Stephen J. Cimbala - Nuclear Deterrence in a Multipolar World: The U.S., Russia and Security Challenges

STEPHEN J. CIMBALA
Penn State Brandywine, USA

First published 2016 by Ashgate Publishing

Published 2016 by Routledge
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Copyright 2016 Stephen J. Cimbala

The right of Stephen J. Cimbala to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Names: Cimbala, Stephen J., author.
Title: Nuclear deterrence in a multipolar world : the U.S., Russia and
security challenges / by Stephen J. Cimbala.
Description: Farnham, Surrey, UK ; Burlington, VT : Ashgate, 2016. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015035610| ISBN 9781472480910 (hardback) |
Subjects: LCSH: Nuclear arms control--International cooperation. | Nuclear
nonproliferation--International cooperation. | Nuclear weapons--Government
policy--United States. | Nuclear weapons--Government policy--Russia
(Federation) | United States--Foreign relations--Russia (Federation) |
Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations--United States.
Classification: LCC JZ5665 .C559 2016 | DDC 355.02/17--dc23 LC record available at
http://lccn.loc.gov/2015035610

ISBN 9781472480910 (hbk)

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This book would not have been possible without my having stood on many shoulders. I would like to extend special thanks to the following colleagues for their helpful insights and encouragement during this and other studies: John Arquilla; Stephen Blank; Paul Bracken; Martin Edmonds; William Flavin; Peter Kent Forster; Andrew Futter; David Glantz; Michael Guillot; Colin Gray; Jacob Kipp; Lawrence Korb; Steven Lambakis; Adam Lowther; Roger McDermott; Michael Noonan; Julian Palmore; Keith Payne; the late Sam Sarkesian; Michael Tate; Timothy Thomas; and John Allen Jay Williams.

Special acknowledgment is made to Dr. James Scouras and Dr. James J. Tritten for use of analytical models originally developed by them. Dr. Scouras is a national security studies fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, and the former chief scientist of the Defense Threat Reduction Agencys Advanced Systems and Concepts Office. His past appointments include program director for risk analysis at the Homeland Security Institute and research positions at the Institute for Defense Analysis and the RAND Corporation. He is also a highly regarded consultant on nuclear strategy, arms control and other national security issues. Dr. Tritten retired after a 44 year career with the Department of Defense, including duty as a carrier-based naval aviator. He was formerly National Security Affairs department chair and a faculty member at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Tritten has published five books and hundreds of chapters, articles, and government technical reports, and his publications have won 13 national writing awards, including the Alfred Thayer Mahan Award from the Navy League of the U.S. I have also benefited enormously from Dr. Scouras and Dr. Trittens understanding and insights into a number of national security and defense issues.

I gratefully acknowledge support from Pennsylvania State University, Brandywine Campus, and the Department of Political Science for my research activities. Chancellor Kristin Woolever, Director of Academic Affairs Cynthia Lightfoot, Head Librarian Susan Ware, and Director of IT Operations Justin Dimatteo and their staffs have been contributory to the completion of this and other works. Lisa Krol has been exemplary as a staff assistant, never discouraged by our sometimes unfathomable university bureaucracy.

I am pleased and gratified that Ashgate has permitted me to publish this third volume of my trilogy on nuclear weapons and their implications for the new world order. I am most grateful for the encouragement and support I have received from Kirstin Howgate and her colleagues, including skillful editing, proofreading, production and follow-through in all respects. I am privileged to have worked with such professionals.

None of the persons previously named is responsible for any of the errors, arguments or opinions here.

Finally, and most important, my wife Betsy, sons Chris and David, daughterin-law Kelly, and sister Michelle, remain the most important people in my life and my greatest blessings.

Nuclear weapons survived the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, but their role in the post-Cold War and twenty-first century worlds will be markedly different from the twentieth century experience. The Cold War, despite some dangerous episodes in U.S.-Soviet relations, was for the most part conducted under two important restraints. The first restraint was the strategic nuclear bipolarity that dominated the international system. The United States (plus NATO) and the Soviet Union dominated the development of military-strategic thinking related to the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence. They also led the way in developing and deploying nuclear technology for military purposes. As a result, the U.S. and the Soviet Union cast shadows over other powers, including other nuclear weapons states, that inhibited nuclear adventurism and irresponsible nuclear saber rattling. Other nuclear weapons states and nuclear aspiring countries knew that, if push came to shove, the United States and the Soviet Union had escalation dominance within their respective regions and spheres of influence. The Suez crisis of 1956 drove home this point, about nuclear-strategic bipolarity as a reality of the Cold War international system.

We have left that world behind us. The Soviet Union is gone, and the international politics of nuclear weapons, including nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control, are more complicated in the twenty-first century. Nuclear weapons remain incredibly destructive, but the United States and post-Soviet Russia have greatly reduced their inventories of intercontinental range (or strategic) nuclear weapons, compared to late Cold War levels. In addition, despite Russian President Vladimir Putins apparent return to a Cold War-like confrontation with the United States and NATO in 2014 and 2015, even Putin cannot turn back the clock to the bipolar structure of Cold War world politics. Putins Russia talks with an ambition that its economic and military power cannot fully support. The Russian President has played a comparatively weak hand well, with respect to keeping the United States and NATO guessing as to his next moves.