Jacques Guillermaz - The Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949-1976

The Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949-1976

We will build a new world, a red world, the world of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

Chieh-fang-chn pao,
August 5, 1967

Jacques Guillermaz
Translated by Anne Destenay

1972 Payot, Paris

This edition was revised and updated by the author to include the period from 1972 through 1976.

First published 1972 by Westview Press

Published 2019 by Routledge
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Copyright 1976 by Taylor & Francis

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Guillermaz, Jacques.
The Chinese Communist Party in power, 1949-1976.
Translation of Le parti communiste chinois au pouvoir.
Bibliography: p. 581
Includes index.
1. Chung-kuo kung ch'an tangHistory. I. Title.
JQ1519.A5G8513 329.9'51 76-7593

ISBN 13: 978-0-367-29080-1 (hbk)

FOR KIRSTI

Like the hero of a Greek tragedy, struck down by fate in the last scene of the play, Mao Tse-tung, the central figure of this book, died just as it was being completed. As circumstances would have it, Chou En-lai and Chu Teh, his two closest and most constant companions in the political and military fields, died just a few months earlier.

In the preface to this book I tried to set out the political context in which this momentous event would take place, and similarly the delicate question of the transfer of power from one outstanding man to a group whose unity would inevitably be fragile, or to a fraction of the party, or to one man more ambitious and resolute than the rest. I also tried to reach beyond the men and foresee the difficulties lying ahead of the second generation of Chinese leaders.

Thus far this analysis and these views have not been affected by the circumstances of Mao Tse-tung's death. No change is apparent in the conditions existing before September 9, 1976, the day on which the Great Helmsman died. The problems are the same, as are their main components. Nevertheless, Mao Tse-tung's gigantic shadow often cast a veil over the reality (including human reality) which he adapted to suit his own vision of the revolution, and new elements may emerge at any moment, in addition to those we already know, to sketch the features of the China of tomorrow.

A great new page in Chinese history has been completed and turned. Its theme, the theme of this book, now takes on its full significance and relevance.

J.G.
Les Avenires
September 11, 1976

If the study of classical China has long remained a European domain, that of contemporary China owes its best and most numerous works to the younger field of American sinology. This is particularly true in the area of monographs and specialized research. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the American public will also pay heed to a book written by a European, by a Frenchman whose diverse diplomatic, military, academic, and even journalistic activities over forty years have resulted in a continuous association with Chinese history.

This long and direct experience has led me to encompass more than a quarter of a century in a single studythe period from the establishment of the new regime in Peking on October 1,1949, to the beginning of 1976. It so happens that this quarter of a century more or less corresponds to the rule of the first generation of Chinese Communists, the generation that gained power in twenty-five years through a combination of political and military action. This generation is coming to an end. In a short space of time some of its most remarkable representativesChou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu, K'ang Shenghave died, leaving behind only Mao Tse-tung (aged eighty-three), Chu Teh (ninety), Teng Hsiao-p'ing (seventy-two), Yeh Chien-ying (seventy-seven), Li Hsien-nien (seventy-one), and several others who are at least in their seventies.

And already there is a changing of the guard. An unknown, Hua Kuo-feng, marches in as the new premier and deputy premier of the Central Committee. He clearly occupies position number one after Mao Tse-tung. Teng Hsiao-p'ing has been relegated to the rank and file. Behind him a few veterans hang onto their positions, but apparently certain elements and their followers who came to the fore during the cultural revolution are crowding in. We recognize Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Hung-wen, Yao Wen-yuan, and even Mao's wife. A three-pronged problem already disturbs diplomats and analysts. Who will emerge as the true heirs of Mao Tse-tung?

Of course, this book does not attempt to predict what lies ahead. But it does seek to assemble and organize as much information as possible about conditions today, and in this sense it casts light on the future. Even if that future remains obscure, it is at least possible to identify the huge and complex problems that already condition it and that will continue to bedevil the new leaders, whoever they may be and whatever individual orientations they may have within the common ideology.

Among China's problems, the demographic problem is certainly the most important and the one about which the least is known. However incredible it may seem, within a margin of 50 to 100 million people no one is sure just what China's population is. The 583 million people counted on the mainland at the time of the official census of 1953 became 656 million in about 1957, and the approximate figure of 800 million is frequently cited today. In 1973, however, Chou En-lai noted that the rate of population increase was about 2 percent. Noted demographers, including John Aird of the U.S. Department of Commerce, have estimated the 1976 population at about 953 million Chinese, which means that the 1990 figure would be around 1.3 billion. In view of the limited amount of arable land available in China and the attendant limitations on agricultural yield, and considering China's industrial backwardness, the country must rapidly reduce its rate of demographic growth and stabilize its population at the level of about a billion people, well before the end of the century.

The second problem, closely linked with the first, is that of economic development. This is particularly important in the field of agriculture, as measured by grain production, for the Chinese diet is almost entirely vegetarian. The current grain production of 280 million tons a year translates into a per capita yield of about 0.3 tons, which is roughly what it was in 1957; thus, the rise in production has about kept pace with the increase in population. Nevertheless, since 1960 the Chinese have found it necessary to import grain. We know that the norms of the twelve-year plan for agriculture (1956-1967) were achieved in only a third of the districts (hsien) in 1975. The plan, which should have produced between 350 and 450 million tons of grain starting in 1967, is thus at least 100 million tons and eight or nine years behind where it should be. China has only another fifteen or twenty years to win the race between population pressure and food production.