of shocks to my own moral system to get me to question the universal value of democratic commitments I learned as a child. Perhaps it was unrealistic to think that Westerners would question those commitments simply by reading one chapter in a book, and I now realize that the opening chapter may have had the unintended effect of closing rather than opening minds.

But isnt there something deeply problematic about an argument that democracy is suitable for some countries but not for China? Shouldnt we be wary of Orientalism that seems to harken back to John Stuart Mills arguments against democracy in barbarian countries such as India? If so, similar accusations can be raised against Chinese intellectuals who often argue that the quality () of Chinese people is too low for electoral democracy. But my argument is different: based on solid empirical evidence (see chapter 1), I argue that the quality of voters is also low in countries such as the United States, and there is no reason to believe that Chinese voters will become any more rational or public-spirited than voters anywhere else. And since China has evolved and implementedin highly imperfect formmeritocratic mechanisms to select and promote political leaders with superior intellectual, social, and moral qualities, shouldnt any improvements be built on such a system? Isnt it important to ask how political meritocracy can be improved, and its disadvantages minimized, in a political context where the ideal has a long history, has inspired political reform over the past three decades, and is widely supported by the people according to reliable political surveys?

Ive given many book talks over the past year, and Im often asked: if electoral democracy can work in Taiwan, why cant it work in mainland China? My reply is that the political context is radically different. For one thing, Taiwan is a moderately well-off society and its problems pale in comparison with those of mainland China (environmental degradation, the huge gap between rich and poor, tens of millions of people living in dire poverty, etc.). So if Taiwanese politics degenerates into political paralysis,of the world. Size matters. Small political communities can afford populism and small-minded navel-gazing even at the cost of neglecting long-term planning or political concern for future generations and the rest of the world. But China is a huge political community and its policies shape the lives of hundreds of millions of Chinese now and in the future, as well as the rest of the world. Mainland China cannot afford the downside of Taiwan-style electoral democracy.