Naval Institute Press - The Road to Pearl Harbor: Great Power War in Asia and the Pacific

THE

GREAT POWER WAR IN

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

EDITED BY JOHN H. MAURER AND ERIK GOLDSTEIN

NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS

ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

2022 by the U.S. Naval Institute

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Maurer, John H., editor. | Goldstein, Erik, editor.

Title: The road to Pearl Harbor : great power war in Asia and the Pacific / edited by John H Maurer, and Erik Goldstein.

Other titles: Great power war in Asia and the Pacific

Description: Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2022014654 (print) | LCCN 2022014655 (ebook) | ISBN 9781682477700 (hardback) | ISBN 9781682477694 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: World War, 1939-1945--Causes. | Great powers--Foreign relations--20th century. | Pacific Area--Foreign relations--20th century. | Japan--Foreign relations--1912-1945. | China--Foreign relations--1912-1949. | United States--Foreign relations--1913-1921. | United States--Foreign relations--1933-1945. | Great Britain--Foreign relations--1910-1936. | Conference on the Limitation of Armament (1921-1922 : Washington, D.C.) | BISAC: HISTORY / Wars & Conflicts / World War II / General | HISTORY / Military / United States

Classification: LCC D741 .R528 2022 (print) | LCC D741 (ebook) | DDC 940.53/11--dc23/eng/20220408

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022014654

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022014655

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

Printed in the United States of America.

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First printing

John H. Maurer and Erik Goldstein

WE ARE DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO THE FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH Institute for sponsoring and supporting this book. Since the Institutes founding, it has stood for open discussion and for a principled realism in foreign policy and grand strategy. When serving as the Institutes president, Alan Luxenberg was an enthusiastic backer of the project. His firm belief about the importance of studying history to gain perspective on todays foreign policy and strategy dilemmas drove the project forward. The Institutes current President Carol Rollie Flynn also shared our enthusiasm for publishing this book. Her advice and support brought the book to completion. Roger Hertog gave his support to this project and got it off the ground. Roger is a longstanding friend of those who value history as a guiding light that provides clarity in understanding the pressing domestic and international problems of our times. Alan, Rollie, and Roger know that mature study and reflection on the past serves as a sure guide to a better future. At the Naval Institute Press, we want to thank Adam Kane, Glenn Griffith, Jack Russell, Robin Noonan, and Ashley Baird for taking on the book and shepherding it through to publication. We appreciate the careful editing given the manuscript by Drew Bryan. Finally, to Grant, Peter, Rich, Walter, and Toshi, we appreciate the outstanding contribution that you made in writing chapters for the book.

REMEMBER PEARL HARBOR! THAT WAS THE RALLYING CRY FOR the American people during the Second World War. It has been eighty years since imperial Japan attacked the United States on December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infamy, in the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his famous speech to the Congress asking for a declaration of war. The American people, government, and armed forces found themselves caught up in a desperate global struggle from which there could be no turning back. The ordeal of waging a world war transformed the United States into a global superpower. From that day to the present, American power and purpose have played a leading role in shaping the international order.

This volume of essays looks back on the period between the two world wars and examines why the struggle for mastery in Asia resulted in a horrific conflict that cost the lives of millions. Our approach to examining why war occurred has been to underscore the contingent nature of history by highlighting the decisions made by leaders who directed the actions of the great powers. These leaders include David Lloyd George, Chiang Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and the uniformed leadership of the Japanese navy. We analyze the menu of foreign policy and strategy choices open to these leaders and explain why the steps they took led to war. In highlighting the role played by these central figures in examining the path to war, we pay close attention to the domestic political and international settings in which they operated. Their internal and external surroundings both provided opportunities for action as well as constrained their policy menu of choice to act creatively.

The outcome of their actions, a great power hegemonic war ranging across Asia and the Pacific, was not inevitable. An alternative prospect existed when in November 1921, statesmen from around the world gathered in Washington to arrest an arms race in naval weaponry and to settle outstanding disputes threatening the peace of Asia. The Washington Conference proved dramatic. The American secretary of state, Charles Evan Hughes, stunned the conference and captured the attention of public opinion around the world in his opening speech, which called for an immediate stop to the naval arms race in the construction of capital shipsthat is, large surface warships, battleships, and battle cruisersthat emerged after the First World War. Hughes highly publicized diplomatic initiative spurred the statesmen in Washington to achieve what had seemed impossible: an arms control agreement that halted construction of the latest, most powerful generation of capital ships. This outcome required that political leaders in Britain, Japan, and the United States agree to overrule their naval advisors, who deemed the acquisition of capital ships to be an urgent strategic necessity. In addition, the negotiations established a treaty framework that promoted the security of the great powers in Asia and the Pacific. At the time, the treaties hammered out in Washington were heralded as a triumph of diplomacy and enlightened statecraft. It is difficult to disagree with that judgment. At the Washington Conference, Britain and the United States took the lead in building a system for international cooperation and security in Asia. Japans leaders, too, partnered with this American and British initiative that promised the prospect of enduring peace.