Stephen J. Blank - Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Strategic Studies Institute Book

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Stephen J. Blank

Editor

November 2011

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ISBN 1-58487-504-6

Foreword ........................................................................v

Introduction .................................................................vii

Stephen J. Blank

Part I

1. Russian Nuclear and Conventional Weapons:
The Broken Relationship .........................................1

Dale R. Herspring

2. Russias Conventional Armed Forces:
Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020 ...33

Roger N. McDermott

Part II

3. Nuclear Weapons in Russian Strategy and
Doctrine ................................99

Andrei Shoumikhin

4. Russias Security Relations with the
United States: Futures Planned and
Unplanned..............................................................161

Pavel K. Baev

5. Nuclear Weapons in Russian National
Security Strategy .......................187

Nikolai Sokov

Part III

6. Caught between Scylla and Charybdis: The
Relationship between Conventional and
Nuclear Capabilities in Russian Military
Thought ...........................................................261

Daniel Goure

7. Russia and Nuclear Weapons..............................293

Stephen J. Blank

8. Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Current
Policies and Future Trends..................................365

Richard Weitz

9. New Start and Nonproliferation: Suitors or
Separate Tables?....................................................417

Stephen J. Cimbala

10. Russias Nuclear Posture and the Threat
that Dare Not Speak its Name............................459

Jacob W. Kipp

About the Contributors ............................................505

While the Cold War is long past, the importance of arms control in Russo-American relations and the related issue of nuclear weapons for Russia remain vital concerns. Indeed, without an appreciation of the multiple dimensions of the latter, progress in the former domain is inconceivable. With this in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is very pleased to present the following essays, which were presented at a conference at the National Defense University on June 28, 2010. These essays explore many, if not all, of the issues connected with Russias relatively greater reliance on nuclear weapons for its security. As such, they constitute an important contribution to the analysis of the Obama administrations reset policy, Russo-American relations, Russian foreign and defense policy, and international security in both Europe and Asia. Additionally, questions concerning the approach taken by other nuclear power nations in reference to the arms control agenda provide a crucial backdrop for the progress toward curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a long-standing central goal of U.S. security policy.

We offer these essays to our readers in the belief that the information and analyses contained herein will strengthen our understanding of Russias extensive nuclear agenda and provide a deeper understanding of the many issues in international security connected with Russia and its nuclear posture.

As of November 2010, the so-called New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) treaty between the United States and Russia that was signed in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, awaits a ratification vote in the Senate. Regardless of the arguments pro and con that have emerged since it was signed, it is clear that the outcome of the ratification vote will not only materially affect the Obama administrations reset policy towards Russia, but also the strategic nuclear forces of both signatories. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, both sides built up their forces based on what each was thought to have or be building. Although the Bush administration (2001-09) rhetorically announced its intention to sever this mutual hostage relationship, it failed in that regard. As a result, critical aspects of that relationship still survive in Russias orientation to the United States and in the language of the treaty, especially in its preamble, which explicitly affirms a link between nuclear offense and defense.

Therefore, whatever the fate of the treaty and the reset policy, it is clear that both Moscow and Washington stand before crossroads in regard to the future of their strategic nuclear programs and force structures. Moreover, each sides course of action will tangibly affect the future course of action of the other side regarding the panoply of issues and policies connected with the development of nuclear weapons and the missions for them. With this in mind, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) organized a conference bringing together several distinguished experts on Russian nuclear weapons. The conference took place at the National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, on June 28, 2010, and the papers that follow are the revised versions of the papers presented at this conference.

Each author was asked to answer several different questions pertaining to the present and future posture of Russias nuclear weapons (including tactical nuclear weapons). Moreover, it quickly became clear that Russias nuclear future in many ways, large and small, depends greatly on the degree of success that Moscow will have in its current large-scale efforts at comprehensive military reform. These reforms encompass virtually the entire military structure and are the most thoroughgoing reforms since Mikhail Frunzes reforms in 1924-25. Consequently, no analysis of nuclear present and future posture is possible without a systematic analysis of those reforms and their impact. Therefore, the following chapters provide an examination of Russias military and political motives behind nuclear weapons policy as they pertain not only to the U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but also to China, whose rising power has clearly caught the Kremlins attention.