N. Elahi - Terrorism in Pakistan: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Challenge to Security

N. Elahi is Honorary Director of the Centre for Peace and Security Studies at the University of the Punjab. He holds a PhD from the University of the Punjab and an MA in Intelligence and International Security from King's College London.

Published in 2019 by

I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd

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Copyright 2019 N. Elahi

The right N. Elahi to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted

by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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References to websites were correct at the time of writing.

International Library of Twentieth Century History 127

ISBN (HB): 978 1 78453 999 3

ISBN (PB): 978 1 83860 376 2

eISBN: 978 1 78672 266 9

ePDF: 978 1 78673 266 8

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library

A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available

CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Map

Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan.

Figures

Trends of sectarian violence (200912).

An eight-arrow scenario.

Situation, progression and impact.

Tables

Details of shrines/madaris bombed by terrorists in KP.

Details of the killing of Sunni Ulema linked with various shrines in KP.

Suicide attacks, deaths and injuries from 2002 to 2017.

Fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan from 2003 to 2018.

Military operations and peace deals.

SWOT analysis of the situation.

Drone attacks in Pakistan: 200515.

Estimated losses during 200115.

ABBREVIATIONS

FOREWORD

It is my great pleasure to preface this book by N. Elahi, an old and valued friend, whose insights have helped me considerably to shape my perceptions of Pakistan. Mr Elahi has been closely observing Pakistan's struggle against terrorism for the past 15 years, with profound insights into the conduct and structures of the counter-terrorism campaign. This book is therefore not only a work of analysis, but also an important historical document in its own right.

Mr Elahi gives a vivid picture of the well-known struggle of Pakistan against terrorism. Furthermore, this book is highly objective and unbiased. Previously there has been both Pakistani and Western commentators engaging in hysterical denunciations and wild conspiracy theories.

One of the valuable features of this book is that it is eminently sensible in its treatment of foreign involvement in the Tehreek-e-Taliban rebellion. It not only draws attention to the alleged role of the Afghan and Indian intelligence services in sheltering the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remnants who took refuge in Afghanistan and from there have continued their attacks on Pakistan, but also makes it clear that the origin, leadership and membership of the TTP have been tragically Pakistani. Mr Elahi rightly attributes the explosion of Pakistani militancy after 2001 to the side-effects of the US invasion of Afghanistan, as well as draws attention to the roots of the TTP rebellion in local traditions and resentments, and to the breakdown of the former indirect system of rule in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Mr Elahi is both clear-sighted and sympathetic (a rare combination) in his portrayal of why so many Pakistanis including Pakistani journalists found this very difficult to accept, and the effects of this non-acceptance of reality had prevailed for several years, leading to the willingness of the Pakistani population to support a tough campaign against the militants. This also led to the repeated attempts by the military and politicians to make peace deals with the TTP, the futility of which is cleverly dissected in this book.

As Mr Elahi writes, however, in early 2009, when the Pakistani security establishment recognised the TTP as a real threat to Pakistan's interests and even its survival as a state (as opposed to the misguided products of legitimate anti-American feelings), they successfully launched a series of operations against the militants to rally public opinion in support of these campaigns over time. Consequently, the Pakistani state and military were greatly helped by the atrocities committed by the TTP against Pakistanis, culminating in the massacre of schoolchildren in Peshawar. Eventually, it simply became impossible not to attribute these crimes to the TTP and its leadership.

This book brings out two more things that are important for both Pakistani and foreign observers to recognise. The first is that in the fight against the TTP insurgency, Pakistan had for a while, and hopefully forever won. This is despite what Mr Elahi says have been the often appalling failures of the Pakistani state and military response, especially regarding the development of a coherent, comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy as well as steady, institutionalised cooperation between Pakistan's disparate and often feuding security institutions.