General Maurice Sarrail 1856-1929
General Maurice Sarrail
courtesy of Monique Rittenberg-Sarrail
General Maurice Sarrail 1856-1929
The French Army and Left-Wing Politics
by Jan Karl Tanenbaum
The University of North Carolina Press
Chapel Hill
Copyright 1974 by
The University of North Carolina Press
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 73-17109
ISBN 0-8078-1222-6
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Tanenbaum, Jan Karl, 1936-
General Maurice Sarrail, 1856-1929
Bibliography: p.
1. Sarrail Maurice Paul Emmanuel, 1856-1929.
2. FrancePolitics and government1914-1940.
DC373.S3T36 1974 320.944081B 73-17109
ISBN 0-8078-1222-6
To My Mother and Father
Contents
Maps
Prepared by Robert H. Chamberlain
Preface
General Maurice Paul Emmanuel Sarrail was commander of the French Third Army at the Battle of the Marne, commander of the Allied Balkan forces during World War I, and French high commissioner to Syria and Lebanon in 1925. Although his military capabilities have been widely disputed, most of the controversy surrounding General Sarrail stems from his involvement with French left-wing politics.
This book attempts to shed light on the political and military aspects of Sarrails public life. An analysis of Sarrails career offers an opportunity to examine several important though neglected aspects of modern French history: the relationship between the French political Left and the army; Frances World War I military-civilian relationship; the tensions between a radical republican general and the conservative military establishment; the exploits of a skilled field commander; the Allies World War I Balkan military policies; the repercussions within the Entente resulting from Sarrails wartime role in Greek and Albanian domestic politics; France and Britains wartime Greek policies; the inadequacies of French liberalisms postwar colonial policy; and last, the relationship between Sarrails tenure as high commissioner to Syria and Lebanon and French domestic politics.
In the course of this study I have benefited from the assistance of several institutions: the United States National Archives; in France, the Bibliothque Nationale, Archives Nationales, Bibliothque de lInstitut de France, Service des Archives de lAssemble Nationale, Archives du Snat, Archives du Ministre des Affaires Etrangres, Archives Centrales du Ministre de la Marine, Archives du Ministre de la Guerre; and in England, the Beaverbrook Library, British Museum, Centre for Military Archives at Kings College, the Public Record Office, the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and the University Library and Churchill College Library at Cambridge.
This book is the extensive revision of a thesis submitted to the University of California at Berkeley. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Robert O. Paxton of Columbia University for his advice and generosity in directing the dissertation.
I am particularly indebted to the late Madame la Gnrale Sarrail, who graciously permitted me to consult the generals personal papers.
I want to thank the generals daughter, Monique Rittenberg-Sarrail, for her generous assistance and support. Above all, I owe a special debt to General Louis Pirot and his family for their warm hospitality, aid, and advice. This work could not have been undertaken without General Pirots unstinting efforts on my behalf.
Finally, I owe an immense debt of gratitude to my wife Joanne and my family for their help and encouragement over many years.
General Maurice Sarrail 1856-1929
I.The Protagonist
I wasto become a military man, but never a militarist.
SARRAIL, Souvenirs
Despite the shattering defeat of 1870, the French professional officer corps maintained its position for the next thirty years as a nearly autonomous body within the state, unfettered by direct civilian control. The ability of the French military establishment to maintain its prerogatives after the collapse of the Second Empire was the result of contemporary political realities. Although the republicans, Bonapartists, and monarchists could not agree on a wide range of religious and political issues, they did have, however, one area of fervent agreementthe reorganization and strengthening of the military establishment.
But enthusiasm for the army by both monarchists and republicans was of recent vintage. Royalists were dubious, even frightened, of the army immediately after 1815 because it was identified with the revolutionary upheavals of the previous twenty-five years; it had been the vehicle of revolutionary ideas while overturning traditional European political, social, and economic institutions. During the Restoration, the conservative middle class was also critical of the army, considering it an economic waste, a drain on the national resources, and thus a hindrance to economic development. But as the century progressed, conservatives were to have a greater appreciation of the army: during the July Monarchy it crushed the politically and socially inspired insurrections; it was the army that snuffed out the June, 1848, uprising. And in 1871 the army was seen not as the inept and decrepit machine that had been ignominiously routed at Sedan, but as the courageous victor over revolutionary Paris and the Commune.
The 1871 civil war, while it demonstrated once again that the army was the savior of the established social and economic order, did succeed
The Franco-Prussian War had also radically changed republican military attitudes. During the Second Empire, republicans, looking forward to a world of international cooperation, general disarmament, and universal peace, advocated the abolition of the professional standing army. The permanent army, considered a support for the authoritarian regime, was a threat to a nations domestic liberties and drained the national finances and corrupted the countrys youth. The republicans wanted short-term universal military training for all citizens; the Swiss militia system was the paradigm of republican military theory. But following the declaration of war against Prussia, republicans, rekindling the Jacobin tradition of the revolutionary wars when patriotism, liberty, and equality were fused into one great passion, formed the Government of National Defense and were prepared to wage war to the bitter end.
For the next two decades the radical republicans exalted the army. Lon Gambetta exemplified this new republican patriotism. In 1867 he demanded the suppression of permanent standing armies. In the aftermath of the crushing defeat in 1870, however, he supported the 1872 recruitment law. He believed the reconstruction of Frances military power to be the countrys major priority. Gambetta not only considered the permanent army a necessity, but he considered military service the basic attribute of citizenship. He reminded his contemporaries that henceforth all Frenchmen should know how to handle
The moderate republicans, or Opportunists, also wanted a strong standing army. Assuming power in the late 1870s, the moderate republicans believed that national security obviated any large-scale personnel changes within the army. The foremost concern of republican leaders such as Charles de Freycinet was to escape diplomatic isolation and German domination. The army was to be the vehicle by which France would once again be a great power; a strong, modernized army was a prerequisite for a successful foreign policy, for a powerful army would inspire confidence in potential allies. Unfortunately, in their desire to create a strong army, the moderates failed to consider the spirit and political attitudes of the higher echelons of the army; technical competence was considered more important than political allegiance.