First published 2013 by Ashgate Publishing
Published 2016 by Routledge
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Copyright Stephen J. Cimbala 2013
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Cimbala, Stephen J.
Arms for uncertainty : nuclear weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy.
1. Nuclear weapons Government policy United States.
2. Nuclear weapons Government policy Russia (Federation)
3. National security United States. 4. National security Russia (Federation)
5. Nuclear arms control. 6. Deterrence (Strategy) 7. Security, International. I. Title
327.1747dc23
The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:
Cimbala, Stephen J., author.
Arms for uncertainty : nuclear weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy / by Stephen J. Cimbala.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Nuclear arms control United States. 2. Nuclear arms control Russia (Federation)
3. National security United States. 4. National security Russia (Federation)
5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Russia (Federation) I. Title.
JZ5665.C54 2013
327.1747dc23
2013002683
ISBN 9781472409850 (hbk)
ISBN 9781315567945 (ebk-PDF)
ISBN 9781317178507 (ebk-ePUB)
Foreword
Colin S. Gray
Unfortunately, one of the few things that we know with high confidence about the future of the human race is that it will continue to be significantly strategic. Furthermore, we should assume with scant need for caveats that future strategic history will have a nuclear dimension. Admittedly, these are sweeping judgments on a subject that cannot be studied directly. Some commentators who speculate adventurously over the temporal horizon become so familiar with the idea of the future that they forget that it can be no source of evidence, as yetit has not existed. This does not mean that we truly are ignorant about our future strategic history, but it does mean that claims of foreknowledge need to be treated with the scepticism that they merit. However, and it is a substantial however, future strategic history is by no means opaque, always provided we do not ask of those who must address its mysteries more than physics permits. So, the bad news that we cannot enjoy unarguably reliable knowledge and hopefully understanding of history literally beyond today, is somewhat, though only somewhat, offset by our variable access to the past of our strategic history. This history, regarded as a whole, not only with reference to its nuclear-weapon infested half century plus since 1945, can provide vital knowledge for understanding the context to Stephen Cimbalas important book, and the likely persistence of the categories of troubles that he addresses.
As Stephen Cimbala insists all too correctly, the subject of his book is really politics. This absolutely central and defining claim could warrant a label of banality because of its necessary truth, were it not for the fact of the frequency with which it escapes notice and respectful attention. It should be axiomatic that if one asks technical questions one is very liable to receive technical answers. The issue-area of nuclear weapons both is and appears to be forbiddingly technical. This technicality indeed is genuinely so, with respect to the relevant science, technology, and engineering. When the technicity inherent in nuclear matters finds expression in weapon programs it can have an intellectually numbing effect on strategic thought and policy practice. It can be difficult for many people who are technically sophisticated to a high degree, to realize that their military-technical subject is all about politics. Nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles make no self-referential sense. They are instruments of statecraft including grand and military strategy.
Contrary to appearances, perhaps, I am not implying any appropriateness of a disdain for science and technical detail. There is a science of warfare that requires careful mathematical analysis. However, that science cannot apply to the inalienably creative world of politics and strategy. By way of analogous argument, excellence in combat yields no guarantee of consequential political advantage or success: one feels that it ought to do so, but tactical competence has to serve strategic goals, which in turn need translation into political gain (consider the US adventure in Iraq in the period 20032006 for example!). While arms control and even armed combat must be treated on their own terms to some degree, thinking of Carl von Clausewitzs grammar of war, we should never be confused about the authority of the logic of policy, which is always political. Also, it is advisable to try to avoid the kind of very large strategic errors that tend to flow from unsound contextualization. Novel though much of the technical basis for Stephen Cimbalas argument may well be, as we muddle through (we hope) a Second Nuclear Age en route to a Third, the political and strategic drivers of the context of this book are anything but new. We do not and cannot know, either reliably or rather less so, what will happen in the remainder of the Twenty First Century, but we do know with, I would claim, quite impressive confidencethough I will eschew the adjective reliablewhat this still quite new century will be like. The reason is because we have more or less available to us the record of our strategic history as a species for at least 2,500 years. As a government advisor in the United States and in Britain, I have opposed time after time casual official use of the highly misleading concept, the forseeable future, but provided one is unambiguously disdainful of any aspiration to predict, ironically the concept does have some useful meaning including that for the nuclear-related issues that Professor Cimbala treats so well in this book.
A great deal of the commentary about the current and future nuclear-weapon issues continues to be conducted in a state of political, moral, strategic, and historical innocence that renders prudent reasoning needlessly challenging. Lest I be misunderstood, let me hasten to explain that I recognize fully, I hope, the needed scope for discretion in the field of public policy with respect to nuclear issues. However, there are vital and enduring contextual realities appreciation of which should lend confidence to our policy-making process.
